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A CRITICAL STUDY OF MENCIUS' PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN NATURE,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO KANT AND CONFUCIUS
INTRODUCTION
I t  seems obvious th a t  th e re  i s  a c lo se  r e la t io n s h ip  between 
human n a tu re  and human a c t io n . But th e re  a re ,  in  g e n e ra l, two ways to  
in v e s t ig a te  t h i s  r e la t io n s h ip .  The one way i s  to  look a t  human a c tio n  in  
term s of human n a tu re , and i t  i s  u s u a lly  c a lle d  a ph ilosophy  of human 
n a tu re . For in s ta n c e , i f  man i s  fundam entally  good, he w i l l  tend to  do 
good th in g s  r a th e r  than  e v i l  th in g s , and i f  he i s  fundam entally  e v i l ,  he 
w i l l  tend to  do e v i l  th in g s  r a th e r  than good th in g s . In  t h i s  s p i r i t  many 
p h ilo so p h e rs  in  th e  E ast as w e ll as in  the  West have t r i e d  to  e x p la in  th e  
complex v a r ie ty  o f human a c tio n  in  term s o f some theo ry  of human n a tu re .
The o th e r way i s  to  look  a t  human a c tio n  f i r s t  and to  base  any assessm ent 
of human n a tu re , w hether i t  be judged good, e v i l ,  o r n e u t r a l ,  on human 
a c tio n .
M encius' ph ilo sophy  re p re s e n ts  a ty p ic a l  form of ph ilosophy of 
human n a tu re , f o r  i t  i s  b u i l t  on one t h e s i s ,  namely, th e  o r ig in a l  goodness 
of human n a tu re . H is whole philosophy  can indeed be summarized in  one 
sen tence; Every man should do h i s  b e s t  to  develop h i s  o r ig in a l  good n a tu re  
to  th e  u tm ost, and i f  he lo se s  i t ,  he should a lso  do h i s  b e s t  to  recover 
i t .  But I  say i t  r e p re s e n ts  one form of philosophy of human n a tu re  because
th e re  a re  many d i f f e r e n t  v e rs io n s . For in s ta n c e , i t  may be t h e i s t i c ,  
a t h e i s t i c  o r n o n th e is t i c .  But a l l  such v a r ia t io n s  have one c h a r a c te r i s t ic  
in  common; th ey  a llow  no excep tion  to  a u n iv e rs a l  c h a ra c te r iz a tio n  of 
human n a tu re . Indeed , th e  main f e a tu re  of a l l  philosophy of human n a tu re  
i s  i t s  claim  of u n iv e r s a l i ty .
A ccord ing ly , M encius' ph ilosophy p re se n ts  us a  very  a t t r a c t iv e  
p ic tu r e ;  i f  we know e x a c tly  what human n a tu re  i s ,  then we can e a s i ly  ex­
p la in  why and how man does one th in g  r a th e r  than  a n o th e r , and, in  a d d it io n , 
why and how man ought to  do one th in g  r a th e r  than  i t s  o p p o s ite . Thus 
M encius' th eo ry  of human n a tu re  seems to  enab le  us to  ex p la in  what doing 
good means, why man ought to  do good r a th e r  than e v i l ,  and how man could 
do good. But I  hope to  show in  t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n  th a t  M encius' p h i lo s ­
ophy i s  u l t im a te ly  a f a i l u r e  because i t  i s  based on a th eo ry  of human na­
tu re  which i t s e l f  cannot be c o n c lu s iv e ly  e s ta b l is h e d  e i th e r  e m p ir ic a lly  or 
n o n e m p iric a lly , and because i t s  claim  of u n iv e r s a l i ty  based on such an in ­
c o n c lu s iv e  th eo ry  of human n a tu re  cannot th e re fo re  be j u s t i f i e d .
For t h i s  pu rpose , in  the  f i r s t  chap ter of t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n  I  w i l l  
e x p la in  what Mencius means by h i s  th eo ry  of human n a tu re  because many d i f ­
f e r e n t  view s on th e  th eo ry  have been o f fe re d . I  w i l l  then d isc u ss  M encius' 
own argum ents advanced to  defend the  th eo ry . My c o n ten tio n  w i l l  be th a t  
Mencius has f a i l e d  to  e s ta b l is h  the o r ig in a l  goodness of human n a tu re .
In  o rder to  ex p lo re  the  inadequacy of M encius' ph ilosophy of 
human n a tu re ,  in  th e  second ch ap te r of t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n  I  w i l l  make r e f ­
erence to  K a n t's  e f f o r t s  to  j u s t i f y  h i s  own "sc ie n ce  of m o ra l i ty ."  Kant 
ta lk s  r e l a t i v e ly  l i t t l e  about human n a tu re , except in  one chap ter of R e li­
g ion  W ithin the  L im its  of Reason A lone. So i t  seems s a fe  to  conclude th a t  
he does n o t advocate  any form of ph ilosophy of human n a tu re .^  In f a c t ,  he
says th a t  we cannot s e n s ib ly  d isc u ss  human n a tu re  as such, fo r  such a
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d isc u ss io n  cannot be f u l l y  based on ex p e rien ce . A ll we can t a lk  about
i s  human " p re d isp o s itio n s "  toward good and human " p ro p e n s it ie s "  toward
e v i l .  Nor i s  he much in te r e s te d  in  ex p la in in g  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between
human n a tu re  and human a c tio n . He i s  p r im a rily  concerned w ith  e s ta b l is h in g
th e  "g en e ra l co n d itio n "  of m oral a c tio n  and of th e  sc ien ce  of m o ra lity
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based on such a c tio n .
N e v e rth e le ss , our re fe re n c e  to  Kant w i l l  be v e ry  u s e fu l  in  ex­
p lo rin g  the  inadequacy of M encius' philosophy of human n a tu re , fo r  the  
fo llow ing  rea so n s . In  the  Foundations of the  M etaphysics of M orals Kant 
t r i e s  to  j u s t i f y  the  u n iv e r s a l i ty  and n e c e s s i ty  o f a supreme m oral p r in ­
c ip le ,  nam ely, a c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e , in  a way s im ila r  to  th a t  in  which 
Mencius t r i e s  to  j u s t i f y  th e  u n iv e r s a l i ty  of h is  th eo ry  of human n a tu re .
As I  w i l l  ex p la in  l a t e r ,  th e re  a re  in  f a c t  s t r ik in g  s im i l a r i t i e s  between 
th e i r  argum ents, a lthough  what they  want to  e s ta b l i s h  (prove) i s  v e ry  d i f ­
f e r e n t  from one a n o th e r . K a n t 's  e f f o r t s  to  p rov ide  an a p o d ic tic  j u s t i f i ­
c a tio n  fo r  a c a te g o r ic a l  Im perative  w i l l  th e re fo re  shed some l i g h t  on our 
u nderstand ing  e x a c tly  what M encius' arguments a r e ,  in  what manner they 
a re  o f fe re d , and on what assum ptions, i f  any, they  a re  based . In  o th e r  
words, Kant w i l l  fu n c tio n  as a c a ta ly s t  in  our understand ing  and evalu ­
a tin g  M encius' philosophy of human n a tu re .
I  w i l l  compare K a n t 's  " a n a ly t ic a l"  argument w ith  M encius' "psy­
ch o lo g ic a l"  argument and K a n t 's  " s y n th e tic a l"  argument w ith  M encius'
" h ig h e r -p r in c ip le "  argum ent. By th i s  com parative study  I  hope to  show in  
th e  end th a t  M encius' theo ry  of human n a tu re  i s  n o t j u s t i f i e d  and th a t  
h is  ph ilosophy based on th i s  in s u f f ic i e n t  theo ry  i s  a ls o  n o t j u s t i f i e d .
I  w i l l  argue by re fe re n c e  to  Kant th a t  th e re  a re  s u f f i c i e n t  grounds to  
conclude th a t  M encius' ph ilosophy  does n o t answer the main q u es tio n  
which Mencius was determ ined to  s o lv e , nam ely, why man ought to  do good 
and a c t  m orally  a t  a l l .
I f  M encius' ph ilosophy  i s  in ad eq u a te , i s  th e re  any o th e r way we 
can e x p la in  in  e th ic a l  term s, a t  l e a s t  to  some d eg ree , th e  com plicated 
human a c tio n , and, i f  so , what a re  the  main c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  of t h i s  a l ­
te r n a t iv e  philosophy? In  search ing  fo r  t h i s  a l t e r n a t iv e  I  w i l l  tu rn  to  
Confucius in  th e  th ird  ch ap te r of t h i s  d i s s e r t a t io n .  Confucius was a man
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of a c tio n , and h is  ph ilosophy  re p re s e n ts  a form of ph ilosophy of a c tio n . 
He was always in te r e s te d  in  human a c tio n  as such , and was n o t much i n t e r ­
e s te d  in  any s p e c u la tiv e  th eo ry  of human n a tu re . My c o n te n tio n  w i l l  be 
th a t  th e  k ind  of philosophy Confucius m ight be taken to  have advocated^— 
l e t  u s c a l l  i t  C onfucius' ph ilosophy  of a c tio n —i s  more adequate than  
M encius' philosophy of human n a tu re ,  and th a t  th e  main f e a tu re  of 
C onfucius ' philosophy may be c h a ra c te r iz e d  as  th e  " p o s i t io n  of many 
c r i t e r i a . " ^
So f a r ,  I  have given my re a d e rs  th e  im pression  th a t  th e re  a re  
two v a lid  p h ilo so p h ie s , namely, M encius' ph ilosophy  of human n a tu re  and 
C onfucius ' philosophy of a c tio n . But I  w i l l  argue in  th e  f i n a l  chap ter 
of t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n  th a t  i t  i s  m islead ing  to  say th a t  th e re  a re  two d i f ­
f e r e n t  k inds of sound p h ilo so p h ie s  and y e t th a t  one i s  more a p p ro p ria te  
than th e  o th e r . On th e  c o n tra ry , I  w i l l  argue th a t  M encius' e f f o r t  to 
ex p la in  com plicated human a c tio n  in  term s o f h is  theo ry  of human n a tu re  
i s  a  f a i l u r e ,  n o t only because h i s  ph ilosophy  cannot ex p la in  s u c c e s s fu lly  
\7hy man ought to  do good, bu t because i t  cannot ex p la in  how man could do
good. R ather than  in du lg ing  in  an a b s tr a c t  th eo ry  of human n a tu re , which 
cannot be v in d ic a te d  e i th e r  d e d u c tiv e ly  or in d u c t iv e ly , we should base 
our in q u iry  of human a c tio n  on human a c tio n  i t s e l f ,  however d i f f i c u l t  i t  
may be .
Of c o u rse , t h i s  does n o t mean th a t  th e re  i s  only one d e fe n s ib le  
ph ilosophy  of a c t io n , i . e . ,  th e  one which i s  rep re sen te d  by Confucius and 
which i s  b ased , n o t on any theory  of human n a tu re , bu t on what human beings 
do . I t  means a t  l e a s t  th a t  C onfucius ' ph ilosophy  may be one a l te r n a t iv e  
to  M encius' ph ilo sophy , and th is  i s  why I w i l l  d isc u ss  Confucius as a 
search  fo r  an a l t e r n a t iv e  r a th e r  than as  an a c tu a l  a l t e r n a t iv e  to  Mencius.
INTRODUCTION FOOTNOTES
^One m ight argue th a t  the  " r a t io n a l  human be ing" to  whom K a n t's  
e th ic s  i s  addressed i s  a k ind  of c h a ra c te r iz a t io n  of human n a tu re . But 
I  say he does n o t advocate any form of ph ilo sophy  of human n a tu re  sim ply 
because  he does n o t base  h is  d isc u s s io n  of man on the  goodness or e v i l  
of human n a tu re , as i t  has been done in  C hinese ph ilosophy .
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This s ta tem en t needs m odify ing , fo r  Kant ta lk s  a l o t  about the  
a p r io r i  elem ents involved  in  e x p e rien ce . As I  w i l l  ex p la in  l a t e r ,  the 
p o in t  i s  th a t  any theo ry  of human n a tu re ,  i f  i t  i s  to  be v a l id ,  must be 
based on some a p r io r i  in fe re n c e  r a th e r  than  in d u c tiv e  in fe re n c e . See 
Immanuel K ant, R e lig io n  W ithin th e  L im its  of Reason A lone, t r a n s .  by 
Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. H arper Torchbooks, New York, 1960, 
o r ig in a l ly  pub lished  in  t h i s  E n g lish  t r a n s la t io n  in  1934, p . 17.
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In  the  in tro d u c tio n  to  th e  second ch ap te r I  w i l l  t a lk  more 
about th e  c ru c ia l  d if f e re n c e s  betw een Kant and M encius.
^The words "a c tio n "  o r "ph ilosophy  of a c tio n "  have become 
troublesom e term s in  ph ilosophy . But in  t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n  I  c a l l  C onfucius ' 
ph ilo sophy  a ph ilosophy of a c tio n  sim ply because  i t  i s  n o t based  on any 
th eo ry  of human n a tu re  b u t on what human be in g s T his i s  why I  c a l l
i t ,  n o t sim ply a philosophy  of a c t io n , b u t C onfucius ' ph ilo sophy  of 
a c tio n .
^ I  use th e  ph rase  "Confucius m ight be taken  to  have advocated" 
b ecau se , a s  I  w i l l  ex p la in  l a t e r ,  t h i s  way of look ing  a t  Confucius i s  
r a d ic a l ly  d i f f e r e n t  from the  t r a d i t i o n a l  in te r p r e ta t io n  th a t  th e re  i s  
l i t t l e  or no d if fe re n c e  between C onfucius and Mencius on the  problem  of 
human n a tu re  and human a c tio n .
^This i s  n o t to  say t h a t ,  acco rd ing  to  C onfucius, we can ex p la in  
human a c tio n  by human a c t io n , w ith o u t in v o lv in g  any th eo ry  of human a c tio n . 
As I  w i l l  e x p la in  l a t e r ,  th e  p o in t i s  th a t  i t  i s  f u t i l e  to  a ttem p t to  
e x p la in  a l l  com plicated human a c tio n  s o le ly  in  term s of M encius' theo ry  
of human n a tu re .
CHAPTER I  
MENCIUS' PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN NATURE 
In tro d u c tio n
M encius' ph ilosophy  i s  based on what we may c a l l  "M encius' 
t h e s i s , "  nam ely, h i s  th eo ry  of human n a tu re . But e x a c tly  what Mencius 
means by h i s  th e s i s  i s  n o t c le a r .  Many d i f f e r e n t  view s on h i s  th e s is  
have been o f fe r e d , perhaps because the  th e s i s  i t s e l f  roav be t r a n s la te d  
in to  many d i f f e r e n t  v e rs io n s  which a re  a l l  gram m atically  c o r re c t  but 
have d i f f e r e n t  nuances and even d i f f e r e n t  m eanings. For in s ta n c e , i t  
may be t r a n s la te d  as  th a t  man i s  by n a tu re  good, or th a t  a l l  men have a 
good n a tu r e .^
In o rd er to  understand  what Mencius means by h is  th e s i s ,  I  w i l l  
f i r s t  rev iew  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  two w idely  kno;m in te r p r e ta t io n s  of the  
t h e s i s ,  and argue t h a t ,  a lthough  th ese  i n te r p r e ta t io n s  a re  n o t w ithout 
some m e r i t ,  they  m iss th e  main p o in t by f a i l i n g  to tak e  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  
the  " p h ilo s o p h ic a l  demand" which prompted Mencius to  consider the  prob­
lem of human n a tu re  and i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  human a c tio n  in  the  f i r s t  p lac e .
What i s  then  th e  c o r re c t  meaning of M encius' th e s is ?  Of cou rse , 
i t  does n o t mean th a t  man i s  born a sage or a m ora lly  im peccable being .
Nor does i t  mean th a t  th e re  i s  n o th ing  man need do in  order to  become a 
" su p e r io r  man" or a man of v i r t u e .  I t  means, I  w i l l  argue , th a t  every
7
man i s  bom  w ith  the "seeds" or "beg inn ings" o f good, vdiich must be c u l­
t iv a te d  and developed i f  he i s  to  become a c tu a l ly  good. Furtherm ore, i t  
i s  th ese  seeds th a t  d i f f e r e n t i a te  man from o th e r  c re a tu re s ,  and i t  i s  
only through th e  c u l t iv a t io n  and developm ent of th ese  seeds th a t  man i s  
t r u ly  "man."
In  o rder to  document my in te r p r e ta t io n  of M encius' t h e s i s ,  in  
the f i n a l  s e c tio n s  of t h i s  chap ter I  w i l l  tu rn  to  M encius' main work.
Book of M encius, and in tro d u c e  th e  two main arguments he o f f e r s  to  show 
th e  v a l id i t y  of h is  th e s i s .  The c r i t i c a l  exam ination of th ese  arguments 
w i l l  be given in  th e  n e x t c h a p te r . In  t h i s  ch ap te r I  w i l l  say more about 
what Mencius means by h i s  th e s is  than how he t r i e s  to  j u s t i f y  i t .
C r e e l 's  I n te r p r e ta t io n
According to  C ree l, "Mencius b e lie v ed  th a t  a l l  men were born
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w ith  the  same k ind  of human n a tu re , and th a t  human n a tu re  i s  good." But 
to  understand  what i t  means to  say th a t  human n a tu re  i s  good. C ree l f i r s t  
says th a t  M encius' th e s i s  "has o f te n  been approached from th e  wrong d i ­
re c t io n "  by re a d e rs  who beg in  w ith  an a n a ly s is  of th e  term  "human n a tu re ."  
C ree l thus suggests  th a t  we should in s te a d  s t a r t  w ith  th e  term  "good."
What does the term  "good" as i t  appears in  M encius' th e s i s  mean? I t  
means, accord ing  to  C re e l, " th a t  which i s  most congruent w ith  human na- 
tu r e ."  For example, "food th a t  g ives one a stomach ache i s  n o t 'good ' 
food. Hay i s  good food fo r  an ox, b u t no t fo r  man, because i t  does no t 
s u i t  h is  n a tu re . A way of l i f e  th a t  allow s only  two hours ou t of the
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tw enty-four fo r  s leep  i s  n o t good, fo r  th e  same re a so n ."
C reel then argues th a t  Mencius ex tends t h i s  sim ple n o tio n  of 
"good" to  the  realm  of m o ra lity . In  h is  d isc u ss io n  o f human n a tu re
Mencius f i r s t  observes th a t  "men's m ouths, e a rs  and eyes a re  made a lik e  
and have s im ila r  l ik e s  and d i s l ik e s "  and then  from t h i s  o b se rv a tio n  "he 
reaso n s th a t  t h e i r  minds should approve s im ila r  m oral p r in c ip le s . By 
tak in g  the term "good" in  th is  way. C reel f i n a l ly  concludes th a t  M encius' 
th e s i s  i s  a s o r t  of ta u to lo g ic a l  s ta te m e n t, i . e . ,  th a t  human n a tu re  i s  
most congruent w ith  human n a tu re , or th a t  human n a tu re  i s  most in  harmony 
w ith  human n a tu re , or th a t  human n a tu re  i s  human n a tu re . C reel s ta t e s :  
"Thus when Mencius says th a t  human n a tu re  i s  good he i s  in  some degree 
speaking ta u to lo g ic a l ly , because in  th e  l a s t  a n a ly s is  he seems to  mean, 
by th e  'g o o d ,' t h a t  which i s  in  harmony w ith  human n a tu re ." ^
On th i s  i n te r p r e ta t io n ,  M encius' th e s i s  cannot be wrong because 
" th a t  i t  i s  good" has been made a p a r t  of th e  meaning of "human n a tu re ,"  
and i t  i s  thus a c o n tra d ic t io n  to  speak of human n a tu re  which i s  n o t good. 
But in  t h i s  case  we reduce M encius' th e s is  to  an empty ta u to lo g y , which 
i s  of course  n e c e s s a r i ly  t r u e ,  bu t i t s  t r u th  i s  t r i v i a l .  F i r s t  of a l l ,  
no ta u to lo g ic a l  p ro p o s itio n  can prove any th ing  o th e r  than  i t s e l f  or some 
o th e r ta u to lo g y . But as I  w i l l  show l a t e r  in  t h i s  c h a p te r , Mencius o f­
f e r s  h i s  theo ry  of human n a tu re  in  o rd er to  ex p la in  "why" man ought to 
do good r a th e r  than e v i l .  And no ta u to lo g ic a l  p ro p o s it io n  can a ffo rd  
such an e x p la n a tio n , fo r  a tau to lo g y  canno t, by i t s e l f ,  imply a non- 
t a u to lo g ic a l  p ro p o s itio n .
Secondly, C re e l 's  t r a n s i t io n  from o rd in a ry  goodness ( e .g . ,  good 
food o r a good l i f e )  to  m oral goodness does n o t seem to  be j u s t i f i e d .
The ch ap te r of the  Book of Mencius from which C ree l quo tes a passage to  
support h is  own in te r p r e ta t io n  of M encius' th e s i s  ru n s  as fo llo w s:
Mencius s a id , " In  good years  the  c h ild re n  of th e  peop le  a re  most of
them good, w h ile  in  bad years  the  most of them abandon them selves to
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e v i l .  I t  i s  n o t owing to  any d if f e re n c e  o f t h e i r  n a tu r a l  powers
con fe rred  by Heaven th a t  they  a re  d i f f e r e n t .  The abandonment i s
owing to  th e  c ircum stances through which they  a llow  th e i r  minds to  
be ensnared and drowned in  e v i l . . . . Thus a l l  th in g s  which a re  the  
same in  k ind  a re  l ik e  to  one another;-w I should we doubt in  regard  
to  man, as i f  he were a s o l i t a r y  ex cep tio n  to  th is ?  The sage and we 
a re  th e  same in  k in d . . . . Men's mouths ag ree  in  having  th e  same 
r e l i s h e s ;  t h e i r  e a rs  ag ree  in  en joy ing  th e  same sounds; t h e i r  eyes
agree in  reco g n is in g  the same b e a u ty :-S h a ll  th e i r  minds a lone  be
w ithou t th a t  which they  s im i la r ly  approve? I t  i s ,  I  say , th e  p r in ­
c ip le  of our n a tu r e , and the d e te rm in a tio n s  of r ig h te o u sn e ss . The 
sages only  apprehend b e fo re  me th a t  of which my mind approves along  
w ith o th e r men. T h erefo re  the  p r in c ip le  of our n a tu re  and th e  d e te r ­
m ina tions of r ig h te o u sn e ss  a re  a g re e a b le  to  my mind, j u s t  as the  
f le s h  of g ra ss  and g ra in - fe d  an im als i s  ag reeab le  to  my mouth.^
Now when Mencius ta lk s  about human n a tu re , he uses the words 
"good" ( - ^  ) o r  " e v i l"  ( & ) .  These words do n o t appear in  th e  ch ap te r
O  /v l‘
quoted above, a lthough  in  th e  t r a n s la te d  v e rs io n  they appear many tim es.
/Is?
For in s ta n c e , the  "good y e a rs"  in  th e  above ch ap te r a re  " r ic h  ( ^  ) 
y e a r s ."  " c h ild re n  o f the  peop le  a re  good" means t h a t  they  a re  "depend­
a b le "  ( ) ,  "bad y e a rs"  a re  "poor ( l ) [ J )  y e a r s ,"  "abandon them selves
to  e v i l "  means sim ply "self-abandonm ent" ) , and "drowned in  e v i l"
r e f e r s  th is  se lf-abandonm ent. Of c o u rse , the  f i n a l  passage of the  chap­
t e r  in d ic a te s  th a t  m oral goodness—th e  p r in c ip le  of our n a tu re  and the 
d e te rm in a tio n s  of r ig h te o u sn e s s , w hatever they  may be—i s  a g re e a b le  to  
our mind, j u s t  as nonmoral goodness i s  to  our body. But the  word 
"ag reeab le"  ( )  used in  t h i s  passage i s  again  d i f f e r e n t  from "good." 
Thus i t  may be in fe r re d  th a t  Mencius makes a d i s t i n c t io n  between m oral 
goodness and nonmoral goodness.
Furtherm ore, i f  we c a re f u l ly  examine th e  whole ch ap te r from 
which we quoted above, we f in d  th a t  Mencius h e re  o f fe r s  an " a n t iq u i ty  
argum ent," which may be summarized in  two s te p s ,  (a) We o f te n  b e lie v e  
th a t  men a re  by n a tu re  d i f f e r e n t ,  fo r  we f in d  th a t  they  a re  in  f a c t
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d i f f e r e n t .  But t h i s  d if f e re n c e  in  f a c t  i s  n o t due to  " th e i r  n a tu r a l  
powers c o n fe rred  by H eaven," b u t due to  " th e  c ircum stances through which 
they  allow  t h e i r  minds to  be ensnared  and drowned in  e v i l . "  So i t  f o l -
O
lows th a t  even " th e  sage and we a re  the  same in  k in d ."  (b) Now " a l l
th in g s  th a t  a re  the  same in  k ind  a re  l ik e  to  one a n o th e r ."  T h is  means
th a t  th e  n a tu re  of o rd in a ry  men, l ik e  th a t  of o ld  sag es , i s  a ls o  good.
In s h o r t ,  what Mencius i s  say ing  in  th is  c h ap te r i s  th a t  " th e  sage and
we a re  th e  same in  k in d ,"  n o t th a t  m oral goodness and nonmoral goodness
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a re  th e  same in  k ind .
To sum up: C re e l’s in te r p r e ta t io n  o f M encius' th e s is  as a
tau to lo g y  i s  n o t j u s t i f i e d  fo r  two re a so n s . F i r s t  of a l l ,  even i f  we 
accep t h is  a s s e r t io n  th a t  m an's nonmoral goodness ( e . g . ,  good food) i s  
fo r  Mencius n o th in g  b u t what i s  most congruent w ith  human n a tu re , i t  does 
n o t fo llo w  from th is  th a t  m an's m oral goodness ( e . g . , good n a tu re  or v i r ­
tu e) i s  a ls o  what i s  most congruent w ith  human n a t u r e . B u t  more impor­
t a n t ly ,  a s  I  w i l l  show in  the  nex t s e c t io n , Mencius o f fe r s  h i s  th e s i s  as 
an answer to  th e  q u e s tio n  why man ought to  do good, and no ta u to lo g ic a l  
p ro p o s it io n  can a ffo rd  such an answ er.
L egge 's  I n te r p r e ta t io n  
The secondly  w idely  known in te r p r e ta t io n  of M encius' th e s i s  i s  
b e s t  re p re se n te d  by James Legge, who t r a n s la te d  many Chinese c la s s ic s  in ­
to  E ng lish  fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e in  h i s to r y .  According to  Legge, th e  co r­
r e c t  meaning of M encius' th e s i s  i s  th a t  man i s  "made f o r , "  "formed f o r ,"  
"designed fo r"  or " c o n s t i tu te d  fo r"  th e  p r a c t ic e  of good ( v i r t u e ) . We 
o f te n  b e lie v e  th a t  man i s  made fo r  the  p r a c t ic e  of e v i l  (v ice ) because 
man does in  f a c t  many e v i l  th in g s . But in  h i s  o r ig in a l  s t a t e  man i s  made
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to  do good r a th e r  than  e v i l .  Ifhen Mencius says th a t  human n a tu re  i s
good, he i s  th e re fo re  "speaking of our n a tu re  in  i t s  id e a l  and n o t as i t
a c tu a l ly  is ." ^ ^
To support t h i s  in te r p r e ta t io n  Legge argues t h a t ,  accord ing  to
M encius, human n a tu re  i s  such th a t  a l l  men have fou r k in d s of in n a te
f e e l in g s  which a re  to  se rve  as the  " p r in c ip le s "  o f m o ra lity . That i s ,
th e  f e e l in g  of com m iseration i s  the  p r in c ip le  of benevolence; th e  fe e lin g
of shame and d i s l i k e  i s  the  p r in c ip le  of r ig h te o u sn e ss ; the f e e l in g  of
modesty and com plaisance i s  th e  p r in c ip le  of p ro p r ie ty ;  and th e  fe e lin g
13of approving and d isapp rov ing  i s  the p r in c ip le  o f knowledge. On the
o th e r  hand, t h i s  does n o t mean th a t  we should  " l e t  every one q u ie t ly  f o l -  
14low t h e i r  n a tu r e ." While a l l  men have such n a tu r a l  f e e l in g s ,  th e i r  
a c tio n s  o f te n  "do n o t come up to  th e  whole o f what t h e i r  n a tu re  lead s  
them to  do" or even " v io la te "  th e i r  n a tu re  to  a g re a t  e x t e n t , o f  course 
n o t because of any in n a te  e v i l  n a tu re ,  bu t because of some e v i l  e x te rn a l  
in f lu e n c e s . Mencius thus e m p h a tica lly  u rg e s , says Legge, th a t  "where 
v i r tu e s  a re  in  q u e s tio n , we a re  to  be s t r iv in g  a f t e r  them n o tw ith stan d in g  
adverse  and opposing c ircu m stan ces ."^ ^  In  o th e r  w ords, Mencius knew very  
w e ll th a t  man w ith  n a tu ra l  f e e l in g s  i s  n o t y e t  m ora lly  good. These f e e l ­
in g s  must be c u l t iv a te d  and developed i f  he i s  to  become a c tu a l ly  good.
I t  fo llow s th a t  Mencius r e f e r s  to  human n a tu re  as an id e a l ,  n o t a s  i t  
a c tu a l ly  i s .  He ta lk s  about human n a tu re  "as i t  ought to  be and no t as 
i t  i s  made to  become.
Legge then compares M encius' th eo ry  of human n a tu re  w ith  th a t  
o f C h r is t ia n  m o ra l is ts .  A lthough many C h r is t ia n s  would reg a rd  M encius' 
th e s i s  as a stum bling b lock  o r som ething e n t i r e ly  a n ta g o n is t ic  to
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C h r is t ia n i ty ,  Legge say s, i t  i s  q u i te  c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  C h r is t ia n  view 
18of man. F i r s t  of a l l ,  i t  i s  a lso  a C h r is t ia n  b e l i e f  th a t  man i s  b a s i ­
c a lly  formed f o r  v i r tu e ,  because , although man i s  f a l l e n ,  says Legge,
"h is  n a tu re  s t i l l  b ea rs  i t s  testim ony , when p ro p e rly  in te r ro g a te d ,
19a g a in s t a l l  u n rig h te o u sn e ss ."  This i s  why S t. Paul d e c la re d  th a t  a
20G en tile  w ithou t th e  law i s  s t i l l  a law to  h im se lf . Secondly, C h ris ­
t ia n s  b e lie v e  th a t  " th e re  i s  none th a t  does good; no, not o ne ."  Mencius 
would deny t h i s ,  c laim ing  th a t  th e  o ld  sages should be exempted from the
g e n e ra liz a tio n , bu t he would adm it th a t  "men in  g e n e ra l do e v i l  and v io -
21l a t e  th e  law of t h e i r  n a tu re ."  F in a l ly ,  Mencius s tro n g ly  b e lie v e s  th a t
22a l l  men can become a sage, and t h i s  b e l ie f  i s ,  accord ing  to  Legge, un­
doubtedly  id e n t ic a l  w ith  C h r is t ia n  d o c tr in e s  of u n iv e rs a l  s a lv a t io n .
On th e  o th e r hand, Legge charges th a t  M encius' theo ry  of human
23n a tu re  i s  "d e fe c tiv e  r a th e r  than  erroneous" because i t  "wants an elem ent
24which R evela tion  s u p p lie s ."  His theo ry  undoubtedly  su p p lie s  a law of
conduct, but t h i s  law, says Legge, "g ives  only th e  knowledge of what we
25a re  re q u ire d  to  do; i t  does n o t g ive th e  power to  do i t . "  By c o n ta in ­
ing  "no acknowledgment of th e  u n iv e rsa l proneness to  e v i l"  and f a i l in g  
to  tak e  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  th e  e s s e n t ia l  power o f God's r e v e la t io n , 
which enab les us to  f ig h t  a g a in s t  e v i l ,  M encius' id e a l  o f developing 
m an's o r ig in a l  good n a tu re  to  f u l l  e f fe c tiv e n e s s  rem ains, fo r  Legge, 
m erely an id e a l .  He s ta t e s :
However we may s t r i v e  a f t e r  our id e a l ,  we do n o t succeed in  reach ing  
i t .  The more we grow in  the  knowledge of C h r is t ,  and see  in  him the  
g lo ry  of hum anity in  i t s  t ru e  s t a t e ,  th e  g re a te r  do we f e e l  our own 
d is ta n c e  to  be from i t ,  and th a t  of o u rse lv es  we cannot a t t a i n  i t .  
There i s  something wrong about u s; we need help  from w ithou t in  o rder 
to  become even what our n a tu re , a p a rt from R e v e la tio n , t e l l s  us we 
ought to  do. (Emphasis i s  m ine.)
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When Mencius says th a t  every  man can become a p e r fe c t  sage who i s  l iv in g
in  lo v e , w alking in  r ig h te o u sn e ss , fo llow ing  the r u le  of p ro p r ie ty ,  and
always approving good and d isapprov ing  e v i l ,  he i s  thus "pushing h is
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d o c tr in e  beyond i t s  p roper l im i t s ," "  because he f a i l s  to  see  th a t  i t  i s
only  through the  g race  of God th a t  man can be p e r f e c t .  I t  i s  indeed a
" b r i l l i a n t  and u n s u b s ta n t ia l  phantasm" to  b e lie v e  th a t  men "have m erely
to  s e t  about fo llow ing  th e i r  n a tu re , and t h a t ,  w ithou t any a id  from w ith -
28o u t, they  w i l l  su re ly  and e a s i ly  go on to  p e r f e c t io n ."
There a re  some u n c le a r  p o in ts  in  L egge 's in te r p r e ta t io n  o f
M encius' th e s i s .  For example, i t  i s  n o t c le a r  how our p a ss io n  i s  r e la te d
to  our in n a te  f e e l in g s .  Nor i s  i t  c le a r  in  what way M encius' th e s i s  i s
29"as  n e a r ly  as  p o s s ib le , id e n t ic a l  w ith" th e  C h r is t ia n  view of man. But 
in  the  fo llow ing  I  w i l l  in d ic a te  one im portan t p o in t  which Legge f a i l s  
to  ta k e  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  in  h is  d isc u ss io n  of M encius' th eo ry  of human 
n a tu re .
W ithin a C h r is t ia n  c o n te x t, doing good i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  p re s c r ip ­
t i v e ,  no t d e s c r ip t iv e .  What i t  r e a l ly  means i s  th a t  we should  o r ought 
to  do good, and in  o rder to  do good, we "need help  from w ith o u t."  In  the  
same manner, Legge b e lie v e s  th a t  M encius' th e s is  i s  a ls o  a p r e s c r ip t iv e  
p ro p o s it io n  th a t  we ought to  be/do  good. And th i s  i s  why he says in  one
p la c e  th a t  human n a tu re  i s ,  fo r  M encius, formed such th a t  v i r t u e  r a th e r
30than  v ic e  "ought to  be suprem e." Of co u rse , i t  might be t ru e  th a t  man 
can become a  sage only through th e  g race of Cod, b u t to  i n te r p r e t  M encius' 
th e s i s  in  t h i s  p r e s c r ip t iv e  way i s  a m istake . For Mencius b e lie v e s  th a t  
he o f fe r s  h i s  th e s is  as a d e s c r ip tiv e  p ro p o s it io n , namely, as an ex p la ­
n a tio n  to  show vrtiy man ought to  do good a t  a l l .
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How can h i s  th e s i s  se rv e  t h i s  purpose? In o rd er to  re p ly  to  
t h i s  q u e s tio n , we need f i r s t  to  d isc u ss  what we may c a l l  "a p h ilo so p h ic a l 
and p e rso n a l demand" which fo rced  Mencius to  r e f l e c t  on the  problem of 
human n a tu re  in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e . Confucius devoted h i s  l i f e  to  t r a n s ­
form ing man in to  a " su p e r io r  man" or a man of m o ra lity . But he d id  n o t 
e x p la in  e x a c tly  why every  in d iv id u a l  should be a m oral person . Why 
should every  in d iv id u a l  do good r a th e r  than  e v il?  Confucius did no t say 
th a t  i t  was because of e x te rn a l  rew ards such as su c ce ss , r ic h e s ,  h igh 
p o s i t io n ,  e t c . ,  o r even im m o rta lity . What in  the  world i s  i t  t h a t  man 
wants so much th a t  he i s  w i l l in g  to  r i s k  dangers and even s a c r i f i c e  h is  
own l i f e ?
Perhaps t h i s  q u e s tio n  d id  no t occur to  C onfucius, fo r  he took 
i t  f o r  g ran ted  th a t  every man should  do good, whenever i t  was p o s s ib le .
Or, he b e lie v ed  th a t  "doing good" was e s s e n t ia l ly  a s e l f - j u s t i f y in g  
p ro p o s it io n . At any r a t e ,  th e  c le a r  answer to  th e  q u e s tio n  was s t i l l  in  
th e  a i r .
One of Mencius* s tro n g  r iv a l s  in  h i s  tim e . Mo Tzu, answered
t h i s  q u e s tio n  in  a sim ple way: We should do good because Heaven wants
us to  do good. Mo Tzu s t a t e s :
Heaven wants r ig h te o u sn e ss  and d i s l ik e s  u n rig h te o u sn e ss . T h e re fo re , 
in  lead in g  th e  peop le  in  th e  world to  engage in  p ra c t ic in g  r ig h ­
teo u sn e ss , I  should be doing what Heaven w an ts . When I  do what 
Heaven w ants. Heaven a ls o  does what I  w ant. . . . The w i l l  of Heaven 
to  me i s  l ik e  th e  compasses to  th e  w heelw right and the  square  to  the  
c a rp e n te r . The w heelw right and th e  c a rp e n te r  apply  th e i r  square  and 
compasses to  measure a l l  square  and c i r c u la r  o b je c ts  in  the  w orld. . . 
Those th a t  f i t  a re  c o r re c t  and th o se  th a t  do not f i t  a re  n o t c o r r e c t .  
(Emphasis i s  m ine.)
Mencius liv e d  in  a tim e d i f f e r e n t  from th a t  of C onfucius. 
Confucius was, i t  seems, the  only  im portan t p h ilo so p h er in  h i s  tim e. But
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Mencius belonged to  one p h ilo so p h ic a l  school among many, and th e se
schoo ls  were competing among them selves fo r  d i s c ip le s  and fo r  th e  favo r
of th e  r u l e r s ,  which would b rin g  w e a lth , power and p o s i t io n .  Mencius
was in  a co n tex t such t h a t ,  from the  p h ilo so p h ic a l p o in t  of v iew , he had
to  ex p la in  more c le a r ly  than  Confucius had why every  in d iv id u a l  should
s t r i v e  to  be a " su p e r io r  man."
On th e  p e rso n a l s id e ,  Mencius proclaim ed h is  m aste r, C onfucius,
th e  g r e a te s t  sage in  h i s to r y  and even confessed th a t  he would always f o l -
32low " th e  way of C o n fu c iu s ."  He was undoubtedly s in c e re  in  h i s  b e l i e f
th a t  h is  id ea s  and a c tio n s  were in  com plete harmony w ith  th o se  of
Confucius and was f irm ly  convinced th a t  " th e  m antle of C onfucius had 
33f a l l e n  upon him ." He a ls o  shared  many d o c tr in e s  w ith  h is  m as te r. L ike
34Confucius he id o liz e d  th e  legendary  sag es . Like C onfucius he had a 
sense  of d iv in e  m issio n  to  b r in g  peace to  th e  m ora lly  and i n t e l l e c tu a l l y  
c h a o tic  s o c ie ty  of h i s  tim e. L ike Confucius he was a p ro fe s s io n a l  
te a c h e r  and a f i l i a l  son . And l ik e  Confucius he was e v e n tu a lly  d isa p ­
p o in ted  in  h is  p o l i t i c a l  c a re e r .
On th e  o th e r  hand, th e re  a re  good reasons to  b e lie v e  t h a t ,  to
35use C r e e l 's  e x p re ss io n , "Mencius was q u ite  ano ther man than  C onfuc iu s ."
F i r s t ,  Confucius was contem ptuous of eloquence, b u t Mencius was a good
d ia l e c t i c i a n ,  d isp la y in g  in g e n u ity  and s u b tle ty  in  h i s  rea so n in g . Second,
Mencius seemed to  understand  th e  m e n ta lity  of o rd in a ry  peop le  b e t t e r  than
C onfucius. He was n o t so awesome as h is  m aster; he was, in  L egge 's  words,
36"more am iable" and "came c lo se  to  u s ."  For example, he was convinced 
th a t  people a re  th e  most im portan t f a c to r  in  government and th a t  they  even 
have the  r ig h t  to  r e v o l t  a g a in s t  the  "way of th e  d e s p o t."  T h ird , Mencius
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was more p r a c t ic a l  than  C onfucius. For example, he understood  th a t  
C onfucius ' v i r t u e  of hum anity was n o t enough to  govern p e o p le , and thus 
advocated r ig h te o u sn e ss  as w e ll .  He b e lie v e d  th a t  "humanity was neces­
sa ry  to  b ind  peop le  to g e th e r  and r ig h te o u sn e ss  was n e c essa ry  to  make 
37d i s t i n c t i o n . " F in a l ly  and most im p o rta n tly , th e re  was a "h e ro ic  e le ­
ment" about M encius. C onfucius conducted h i s  d isc u s s io n  w ith  h is  d i s ­
c ip le s  in  a r e l a t i v e ly  calm atm osphere, and i t  was u s u a lly  an a ttem p t to  
a r r iv e  a t  and to  examine th e  t r u t h .  But M encius' d isc u ss io n  was u su a lly
"taken  up w ith  the  e n te r p r is e  of defend ing  and p ropaga ting  th e  t ru e  doc-
38 39t r i n e , "  which he b e lie v e d  he had a lre a d y  understood  com ple te ly . For
exam ple, w h ile  Confucius f ra n k ly  adm itted  h i s  m is tak es  s e v e ra l  tim es,
40Mencius never openly adm itted  th a t  he was wrong.
A ll th ese  c o n s id e ra tio n s  do su g g est th a t  M encius, being  one of 
the  most "ag g re ssiv e "  p h ilo so p h e rs  in  th e  h i s to r y  o f China, wanted to  
meet th e  c h a llen g e  of h i s  r i v a l s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  th e  schoo l of Mo Tzu, and 
o ffe re d  a s e c u la r ,  n o n re lig io u s  s o lu t io n  to  th e  problem  of vdiy man ought 
to  do good. Whether he succeeded in  t h i s  am bitious p r o je c t  i s  of course  
an o th e r m a tte r ,  bu t we should keep in  mind th a t  h i s  th eo ry  of human n a tu re  
was p a r t i c u la r ly  designed  to  meet t h i s  c h a lle n g e . He wanted to  g ive  us 
more than  a sim ple p r e s c r ip t io n  th a t  man ought to  be /do  good; he wanted 
to  show us why man ought to  do good r a th e r  than  e v i l .  He t r i e d  to  demon­
s t r a t e  the  very  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f good a c tio n s  and of m o ra lity  based on such 
a c t io n s .  Fung Yu-Ian a p tly  s t a t e s  t h i s  p o in t;
Every man shou ld , w ithou t thought o f p e rso n a l advan tage , uncondi­
t io n a l ly  do what he ought to  do, and be what he ought to  b e . . . .
But though C onfucius h e ld  th ese  d o c tr in e s ,  he f a i l e d  to  ex p la in  why 
i t  i s  th a t  a man should a c t  in  t h i s  way. M encius, however, a t ­
tem pted to  g iv e  an answer to  t h i s  q u e s tio n , and in  so doing d ev e l­
oped th e  th eo ry  f o r  which he i s  most famed: th a t  of th e  o r ig in a l
goodness of human n a tu re .
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Whether M encius' theo ry  of human n a tu re  i s  a s a t i s f a c to r y  re p ly  
to  the  q u es tio n  i s  a su b je c t I  w i l l  d isc u ss  in  the  fo llow ing  c h a p te rs .
In  th e  rem aining se c tio n s  of th is  ch ap te r I  w i l l  t r y  to  ex p la in  what 
Mencius means by saying th a t  human n a tu re  i s  o r ig in a l ly /n a tu r a l ly  good.
For t h i s  purpose I  w i l l  f i r s t  in tro d u ce  M encius' own argum ents in  the 
n ex t s e c tio n .
M encius' Arguments
Mencius o f f e r s ,  in  g e n e ra l, two main argum ents. The f i r s t ,
tAiich I  w i l l  c a l l  a p sy ch o lo g ica l argum ent, i s  s ta te d  in  th e  Book of 
42Mencius 6A:6 :7 :
The f e e l in g  of com m iseration belongs to  a l l  men; so does th a t  of 
shame and d i s l ik e ;  and th a t  of reverence  and r e s p e c t ;  and th a t  of 
approving and d isapp rov ing . The fe e lin g  o f com m iseration im p lies  
th e  p r in c ip le  of benevolence; th a t  o f shame and d i s l i k e ,  th e  p r in ­
c ip le  of r ig h te o u sn e ss ; th a t  of reverence  and r e s p e c t ,  th e  p r in c i ­
p le  of p ro p r ie ty ;  and th a t  of approving and d isap p ro v in g , th e  p r in ­
c ip le  of knowledge. Benevolence, r ig h te o u sn e ss , p ro p r ie ty ,  and 
knowledge a re  not in fu sed  in to  us from w ith o u t. We a re  c e r ta in ly  
fu rn ish ed  w ith  them. . . . Hence i t  i s  s a id ,  "Seek and you w i l l  f in d  
them. N eglect and you w i l l  lo s e  them ." Men d i f f e r  from one ano ther 
in  regard  to  them ;—some as  much again  as  o th e r s , some f iv e  tim es as 
much, and some to  an in c a lc u la b le  amount : —i t  i s  because they  cannot 
c a rry  out f u l ly  t h e i r  n a tu ra l  powers.
The argument may be summarized in  th re e  s te p s ,  (a) A ll men 
w ithou t excep tion  a re  born w ith  fo u r k inds of in n a te  f e e l in g s  of sympathy- 
com m iseration, sh a m e -d is lik e , m odesty-com plaisance (o r d e c lin in g -y ie ld in g  
or rev e re n ce -re sp e c t)  and righ t-w rong  (o r ap p ro v in g -d isap p ro v in g ).^ ^
These fe e l in g s  a re  in n a te  or n a tu r a l  in  th a t  they a re  n o t due to  in c u l­
c a tio n  or examples or s o c ia l  p re ssu re  bu t a re  "n a tiv e "  to  man. (b) These 
f e e l in g s  a re  the  "seeds" o r "beginnings" of good in  th e  sense t h a t ,  i f  
f u l l y  c u lt iv a te d  and developed, they  would become fo u r " c o n s ta n t"  v i r tu e s ,  
namely, humanity (o r benevo lence), r ig h te o u sn e ss , p ro p r ie ty , and wisdom
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(or know ledge). They a re ,  to  use  R ic h a rd s ' e x p re ss io n , " the  minimal
44m a n ife s ta tio n s"  o r " the  f i r s t  and low est s ig n s"  of v i r tu e s .  Thus,
th e  f e e l in g  of sym pathy-com m iseration i s  th e  beginning  of hum anity; the
f e e l in g  of sh am e-d is lik e  i s  the  beginn ing  of r ig h te o u sn e ss ; th e  fe e lin g
of m odesty-com plaisance i s  the  beginning  of p ro p r ie ty ;  and th e  f e e l in g
45of rig h t-w ro n g  i s  th e  beginning  of wisdom. (c) The c u l t iv a t io n  or
development he re  means th a t  the  f e e l in g s  should be expanded or en larged
to  o th e r  a re a s  by means of ed u ca tio n . Men may become v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from
one ano ther in  reg a rd  to  th ese  v i r t u e s ,  b u t i t  i s  because they d id  n o t
" c a rry  out f u l l y  t h e i r  n a tu r a l  p o w e r s n o t  because they  were o r ig in a l ly
born  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  degrees of in n a te  f e e l in g s .  In  t h i s  sense we may say
th a t  v i r tu e s  "a re  n o t in fu sed  in to  us from w ith o u t. We a re  c e r ta in ly
fu rn ish ed  w ith  them.
Mencius ta lk s  ve ry  l i t t l e  about th e  f e e l in g s  of modesty-
com plaisance and of rig h t-w ro n g . He seems much more a t  home w ith  the
f e e l in g s  of sym pathy-com m iseration and of sh am e-d is lik e  than  th e  o th e r
48two, a s  evidenced by h i s  g iv ing  f u l l e r  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  of them and c i t in g
them in  o th e r  c o n te x ts  where we might expect a l l  fo u r f e e l in g s  to  be men- 
49tio n e d . Mencius thus says th a t  a man who sees a c h ild  about to  f a l l  
in to  a  w e ll ,  no m a tte r  who the  man may b e , w i l l  experience  a f e e l in g  of 
sym pathy-com m iseration. And th i s  f e e l in g  i s  n o t aroused by h is  d e s ir e  
to  ga in  the  fav o r of th e  c h i ld 's  p a re n ts  or to  be p ra ise d  by h is  ne igh ­
b o rs and f r ie n d s ,  o r by h i s  f e a r  of being  thought c a llo u s  i f  he d id  no t 
rescu e  th e  c h i l d . I n  ano ther p la c e , Mencius expressed  th is  fe e lin g  
n e g a tiv e ly  by say ing  th a t  i t  i s  a " fe e lin g  of no t w anting to  in ju re  
o t h e r s . M e n c i u s '  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of the  f e e l in g  of sh am e-d is lik e  i s  not
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convincing . He says th a t  a l l  men, even th ie v e s , d i s l i k e  b reak ing  in  or
clim bing a  w a ll to  s t e a l  som ething, and th a t  a l l  men, even c r im in a ls ,
52a re  ashamed when they  a re  t r e a te d  as men who lack  m o ra lity . And in
ano ther p lace  th is  f e e l in g  i s  p o ssesse d , says M encius, by an " in f e r io r
(. 53man" who i s  n o t ashamed of a re p u ta tio n  beyond h is  m e r its  or by an o f f i ­
c e r  who "speaks what he should no t and does n o t speak what he shou ld .
I t  i s  not c le a r  how th ese  f e e l in g s  can be r e la te d  to  or ex­
panded to  th e  realm  of m o ra lity . Does the  t r a n s i t io n  to  m o ra lity  r e q u ire  
expansion or in te n s i f ic a t io n  of th ese  f e e l in g s  them selves or mere ex ten ­
s io n  of th e  domains of th ese  fe e l in g s ?  The l a t t e r  seems to  be the  c a se .
For Mencius says th a t  i f  we expand "what we w i l l  n o t b e a r"  ( f e e lin g  of
sympathy-com miseration) to th e  a re a  o f "what we can b e a r ,"  then  th e re  
w i l l  be th e  v i r tu e  of hum anity. I f  we expand "what we w i l l  no t do"
( fe e lin g  of sham e-d islike) to  the  a re a  of "what we w i l l  d o ,"  then th e re  
w i l l  be the  v i r tu e  of r ig h te o u sn e ss .^ ^
A ll in  a l l ,  th e  argument i s  based on th e  b e l i e f  th a t  the  above- 
m entioned in n a te  f e e l in g s  a re  e s s e n t ia l  c o n s t i tu e n ts  of human n a tu re  and 
th a t  they  can be expanded to  th e  realm  of m o ra lity  by means of ed u ca tio n . 
This means th a t  m o ra lity  can be derived  from the  se lf-deve lopm en t of 
human n a tu re  i t s e l f ,  n o t from , say , commandments of God or o th e r  e x te rn a l  
inducem ents.
M encius' second argum ent, which I  w i l l  c a l l  the  " h ig h e r -p r in c ip le "
argum ent, i s  s ta te d  in  th e  Book of M encius, 6A:14:2 through 6A:16:3:
Some p a r ts  of the  body a re  n o b le , and some ig n o b le ; some g r e a t ,  some 
sm all. The g re a t  must n o t be in ju re d  fo r  th e  sm a ll, nor th e  noble 
fo r  th e  ig n o b le . He who n o u rish es  th e  l i t t l e  belong ing  to  him i s  a 
l i t t l e  man, and he who n o u rish es  the  g re a t  i s  a g re a t  man. . . .
Those who fo llow  th a t  p a r t  of them selves which i s  g re a t  a re  g re a t  
men; those vA\o fo llow  th a t  p a r t  which i s  l i t t l e  a re  l i t t l e  men. . . .
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L et a man f i r s t  stand  f a s t  in  th e  supremacy of the  n o b ler p a r t  of 
h i s  c o n s t i tu t io n ,  and the in f e r io r  p a r t  w i l l  no t be ab le  to  tak e  i t  
from him. . . . There i s  a n o b i l i ty  of Heaven, and th e re  i s  a n o b il­
i t y  of man. Benevolence, r ig h te o u sn e s s , s e lf - c o n s e c ra t io n , and 
f i d e l i t y ,  w ith  unwearied jo y  in  th e se  v i r t u e s ; — th ese  c o n s t i tu te  the  
n o b i l i ty  of Heaven. To be a kung, a  c h 'in g ,  o r a  t a - f u ; — th is  con­
s t i t u t e s  the  n o b i l i ty  of man. The men of a n t iq u i ty  c u lt iv a te d  th e i r  
n o b i l i ty  o f Heaven, and the  n o b i l i ty  of man came to  them in  i t s  
t r a i n .  The men of th e  p re se n t day c u l t iv a te  t h e i r  n o b i l i ty  of 
Heaven in  o rd er to  seek f o r  th e  n o b i l i ty  o f man, and when they  have 
ob ta in ed  t h a t ,  they  throw away the  o th e r ;— th e i r  d e lu s io n  i s  extrem e. 
The is s u e  i s  sim ply t h i s ,  th a t  they  must lo se  th a t  n o b i l i ty  of man 
as w e ll .
The argument s t a r t s  w ith  th e  p r in c ip le  of r e l a t i v e  im portance, 
namely, th a t  we pay our a t te n t io n  to  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  of our body accord ing  
to  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  im portance. For exam ple, the  man who takes good care  
of h i s  f in g e r s  and n e g le c ts  h is  sh o u ld ers  and back i s  a fo o l.  He who 
n o u rish e s  the  sm all p a r ts  w i l l  become a sm all man, and he who n o u rish es  
the  g re a t  p a r ts  w i l l  become a  g re a t  man. Mencius then  argues th a t  man 
c o n s is ts  of sm all p a r ts  (em otional e l e m e n t s ) a n d  g re a t  p a r ts  ( r a t io n a l  
e le m e n ts ) . The em otional elem ents embody what may be  c a lle d  a "low er 
p r in c ip le "  o r ,  in  M encius' own w ords, a " n o b i l i ty  of man," in  th a t ,  i f  
n o t p ro p e r ly  c o n tro lle d  by th e  l a t t e r ,  th ey  may lead  to  e v i l .  The r a t i o ­
n a l e lem ents embody what may be c a lle d  a "h ig h e r p r in c ip le "  o r a " n o b il­
i t y  of h eav en ,"  in  th a t  t h e i r  main fu n c tio n  i s  to  l im i t  the  g r a t i f i c a t i o n  
of em otion, so to  speak.
But t h i s  does n o t mean th a t  m an's em otional elem ents should be 
suppressed  o r oppressed  by the r a t i o n a l  e lem en ts. T his i s  bo th  impos­
s ib le  and u n d e s ira b le . F i r s t  of a l l ,  as ex p la in ed  in  the  p sy ch o lo g ica l 
argum ent, th e re  a re  w ith in  th e  em otional elem ents fo u r  n a tu r a l  and m oral 
f e e l in g s  as w e ll  as o th er d e s ire s  fo r  w e a lth , food and sex . Secondly, 
th e se  d e s i r e s  a re  n e u tr a l  in  the sense th a t  w h ile  th ey  a re  n o t the
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b eg inn ings of good fo r  them selves, they  need n o t be o b s ta c le s  to  the  
development of th e  fou r f e e l in g s .  T his b e l i e f  was w e ll expressed  in  
M encius' re p ly  to  King Hsuan of C h 'i :  " I f  your M ajesty love w e a lth , l e t
your people en joy  the  same. . . .  I f  your M ajesty love  se x , l e t  your
peop le  en joy  the  same, and what d i f f i c u l t y  w i l l  th e re  be fo r  you to  be -
58come th e  t ru e  k ing  of the  em pire?" On th e  c o n tra ry , m an 's em otional
e lem en ts , p ro p erly  gu id ed , may become, in  C r e e l 's  w ords, th e  " s u re s t
59g u a ra n to rs  of m oral c o n d u c t."  C reel c le a r ly  s t a t e s  t h i s  p o in t:
Although the  em otional n a tu re  i s  to  be c o n tro l le d ,  Mencius says v e ry  
s p e c i f ic a l ly  th a t  i t  i s  n o t to  be re p re s se d . He c o n s id e rs  th a t  i f  
p ro p e r ly  channeled the  em otions a r e ,  f a r  from being  immoral, the  
g r e a te s t  of m oral fo rc e s .  Thus he says th a t  i t  i s  n e c e ssa ry  to  
c u l t iv a te  o n e 's  em otional n a tu re , so th a t  i t  may a t t a in  to  i t s  f u l l  
BtatnrJo
Here i s  th e  e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e re n c e  between Mencius and Mo Tzu. Mo 
Tzu was w il l in g  to  s a c r i f i c e  a l l  em otional d e s i r e s .  C lo th ing  should keep 
man from th e  cold  in  w in te r  and th e  h e a t  in  summer, b u t should n o t be 
a t t r a c t i v e .  Food should  n o u rish  man, b u t n o t be w e ll seasoned . Houses 
should keep man from the  r a in  and th ie v e s , b u t should n o t have u s e le s s  
d e c o ra tio n . Mo Tzu was p a r t i c u l a r l y  opposed to  m usic, which used m an's 
tim e and w ealth  in  th e  making and p lay in g  th e  m u sica l in s tru m e n ts , y e t 
c re a te d  no th ing  ta n g ib le .  We thus rea d : "What i s  i t  th a t  causes r u le r s
to  n e g le c t  government and common men to  n e g le c t  t h e i r  work? M usic. There­
f o re ,  Mo Tzu sa y s , ' I t  i s  wrong to  p lay  m u s i c ' . H e  b e lie v e d  th a t  h i s  
whole system  stood in  danger of being  wrecked by th e  em otions, so he sim­
p ly  d e c la re d  th a t  they  should be e lim in a te d : "Joy and an g er, p le a su re
and sorrow , love [and h a te ] ,  a re  to  be go t r id  of
On th e  o th e r  hand , Mencius was w e ll aware th a t  because  of e v i l  
e x te rn a l  in f lu e n c e s , such as u n q u a lif ie d  te a c h e rs , inhumane governm ent.
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c o rru p t s o c ie ty , m an's em otional n a tu re  does no t always become " the  
g r e a te s t  of m oral fo rc e s ."  I t  can e a s i ly  be f r u s t r a t e d  or overpowered 
by e v i l  c ircum stances, so th a t  man becomes d i f f e r e n t  from o th e r c re a ­
tu re s  "very  s l ig h t ly ,
F o r tu n a te ly , man h a s , Mencius a rg u e s , a r a t i o n a l  n a tu re  or a 
no b ler p a r t  as w e ll as an em otional n a tu re  o r an i n f e r io r  p a r t ;  and when­
ever he i s  in  danger of being d e fe a te d  by e v i l  powers, he wants to  and 
t r i e s  to  fo llow  a h ig h er p r in c ip le  in h e re n t in  h i s  r a t i o n a l  n a tu re . What 
man should do th e re fo re  i s  to  l e t  t h i s  h ig h er  p r in c ip le  p r e v a i l ,  c o n tro l ,  
govern , r e g u la te  or d i r e c t  the lower p r in c ip le ,  fo r  th e  n e g le c t of the  
h ig h e r  p r in c ip le  w i l l  in e v i ta b ly  lead  to  the  " lo s s "  of the  low er. The 
a n c ie n t sag es , fo r  example, d i l ig e n t ly  c u lt iv a te d  the  n o b le r p a r t  or a
n o b i l i ty  of heaven, and th e  in f e r io r  p a r t  o r a n o b i l i ty  of man " n a tu ra l ly  
64fo llo w ed ."  Today people a re  concerned w ith  th e  c u l t iv a t io n  of the 
n o b i l i ty  of heaven, Mencius ex c la im s, only to  seek th e  n o b i l i ty  of man; 
and once they achieve some degree o f n o b i l i ty  of heaven, they fo rsak e  th e  
o th e r . At th e  end they  su re ly  lo se  th e  n o b i l i ty  of man as w e ll. I f  we 
b u ild  up th e  n o b le r p a r t  of our n a tu re , th e  in f e r io r  p a r t  can never take 
i t  away.
To sum up: According to  M encius, th e re  i s  a d if f e re n c e  ra th e r
than  an in h e re n t o p p o s itio n  between emotion and reaso n . Man's em otional 
n a tu re  i s  only a lower p r in c ip le  of m o ra l ity , b u t i t  i s  s t i l l  a p r in c ip le  
which we cannot and should n o t do away w ith .^ ^  But t h i s  does no t make 
m an 's n a tu re  o r ig in a l ly  good. Man. i s  o r ig in a l ly  good because he has 
w ith in  h im se lf  a h ig h er  p r in c ip le  of reason  as w e ll a s  a lower p r in c ip le  
of em otion, and in  th i s  sense i t  i s  n a tu ra l  fo r  him to  fo llow  or t ry  to
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fo llow  th e  h ig h er p r in c ip le  whenever he i s  in  danger of being  defea ted  
by e v i l  powers. To use L egge 's words, man i s  o r ig in a l ly  good, n o t be­
cause he i s  a " c re a tu re  of a p p e ti te s  and p a s s io n s ,"  b u t because he " is  
l i f t e d  up in to  a h ig h e r  c i r c l e  of in te l l ig e n c e  and v i r tu e .
The c r i t i c a l  exam ination of M encius' arguments w i l l  be g iven  in  
th e  n ex t c h a p te r. In  the  f i n a l  s e c tio n  o f th is  ch ap te r I  w i l l  t r y  once
more to  ex p la in  what Mencius means by say ing  th a t  human n a tu re  i s  o r ig ­
in a l ly  good.
A Comment on M encius' Theory o f Human N ature
The f i r s t  th in g  we should keep in  mind about M encius' th e s i s  i s
t h a t ,  accord ing  to  M encius, man has only  th e  "seeds"  or "beg inn ings" of
good, n o t good i t s e l f .  These seeds must be c u lt iv a te d  and developed to
the  e x te n t  th a t  man can "se rve  heaven" and even " f u l f i l  h i s  d e s tin y .
The most im portan t th in g  man has to  do th e re fo re  i s  to  c u l t iv a te  th e se
seeds to  f u l l  e f fe c tiv e n e s s .^ ^  Mencius thus s ta t e s ;
S ince a l l  men have th ese  fou r p r in c ip le s  in  them selves, l e t  them 
know to  g ive them a l l  t h e i r  development and com pletion , and the  
is s u e  w i l l  be l ik e  th a t  of f i r e  which has begun to  b u rn , o r th a t  
of a sp rin g  which has begun to  f in d  v e n t. Let them have th e i r  
com plete developm ent, and they w i l l  s u f f ic e  to  love and p ro te c t  
a l l  w ith in  the  fou r se as . Let them be denied th a t  developm ent, 
and they  w i l l  n o t s u f f ic e  fo r  a man to  se rve  h i s  p a re n ts  w ith .°^
At the  same tim e, by saying th a t  t h i s  development of th e  mind 
i s  sim ply to  "p rese rv e"  m an's o r ig in a l  n a tu re , Mencius seems to  imply 
th a t  th e re  i s  a f t e r  a l l  no th ing  to  be d i l ig e n t ly  c u l t iv a te d .  He says 
th a t  the  only d if fe re n c e  between old sages and o rd in a ry  peop le  i s  th a t  
vdiile we o f te n  "d isc a rd "  our o r ig in a l  n a tu re , th e  sages p rese rv e  t h e i r  
n a tu re . For example, the  Emperor Shun d id  n o t d i l ig e n t ly  "pursue" hu­
m anity  and r ig h te o u sn e ss , b u t sim ply "walked along the path  of humanity
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and r ig h te o u sn e ss ."^ ^  In ano ther p lac e  he says th a t  the  " su p e r io r  man"
i s  th e  man who "does n o t lo se  h i s  c h i l d 's  h e a r t . F i n a l l y ,  he d e c la re s
72th a t  th e  purpose of education  i s  sim ply " to  seek th e  l o s t  m ind."
Now one m ight th in k  th a t  th e re  i s  a  c o n f l i c t  or even c o n tra d ic ­
t io n  between p re se rv in g  o n e 's  o r ig in a l  n a tu re  and d i l ig e n t ly  c u l t iv a t in g  
o n e 's  o r ig in a l  n a tu re . 1 do no t th in k  so . To understand  t h i s  we need 
to  examine M encius' own example;
L et n o t th e  mind fo rg e t  i t s  work, b u t l e t  th e re  be no a s s i s t in g  the  
growth of th a t  n a tu r e . Let us n o t be l ik e  the  man of Sung. There 
was a man of Sung, who was g riev ed  th a t  h i s  growing corn  was n o t 
lo n g e r , and so he p u lle d  i t  up. Having done t h i s ,  he re tu rn e d  home, 
looking  v e ry  s tu p id , and sa id  to  h i s  p eo p le , "1 am t i r e d  today . 1 
have been h e lp in g  the  corn to  grow lo n g ."  His son ran  to  look a t  
i t ,  and found the  corn  a l l  w ith e red .
T h is sim ple s to ry  c le a r ly  i l l u s t r a t e s  th a t  we should h e lp  the  corn to  
grow f a s t  by weeding, f e r t i l i z i n g ,  and so f o r t h ,  b u t we should n o t a r t i f i ­
c i a l l y  make th e  corn  grow f a s t  by p u ll in g  i t  o u t; f o r  t h i s  w i l l  no t 
only  be of no b e n e f i t  to  th e  corn  b u t w i l l  in ju r e  i t .  In  o th e r  words, 
when we grow som ething, we must do many th in g s  f o r  i t ,  b u t a t  th e  same 
tim e we must never make i t  grow a r t i f i c i a l l y .  In  a s im ila r  way, we must 
c u l t iv a te  and develop our o r ig in a l  n a tu re  by prom oting the  Way, by ac­
cum ulating r ig h te o u sn e ss , and by p r a c t ic in g  v i r t u e ,  on the one hand, b u t 
l e t  i t  grow n a tu r a l ly ,  on the  o th e r . As Mencius sa y s , " l e t  no t the  mind
fo rg e t  i t s  work, b u t l e t  th e re  be no a s s i s t i n g  th e  growth of th a t  n a tu re "
74in  an a r t i f i c i a l  way. Indeed , the  way to  se rv e  heaven i s  to  p rese rv e  
o n e 's  mind and to  n o u rish  o n e 's  mind a t  th e  same tim e.^^
Let me summarize what 1 have sa id  in  t h i s  c h a p te r . Because of 
the  above-m entioned "p h ilo so p h ic a l and p e rso n a l demand" Mencius was fo rced  
to  e x p la in  more c le a r ly  than Confucius had why man ought to  do good r a th e r
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than  e v i l .  In  so lv in g  th is  problem , Mencius d id  n o t say th a t  man must 
be benevo len t and r ig h te o u s  because i t  would somehow g lo r i f y  some su p er­
n a tu r a l  d e i t i e s ,  o r because th e re  was a supreme m oral p r in c ip le  l ik e  a 
c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e . Nor d id  he appeal to  the  u t i l i t a r i a n  d o c tr in e  
of en lig h ten ed  s e lf is h n e s s  a lthough  he was d e f in i te ly  a man of p r a c t i ­
c a l i t y .  Furtherm ore, w h ile  he o f te n  made re fe re n c e  to  th e  o ld  t r a d i t io n  
as having a u th o r i ty  in  i t s e l f ,  he d id  n o t say th a t  man ought to p ra c t ic e  
v i r tu e  r a th e r  than  v ic e  j u s t  because the teach in g s  of old legendary  
sages c o n s ti tu te d  th e  p e r f e c t  p a t te rn  fo r  m an's thought and a c t io n ,  and 
because th ese  te a c h in g s , in  tu rn ,  urged every  man tc  p r a c t ic e  v i r t u e .
M encius' re p ly  to  th e  q u e s tio n  why man ought to  do good i s  
r a th e r  s u rp r is in g . He b e lie v e s  th a t  h i s  th eo ry  of human n a tu re  could 
so lv e  a l l  th e  e th ic a l  problem s r e la te d  to  human a c t io n . Thus he deduces 
from th e  o r ig in a l  goodness of human n a tu re  (1) th a t  man u s u a lly  does 
good r a th e r  than  e v i l ,  (2) man wants to  do good whenever he can , (3) man
knows what i s  good and what i s  e v i l ,  (4) man knows th a t  he ought to  do
good, and (5) th a t  man in  f a c t  has a c a p a b i l i ty  to  do good.
Whether th e se  a s s e r t io n s  fo llo w  from M encius' th e s i s  i s  a sub­
j e c t  I  w i l l  d isc u s s  in  th e  C onclusion of t h i s  d i s s e r t a t io n .  In  the  
nex t ch a p te r  I  w i l l  f i r s t  examine c r i t i c a l l y  M encius' two main argum ents 
which he o f fe r s  to  defend h i s  th eo ry  of human n a tu re .
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72I b id . ,  6A :11:4. In  t h i s  sense  M encius' th eo ry  of education  
i s  o f te n  compared to  P l a to 's  d o c tr in e  of r e c o l le c t io n .
^^I b id . ,  2A :2:16.
^^I b id . ,  2A :2:16.
^^I b id . , 7A :1:2. (a) The c o r re c t  t r a n s la t io n  of t h i s  passage i s
as fo llo w s: "To p re se rv e  o n e 's  mind and to  nou rish  o n e 's  n a tu re  a re  the
way to  se rv e  Heaven." But h e re  Mencius seems to  be using  "mind" and 
"n a tu re "  synonymously, (b) One might wonder, th en , which one should  come 
f i r s t .  Should we t r y  to  p re se rv e  our n a tu re  f i r s t  and then c u l t iv a te  i t ,  
or v ic e  ve rsa?  I s  one the  n ecessa ry  c o n d itio n  fo r  the  o ther?  But th ese  
q u e s tio n s  a re  m ean ing less. P re se rv in g  o n e 's  mind and c u l t iv a t in g  i t  a re  
one and th e  same th in g .
^^According to  Hu Shih , Mencius once d e c la re d  th a t  to  accep t th e  
e n t i r e  Book of H is to ry  i s  worse than  to  accep t no p a r t  of i t ,  and th a t ,  
of one p a r t i c u l a r  e ssay  in  th a t  book, he would accep t "no more th an  two 
o r th re e  [bamboo] p a g e s ."  See Hu S h ih , "The S c ie n t i f i c  S p i r i t  and Method 
in  Chinese P h ilo so p h y ,"  The Chinese Mind, ed. by C harles A. Moore, 
H onolulu , 1968, p . 19.
In  an o th er p la c e  Mencius a lso  d e c la re d  th a t  Shun' s t i t l e  to  the  
th rone  was u l t im a te ly  r a t i f i e d ,  no t by the  a u th o r i ty  o f h i s  p red e c e sso r , 
Yao, b u t by the  adherence of th e  people  to  h i s  r u le .  Book of M encius, 
5A :5:5 . Compare t h i s  d e c la ra t io n  w ith  C onfucius ' s ta tem en t th a t  even 
Yao and Shun " f e l l  s h o r t  of hum anity ."  A n a le c ts , 6 :2 8 .
CHAPTER I I
THE INADEQUACY OF MENCIUS' PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN NATURE,
WITH REFERENCE TO KANT
In tro d u c tio n
In t h i s  c h a p te r  I w i l l  f i r s t  examine, in  g en e ra l te rm s,
M encius' two argum ents s ta te d  in  th e  p rev io u s c h a p te r , and argue  th a t  
they  f a i l  to  prove M encius' th eo ry  o f human n a tu re . I  w i l l  th en  make 
re fe re n c e  to  K ant, and compare M encius' argum ents w ith  K a n t 's  argum ents, 
which he o f fe r s  to  prove th e  u n iv e r s a l i ty  and n e c e s s i ty  of a c a te g o r ic a l  
Im perative  in  th e  Foundations of th e  M etaphysics o f M orals.
A q u e s tio n  a r i s e s ,  th e n , as to  how one can compare Kant w ith  
M encius. For i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  th e re  a re  many d if f e re n c e s  betw een th e i r  
argum ents. For in s ta n c e , Kant seems to  n e g le c t o r downgrade em otions or 
in c l in a t io n s  as something a g a in s t  m o ra l ity ,^  w hereas, as I  m entioned in  
th e  p rev ious c h a p te r , Mencius does n o t. Furtherm ore , K a n t 's  argument 
i s  b a s ic a l ly  founded on h is  d e f in i t io n  o f a good w i l l ,  w hereas Mencius 
seldom ta lk s  about a w i l l .  In  f a c t ,  Mencius does no t even seem to  be 
aware of th e  c o n f l ic t  between w i l l  and d e s i r e .
But th e  most c ru c ia l  d if fe re n c e  betw een Kant and Mencius i s ,  I
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th in k , th a t  they have d i f f e r e n t  concep tion  of " u n iv e r s a l i ty ."  When 
Mencius says th a t  a l l  men w ithou t ex cep tio n  a re  o r ig in a l ly  good, he
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means th a t  a l l  men in  f a c t  can do good, th a t  they u s u a lly  do good when-
3
ever they  can , and th a t  they  know th a t  they  ought to  do good. So h is  
concep tion  o f " u n iv e r s a l i ty "  i s  p a r t ly  c o n s is te n t  w ith  our o rd in a ry  
usage o f th e  term . But K a n t's  concep tion  of the  term  i s  very  d i f f e r e n t  
from th e  o rd in a ry  usage. According to  K ant, a c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  i s  
an a b s o lu te ly  u n iv e rs a l  and necessa ry  m oral law , no t because every man 
knows and consciously  t r i e s  to  fo llow  i t ,  bu t because a l l  human a c tio n , 
in  o rd e r to  be m orally  w orthy, must conform to  i t ,  and, in  a d d it io n , 
w ithou t i t  we cannot even t a lk  reasonab ly  about m oral a c tio n . To use 
K a n t 's  own e x p re ss io n , a c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  i s  a "form al" law , not 
a s o r t  of a b so lu te  norm from tAilch we can deduce p a r t ic u la r  " m a te r ia l"  
maxims and app ly  them to  our d a ily  l iv e s .  In  o th e r words, i t  i s  a su­
preme m oral law fo r  a l l  r a t io n a l  agen ts only as a "g en era l co n d itio n "
o r , to  use C ollingw ood 's words, an "a b so lu te  p resu p p o s itio n "  of moral
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a c tio n ;  we cannot have m o ra lity  w ithou t a c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e .
In s p i t e  of a l l  th ese  d if f e re n c e s ,  our re fe re n c e  to  K an t's  
argum ents w i l l  show, I  hope, why M encius' a ttem p t to  p rov ide  a j u s t i f i ­
c a tio n  fo r  th e  u n iv e r s a l i ty  of h i s  th e s i s  i s  doomed to  f a i l u r e .  P o r, 
as I  w i l l  e x p la in  l a t e r ,  t h e i r  argum ents a ls o  have many s im i la r i t i e s  and, 
more im p o rta n tly , have the  same lo g ic a l  form or s tr u c tu r e .^
In  the  Foundations Kant o f fe r s  two d i f f e r e n t  k inds of argum ents. 
He s t a r t s  w ith  an assum ption th a t  our o rd in a ry  m oral d isc o u rse  i s  mean­
in g fu l  and, in  a d d it io n , th a t  our o rd in a ry  m oral judgm ents a re  t ru e .  He 
then  asks what a re  the  c o n d itio n s  th a t  must hold i f  t h i s  claim  i s  to  be 
j u s t i f i e d ,  and th is  i s  what he c a l l s  an " a n a ly t ic a l  argum ent." By ad­
d re s s in g  th o se  who sh are  h is  b a s ic  m oral c o n v ic tio n s  about what i s  r ig h t
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and what i s  wrong, about who I s  to  be p ra ise d  o r blamed, Kant a tte m p ts , 
in  th e  f i r s t  c h ap te r of th e  F oundations, to  lead  u s , by an a n a ly t ic a l  
argum ent, from our o rd in a ry  m oral judgments to  a p h ilo so p h ic a l sta tem en t 
of th e  f i r s t  p r in c ip le  of m o ra l ity , namely, a c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e .
By ad d ressin g  th o se  # 1 0  g ra n t th e  m eaningfu lness of our o rd in a ry  m oral 
d isco u rse  b u t may embrace p r in c ip le s  o th e r than  a c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e , 
Kant a tte m p ts , in  th e  second c h ap te r of the  F o undations , to  fo rm u la te , 
s t i l l  by an a n a ly t ic a l  argum ent, t h a t  f i r s t  p r in c ip le  in  many d i f f e r e n t  
ways. In  th e  th ird  c h ap te r Kant a ttem p ts  to  d e r iv e  the  supreme p r in c ip le  
of m o ra lity  from pure p r a c t ic a l  reason  i t s e l f ,  and th i s  i s  what he c a l l s  
a " s y n th e t ic a l  argum ent."^
In our com parative study  of Kant and M encius, I  w i l l  f i r s t  sum­
m arize K a n t's  a n a ly t ic a l  argument and compare i t  w ith  M encius' psycho­
lo g ic a l  argument. This w i l l  show th a t  M encius' t h e s i s ,  which c la im s to  
be u n iv e r s a l ,  must be j u s t i f i e d ,  i f  a t  a l l ,  by some nonem pirica l argu­
m ents. I  w i l l  then  compare K a n t 's  s y n th e t ic a l  argument w ith  M encius' 
" h ig h e r -p r in c ip le "  argument and hope to  show th a t  Mencius has f a i le d  to  
p rov ide  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  th e  u n iv e r s a l i ty  of h is  theo ry  of human na­
t u r e ,  in  the  same way th a t  Kant has f a i l e d .  Of co u rse , K a n t's  f a i l u r e  
i t s e l f  does n o t prove M encius' f a i l u r e ,  b u t i t  w i l l  show th a t  th e re  a re  
s u f f i c i e n t  grounds to  conclude th a t  M encius' argument i s  doomed to  
f a i l u r e .
A G eneral Exam ination o f M encius' Theory o f Human N ature
Here I  w i l l  make only  a few g e n e ra l remarks on th e  q u e s tio n
whether Mencius has proved h is  th e s i s  th a t  man i s  o r ig in a l ly  good ; a
more thorough exam ination w i l l  be g iven  in  th e  next s e c t io n , where I
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w i l l  compare Mencius* two argum ents w ith  those  of Kant.
F i r s t ,  M encius' "w ater an a lo g y ,"  mentioned in  h is  re p ly  to  h i s  
opponent Kao Tzu, who argued th a t  human n a tu re  i s  n e ith e r  good nor e v i l ,  
makes f a i r l y  good sen se . Mencius says th a t  m an's o r ig in a l  n a tu re  i s  a l ­
ways good j u s t  as w ater always flow s downward, a lthough  i t  can become 
e v i l  in  the  same way th a t  w ater can be fo rced  to  flow  upward by some 
a r t i f i c i a l  means.^ However, an analogy i s  n o t a p ro o f. I t  i s  b u t  a 
f ig u re  understood  only w ith in  i t s  c o n te x t. Furtherm ore, th e  same analogy 
can s u c c e s s fu lly  be used to  e s ta b l is h  th e  o p p o s ite  th e s is  t h a t  human na­
tu re  i s  o r ig in a l ly  e v i l .
Second, M encius' p sy c h o lo g ic a l argument i s  based on our de 
f a c to  f e e l in g s ,  and so has some p sy ch o lo g ica l ap p ea l. But i t  obv iously  
f a l l s  sh o r t  of showing th a t  th e re  a re  s u f f i c i e n t  grounds to  accep t h i s  
th e s i s  r a th e r  than  o th e r  th e o r ie s  of human n a tu re , (a) I t  i s  no t c le a r  
a t  a l l  w hether a l l  men a re  born  w ith  o r ig in a l ly  good seeds, e v i l  se ed s , 
bo th  of them, o r n e i th e r  of them. Our d a i ly  experience  seems to  sub­
s ta n t i a t e  a "m iddle p o s i t io n ,"  i . e . ,  t h a t  man i s  n e i th e r  good nor e v i l ,  
o r th a t  man i s  good as much as e v i l ,  or th a t  man i s  p a r t ly  good and 
p a r t ly  e v i l ,  r a th e r  than an extrem e p o s i t io n  th a t  man i s  e n t i r e ly  good 
or e v i l ,  (b) Mencius o f fe r s  no in d u c tiv e  support fo r  h is  th e s i s .  He 
sim ply sp e c u la te s  on human n a tu re  on th e  b a s is  of h is  own s u b je c tiv e  
o p in io n . I t  must be noted th a t  h is  reason ing  i s  n e i th e r  in d u c tiv e  nor 
d e d u c tiv e , and, as a r e s u l t ,  h is  argum ent, i f  i t  i s  an argument a t  a l l ,
g
i s  p u re ly  an a r b i t r a r y  one. R ichards comments on th i s  p o in t:
. . .  i t  i s  no p a r t  of M encius' purpose to  a n a ly se , j u s t i f y  o r d i s ­
cuss them [fo u r f e e l in g s  and fo u r v i r tu e s ]  in  g e n e ra l. The c a s u is try  
of them, the  d isc u ss io n  of p a r t i c u la r  examples, i s  a main p a r t  of
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h i s  work and a l l  p sy ch o lo g ica l a rgum entation  may be regarded  as an 
apology to  en fo rce  them. . . . S ince a l l  men know them and accep t 
them, h i s  ta s k  i s  only  to  encourage m en 's energ i to  flow  in to  
t h e i r  developm ent. (Emphasis i s  m ine. ) ^
(c) Mencius sim ply observes s e v e ra l  human a c tio n s  which a re  c lo s e ly  r e ­
la te d  to  th e  f e e l in g s  of sym pathy-com m iseration o r of sh a m e -d is lik e , and 
then  g e n e ra liz e s  th a t  a l l  men have th ese  f e e l in g s .  But t h i s  i s  a case 
of "h as ty  g e n e ra l iz a t io n ."  On th e  o th e r  hand, even i f  we suppose th a t  
we know th e  g e n e ra l n a tu re  of man, good or e v i l ,  t h i s  knowledge i s  so 
g e n e ra l th a t  i t  can g iv e  us no in s ig h t  in to  de te rm in ing  why a p a r t ic u la r  
p e rso n , Dick or Ja n e , ought to  a c t  f r e e ly  in  a c e r ta in  way. In  s h o r t ,  
Mencius cannot avoid th e  charge of h a s ty  g e n e ra l iz a t io n ;  and even i f  we 
accep t h i s  g e n e ra l iz a t io n , he cannot avoid th e  charge o f "h as ty  
p a r t i c u l a r i z a t io n ."
T h ird , M encius' h ig h e r -p r in c ip le  argum ent a ls o  f a i l s  because i t  
i s  based on an unw arranted assum ption th a t  man has w ith in  h im se lf  both a 
h ig h e r  p r in c ip le  and a lower p r in c ip le ,  (a) I t  i s  an unw arranted assump­
t io n  because Mencius does n o t even endeavor to  prove th a t  th e re  a re  such 
p r in c ip le s .  F urtherm ore , even i f  we a ccep t th o se  p r in c ip le s ,  i t  does 
n o t fo llow  th a t  a l l  human a c tio n  i s  s o le ly  c o n tro l le d  by them. Be­
s id e s  or over th o se  p r in c ip le s , th e r e  may v e ry  w e ll  be o th e r  p r in c ip le s ,  
such as  s u rv iv a l ,  te le o lo g y , p u rp o siv en ess , or w hatever, (b) M encius' 
c h a ra c te r iz a t io n  of man as having both  an em otional and a r a t io n a l  na­
tu re  i s  undoubtedly d u a l i s t i c ,  and t h i s  dualism  seems to  undermine the  
v a l i d i t y  of M encius' u n iv e rs a l  c h a ra c te r iz a t io n  of human n a tu re  as 
e n t i r e ly  good, (c) Mencius does n o t downgrade m an's em otional n a tu re  as 
being  in  d i r e c t  o p p o s itio n  to  m o ra lity . To be s u re , i t  i s  something 
l e s s  than a h ig h e r  m oral p r in c ip le ,  b u t i t  i s  s t i l l  a p r in c ip le  to  guide
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m an's a c t io n s .  This means t h a t ,  s in c e  man can fo llow  e i th e r  of th e  two 
p r in c ip le s ,  Mencius must show e x a c tly  why man should f r e e ly  fo llo w  a 
h ig h e r  p r in c ip le  r a th e r  than  fo llow  a lower p r in c ip le .  In  o th e r  words, 
i t  i s  n o t enough to  say th a t  th e re  a re  two d i f f e r e n t  p r in c ip le s ;  Mencius 
s t i l l  must prove th a t ,  as f a r  as m o ra lity  i s  concerned , th e  world governed 
by a h ig h er p r in c ip le  does o r should c o n tro l  th e  w orld governed by a 
lower p r in c ip le ,  and th a t  man ought to  l iv e  a s  a member of the  form er 
w orld , d e s p ite  th e  f a c t  th a t  he can a lso  l iv e  as a member of the l a t t e r .
K a n t 's  A n a ly tic a l  Argument and M encius' P sy ch o lo g ica l Argument
In  t h i s  s e c t io n  I  w i l l  d isc u ss  some in te r e s t in g  s i m i l a r i t i e s  
between K a n t's  and M encius' argum ents, and then  d isc u ss  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  
of K a n t 's  argument fo r  M encius. For th is  purpose I  w i l l  f i r s t  summarize 
K a n t 's  argum ent.
According to  K ant, no th ing  in  th e  world i s  a b s o lu te ly  good ex­
ce p t a good w i l l ;  a good w i l l  a lone  i s  good w ithou t q u a l i f i c a t io n .  A ll 
" g i f t s  of n a tu re "  l ik e  in te l l ig e n c e ,  w it ,  judgm ent, cou rage , r e s o lu te n e s s  
and p e rse rv e ra n ce  and a l l  " g i f t s  of fo rtu n e "  l ik e  power, r ic h e s ,  honor, 
h e a l th ,  g e n e ra l w e ll-b e in g  and contentm ent a re  a ls o  good, b u t "w ithou t 
th e  p r in c ip le  of a good w i l l  they  can become extrem ely  bad" (Ak. 394).
In  a d d it io n , a good w i l l  i s  good, n o t fo r  what i t  accom plishes, b u t fo r  
what i t  in te n d s . Even i f  i t  could n o t ach ieve  an y th in g , i t  would s t i l l  
" sp a rk le  l ik e  a jew el in  i t s  own r i g h t ,  as something th a t  had i t s  f u l l  
w orth in  i t s e l f "  (Ak. 394). In s h o r t ,  i t  i s  good "on ly  because of i t s  
w i l l in g ,  i . e . , i t  i s  good in  i t s e l f . "  And t h i s  good w i l l  "dw ells  in  the  
n a tu r a l  sound u n d ers tan d in g "  (Ak. 397) of a l l  r a t io n a l  b e in g s .
But th e  concept of a good w i l l ,  says K ant, i s  "co n ta in ed "  in
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th e  concept of d u ty . And the  a n a ly s is  of the  concept of du ty  shows 
th a t  a c tio n s  a re  m ora lly  worthy (a) i f  they a re  done from a sense of 
d u ty , n o t from in c l in a t io n ,  and /o r (b) i f  they  a re  done n o t only in  ac­
cordance w ith  duty  b u t fo r  the  sake of d u t y . B u t  to  a c t  fo r  the  sake 
of du ty  i s  to  a c t  ou t of re s p e c t  fo r  th e  law; th e  m oral worth of an 
a c tio n  does n o t l i e  in  the  e f f e c t  which i s  expected from i t ,  b u t r a th e r  
in  fo llo w in g  th e  law i t s e l f .  And th i s  law , which can "determ ine the 
w i l l  w ithou t re fe re n c e  to  the  expected r e s u l t "  (Ak. 402) and thus demands 
a u n iv e rs a l  conform ity  of a l l  a c t io n s ,  tak es  the  fo llow ing  form: "Would
I  be co n ten t th a t  my maxim should  ho ld  as a u n iv e rs a l  law fo r  m yself as 
w e ll as fo r  o th e rs? "  or "Can I  w i l l  th a t  my maxim become a u n iv e rs a l  
law?" (Ak. 403). What i s  im portan t h e re  i s  th a t  we cannot draw th is  
u n iv e r s a l  law by g e n e ra liz in g  some examples of m orally  good a c tio n  given 
to  us in  e x p e rien ce . On the  c o n tra ry , m o ra lity  can never be based on 
e m p iric a l exam ples. Furtherm ore, we cannot even be su re  th a t  th e re  a re  
such examples a t  a l l .  I t  fo llow s th a t  " a l l  m oral concepts have th e i r
s e a t  and o r ig in  e n t i r e ly  a p r io r i  in  reason"  (Ak. 411).
12Now to  show th a t  a c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  i s  p o ss ib le  ( j u s t i ­
f ie d )  , Kant c o n tin u e s , we have to  show th a t  the  p r in c ip le s  on which i t  
commands a re  v a l id  and b ind ing  fo r  a l l  r a t io n a l  b e in g s . The im perative  
of s k i l l  and prudence p re s e n ts  no problem , fo r  i t  invo lves an a n a ly t ic  
p ro p o s i t io n , i . e . ,  any r a t io n a l  agent who w i l l s  an end n e c e s s a r i ly  w i l ls  
th e  means to  th a t  end as w e ll .  But the  im p era tiv e  of m o ra lity  (ca teg o r­
i c a l  im perative) cannot be j u s t i f i e d  in  t h i s  way, f o r ,  as we have a lread y  
se en , "we cannot show w ith  c e r ta in ty  by any example th a t  the  w i l l  i s  
h e re  determ ined by the  law alone  w ithou t any o th e r in c e n tiv e s"  (Ak. 419).
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In o rd er to  j u s t i f y  i t  we have to  show th a t  man as a r a t io n a l  agent would 
n e c e s s a r i ly  a c t  in  a c e r ta in  way, and t h i s  cannot be done by an a n a ly t­
i c a l  argument.
What i s  the  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f K a n t's  argument fo r  the  c r i t i c a l  
understand ing  of Mencius? L et me beg in  by say ing  th a t  Kant and Mencius 
sh a re  the assum ption th a t  our o rd in a ry  m oral d isc o u rse  i s  m eaningful and, 
in  a d d it io n , th a t  s in c e  we a l l  know what i s  r ig h t  and wrong, or who i s  
to  be p ra ised  or blamed m o ra lly , our o rd in a ry  m oral judgments a re  u s u a lly  
t ru e .  For Kant t h i s  i s  indeed a b a s ic  assum ption of h is  a n a ly t ic a l  argu­
ment. Kant s ta t e s :
Thus w ith in  the  m oral knowledge of common reason  we have a t ta in e d  
i t s  p r in c ip le .  To be s u re ,  common human reason  does n o t th in k  of 
i t  a b s t r a c t ly  in  such a u n iv e r s a l  form , b u t i t  always has i t  in  
view and u ses i t  as th e  s tan d ard  of i t s  judgm ents. . . . W ithout 
in  th e  l e a s t  teach in g  common reaso n  any th ing  new, we need only  to  
draw i t s  a t t e n t io n  to  i t s  own p r in c ip le ,  in  th e  manner of S o c ra te s , 
thus showing th a t  n e i th e r  sc ie n c e  n o r ph ilosophy i s  needed in  o rder 
to  know îd iat one has to  do in  o rd er to  be h onest and good, even 
w ise and v ir tu o u s .  (Ak. 404)
In a s im ila r  way, Mencius b e l ie v e s  th a t  everyone can do good and, in  ad­
d i t io n ,  th a t  everyone knows th a t  he  ought to  do good. For example, a l l  
c h ild re n , w ithou t being  ta u g h t ,  know th a t  they ought to  love t h e i r  p a r­
e n ts  and re sp e c t th e i r  e ld e r s ;  they  a re  in  f a c t  capab le  of doing so; and 
13they  in  f a c t  do so .
This assum ption shared  by both  p h ilo so p h e rs  in d ic a te s  th a t  th e i r
argum ents have some draw backs. F i r s t  of a l l ,  th e  arguments have no fo rc e
whatsoever fo r  those  s c e p tic s  who do no t tak e  f o r  g ran ted  th a t  th e re  i s  a
m o ra lity  and b e lie v e ,  in s te a d , th a t  th e re  i s  no good reason  to  p ra is e  or
14blame o th e r people m o ra lly . Furtherm ore , even i f  we accep t th e  meaning­
fu ln e s s  of our o rd in a ry  m oral judgm ents, i t  does no t fo llow  th a t  our
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o rd in a ry  m oral judgm ents a re  u s u a lly  t r u e .  Both p h ilo so p h e rs , a t  l e a s t  
in  th is  s ta g e , do no t even co n sid e r the  "hard c ases"  where we ve ry  much 
want to  do what i s  r i g h t ,  b u t cannot f ig u re  ou t what th a t  r ig h t  i s .^ ^
The same s o r t  of na ive  assum ption i s  a ls o  p re se n t in  K an t's  
d isc u ss io n  of a good w i l l  and M encius' d isc u ss io n  of good n a tu re . N e ith e r 
ph ilo sopher o f f e r s  any e la b o ra te  arguments b u t both  b lu n tly  d e c la re  th a t  
th e re  a re  such th in g s  in  a l l  human b e in g s . They seem to  th in k  th a t  th e re  
i s  no need of any in d u c tiv e  o r deductive  reason ing  to  show th a t  th e re  i s
a good w i l l  o r a  good n a tu re . I n s te a d , they  a re  more concerned w ith  ex­
p la in in g  how th e  concept of good w i l l  or of good n a tu re  i s  r e le v a n t  to  
m an's m oral a c tio n  and m o ra lity  in  g e n e ra l. Mencius seems to  th in k  th a t  
s in c e  m an's o r ig in a l  good n a tu re  i s  so obv ious, a l l  we need to  do i s  to  
observe a few human a c tio n s  which a re  c lo s e ly  r e la te d  to  human n a tu re .
In  a s im ila r  way Kant b lu n tly  d e c la re s  th a t  a good w i l l  a lone  i s  good 
w ithou t q u a l i f ic a t io n ;  a l l  o th e r  " g i f t s "  can become extrem ely  bad i f  they  
a re  n o t accompanied by a good w i l l .
There i s  a ls o  a p a r a l l e l  between how both  p h ilo so p h e rs  i n t r o ­
duce a good w i l l  and a good n a tu re . Both b e lie v e  th a t  a good w i l l  or a 
good n a tu re  i s  somehow more " o r ig in a l"  than  an e v i l  w i l l  o r an e v i l  na­
tu re .  Kant i s  n o t so  e x p l i c i t  as M encius, who openly opposes both  Hsun 
T zu 's  th e s is  th a t  human n a tu re  i s  o r ig in a l ly  e v i l  and Kao T zu 's  th e s is
th a t  human n a tu re  i s  o r ig in a l ly  n e i th e r  good nor e v i l .  He does n o t say ,
fo r  example, th a t  th e re  i s  an u n q u a lif ie d  e v i l  w i l l  as w e ll as an un­
q u a lif ie d  good w i l l ,  b u t th a t  a good w i l l  i s  more " o r ig in a l ."  But th is  
i s  im plied  by Kant in  h i s  b e l ie f  th a t  m an's p re d is p o s it io n s  toward good 
somehow outweigh m an's p ro p e n s i tie s  toward e v i l  and th a t  th e re  w i l l  be
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an u ltim a te  " v ic to ry  of th e  good over the  e v i l  p r in c ip le "  and a "k ing ­
dom of God on e a r th .
With th ese  p re lim in a ry  rem arks in  mind, we come to  a main 
p o in t. What i s  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  of K a n t 's  a n a ly t ic a l  argument fo r  
Mencius? In th e  f i r s t  ch ap te r of th e  Foundations Kant draws, s o le ly  
from our o rd in a ry  m oral judgm ents, th e  concept of du ty  and the u n iv e rs a l  
law whose form i s  a c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e . But in  the second chap ter 
he i n s i s t s  th a t  th is  does n o t mean th a t  we can d e riv e  th e  concept of 
duty  and of a c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  by g e n e ra liz in g  examples of m oral 
a c tio n  given to  us in  e x p e rien ce . In  f a c t ,  f o r  s e v e ra l  reasons m o ra lity  
can never be based  on e m p ir ic a l exam ples. One, m o ra lity  i s  n o t a m atte r  
of b lin d  im ita t io n ;  th e  most such examples can do i s  to  encourage us to  
a c t  d u t i f u l l y .  Two, i t  i s  because we a lre ad y  p o ssess  a m oral p r in c ip le  
th a t  we can judge an a c tio n  to  be an example o f m oral a c tio n , and not 
the  o th e r  way around. T hree, most of a l l ,  "no experience  can g ive  oc­
c a s io n  fo r  in f e r r in g  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  of such a p o d ic t ic  laws" (Ak. 408)
because ev ery th in g  in  ex p e rien ce  i s  c o n tin g en t o r co n d itio n e d , n o t n e ces-
18sa ry  o r  uncond itioned . But m o ra lity  "must be v a l id  w ith  a b so lu te  
n e c e s s i ty  and n o t m erely under co n tin g e n t c o n d itio n s  and w ith excep tions"  
(Ak. 408). What i s  w orse, we cannot even be su re  th a t  th e re  a re  such 
examples a t  a l l  because we cannot t e l l  w ith  c e r ta in ty  whether or n o t an 
a c tio n  i s  done accord ing  to  a w i l l  th a t  i s  "determ ined by the  law alone 
w ithou t any o th e r  in c l in a t io n s "  (Ak. 419). I t  fo llow s th a t  " a l l  m oral 
concep ts have t h e i r  s e a t  and o r ig in  e n t i r e ly  a p r io r i  in  reason" (Ak.
411) and, fo r  the  same rea so n , th a t  we must d e riv e  the  supreme p r in c ip le  
of m o ra lity , i f  i t  i s  p o ss ib le  a t  a l l ,  from pure p r a c t ic a l  reason  i t s e l f .
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To prove th a t  th e  p r a c t ic a l  r u le  based on pu re  reason  i s  a c a te g o r ic a l
im p e ra tiv e , we have to  go beyond experience  " to  a c r i t i c a l  exam ination
of th e  s u b je c t ,  i . e . ,  of the  pure p r a c t i c a l  reaso n "  (Ak. 440). But such
an exam ination  b r in g s  up the  q u estio n  of s y n th e t ic  a p r i o r i  co n cep ts ,
and t h i s  w i l l  be d e a l t  w ith  in  th e  th i r d  and f i n a l  ch ap te r of the
19Foundations by a s y n th e t ic a l  argum ent, says Kant.
I t  cannot be shown by any example ( i . e . ,  i t  cannot be e m p ir ic a lly  
shown) w hether or no t th e re  i s  such [a  c a te g o r ic a l]  im p era tiv e ; 
i t  i s  r a th e r  to  be suspec ted  th a t  a l l  im p era tiv es  which appear to  
be c a te g o r ic a l  may y e t be h y p o th e t ic a l ,  b u t in  a h idden  way. (Ak.
419)
Now we a re  in  a p o s it io n  to  a p p re c ia te  more f u l l y  th e  s ig n i f ­
icance  of K a n t 's  a n a ly t ic a l  argument fo r  M encius' p sy ch o lo g ica l argum ent, 
w hich, by app ea lin g  to  our ^  f a c to  e m p ir ic a l f e e l in g s ,  o f f e r s  an "em pir­
i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n "  f o r  the  u n iv e r s a l i ty  of h i s  theo ry  o f human n a tu re .
I f  Kant i s  c o r r e c t ,  t h i s  s o r t  of e m p iric a l appeal w i l l  never p rov ide  a
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  M encius' u n iv e r s a l  s ta te m e n t th a t  a l l  men w ith o u t ex­
c e p tio n  a r e  o r ig in a l ly  good. M encius' argum ent w i l l  n o t e s ta b l i s h  what 
i t  p u rp o rts  to  e s ta b l i s h ,  n o t only  b ecau se , as I  m entioned in  th e  p rev ious 
s e c t io n , i t  commits th e  f a l la c y  of h a s ty  g e n e ra liz a tio n  and of h a s ty  
p a r t i c u l a r i z a t io n ,  b u t ,  more fundam en ta lly , because no c o n tin g e n t em pir­
i c a l  examples can p rov ide  a p o d ic tic  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  u n iv e r s a l  s t a t e -
20m ents such as  M encius' t h e s i s .  Furtherm ore , we cannot even be su re  
th a t  th e re  a re  such e m p iric a l examples a t  a l l  because we cannot t e l l  
w ith  c e r ta in ty  w hether an a c t  of com m iseration , fo r  example, i s  p e r ­
formed ou t of th e  a g e n t 's  o r ig in a l  good n a tu re ,  or out of o th e r  " incen ­
t i v e s , "  or out of b o th .
To r e p e a t ,  M encius' e f f o r t  to  p rov ide  an e m p ir ic a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n
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i s  doomed to  f a i l u r e ,  f o r  a l l  e m p iric a l examples a re  co n tin g en t and 
c o n d itio n e d , and a re  thus unab le  to  prove or d isp rove  any necessa ry  and 
u n c o n d itio n a l s ta te m e n ts . T his i s  why M encius' t h e s i s ,  which he claim s 
to  be u n iv e rs a l  and thus in  a sense  n ecessa ry  and u n c o n d itio n a l, must 
be j u s t i f i e d ,  i f  a t  a l l ,  by some nonem pirica l argum ents, and th i s  i s  
e x a c tly  what he i s  a ttem p tin g  to  do in  h i s  nonem pirical " h ig h e r-  
p r in c ip le "  argument.
K a n t's  S y n th e tic a l  Argument and M encius'
"H ig h e r-P rin c ip le "  Argument
In  t h i s  s e c t io n  I  w i l l  compare K an t's  s y n th e t ic a l  argument w ith  
M encius' h ig h e r - p r in c ip le  argum ent, and hope to  show th a t  M encius' non­
e m p iric a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  th e  u n iv e r s a l i ty  of h is  theory  of human n a tu re  
i s  a ls o  doomed to  f a i l u r e .  But b e fo re  going in to  th is  com parative a n a l­
y s i s ,  l e t  us f i r s t  examine a s im i la r i t y  between K an t's  p o s it io n  on i n c l i ­
n a tio n  and M encius' p o s i t io n  on em otional n a tu re .
As I  m entioned b e fo re , Mencius m ain ta in s th a t  man has  w ith in  
h im se lf  bo th  a h ig h e r  p r in c ip le  based on h is  r a t io n a l  n a tu re  and a lower 
p r in c ip le  based on h i s  em otional n a tu re . However, he a lso  m ain ta in s  th a t  
th e re  i s  only  a d if f e re n c e  and n o t an in h e re n t o p p o sitio n  between th ese  
two p r in c ip le s .  On th e  o th e r  hand , when Kant makes a d i s t in c t io n  between 
du ty  and in c l in a t io n ,  he seems to  downgrade in c l in a t io n  as something 
d ia m e tr ic a l ly  opposed to  m o ra lity , such th a t  we shou ld , i f  p o s s ib le , do 
away w ith  i t  com plete ly . In  what fo llo w s , however, I  w i l l  argue th a t  
K a n t 's  b a s ic  p o s it io n  i s  th a t  a m oral a c tio n  may be done, n o t only  out 
of a sense  of d u ty , b u t a lso  out of the com bination or even coopera tion  
betw een n a tu r a l  in c l in a t io n  and the  sense of d u ty , and th a t  in  th is
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sense h is  p o s it io n  i s  s im ila r  to  M encius' p o s i t io n .
Some sc h o la rs  l ik e  W olff and P o r te r  argue th a t  Kant i s  r ig h t  in
ho ld ing  th a t  our sense of du ty  based on a good w i l l  i s  " th e  h ig h e s t
m o tiv e ,"  b u t th a t  he f a i l s  to  see  the  obvious f a c t ,  th a t  " i t  i s  only
through the  s e n s i b i l i t i e s  th a t  th e  w i l l  can a c t  m orally  a t  a l l ,  by e n e r-
21g iz in g  and c o n tro l l in g  them ." For exam ple, Kant contends th a t  an in ­
c l in a t io n  to  make o th e r  people  happy i s  on a le v e l  w ith  o th e r  in c l in a ­
t io n s ,  th a t  i t  i s  v a lu a b le  only  as i t  tends to  produce a c ts  in  the  pub­
l i c  i n te r e s t s ,  and th a t  in  t h i s  sense i t  i s  n o t m oral. But i t  i s  e v i­
d e n t, the c r i t ic is m  c o n tin u e s , th a t  th e re  i s  some m oral worth in  such an 
in c l in a t io n .  Furtherm ore, the  " id ea"  of a good w i l l  can never move man 
to  a c t  m orally  in  the  absence of any d e s i r e  o r in c l in a t io n .  S e n s ib i l i ty ,  
excep t when d ire c te d  by a good w i l l ,  has no e th ic a l  e lem ent, b u t i t  does 
n o t fo llow  from t h i s  th a t  a good w i l l  i s  n o t connected w ith  a d i r e c t  
s e n s i b i l i t y  in  o rd e r to  make man a c t  f o r  th e  sake o f d u ty . In  s h o r t ,
Kant regards in c l in a t io n  as  a l im ita t io n  on th e  w i l l ,  n o t ,  as he shou ld ,
22as "a  source of ends towards which reaso n  gu ides u s ."
Now th e  am biguity  of K a n t's  language lends some support to  
t h i s  c r i t ic is m . For example, in  h i s  second p ro p o s it io n  on duty  Kant 
says th a t  "an a c t  from duty  w holly excludes th e  in f lu e n c e  of in c l in a t io n "  
(Ak. 400). But K a n t's  o v e r - a l l  emphasis on du ty  does n o t support such 
an in te r p r e ta t io n .  F i r s t  of a l l ,  when Kant says th a t  man shows m oral 
worth only  when he does good from a sense  o f d u ty , n o t from in c l in a t io n ,  
he i s  sim ply c o n tra s tin g  two m otives taken  in  i s o la t io n  in  o rder to  f in d  
out which of them i s  th e  source of m oral human a c tio n . I t  i s  th e  m otive 
of d u ty , n o t of in c l in a t io n ,  th a t  g ives m oral worth to  an a c tio n .
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Furtherm ore, Kant em phasizes th a t  th e re  i s ,  to  use Ross' e x p re ss io n , a 
"com plete d if fe re n c e "  and n o t a " n a tu ra l  o p p o sitio n "  between duty  and 
in c l in a t io n .  Of co u rse , Kant says th a t  th e  s te r n  command of du ty  o f te n  
r e q u ire s  s e l f - d e n ia l  and th a t  th is  command i s  a law which must be obeyed, 
even a g a in s t  s trong  in c l in a t io n ,  i f  n e c e ssa ry . But he does n o t mean tn a t  
du ty  i s  always a g a in s t in c l in a t io n  o r th a t  i t  always r e q u ire  s e l f - d e n ia l .  
L et me c la r i f y  th is  p o in t by examining K an t's  own exam ples.
My benevolent a c t has no m oral worth i f  i t  i s  sim ply th e  e f f e c t
o f my n a tu r a l  in c l in a t io n .  But Kant does n o t say th a t  th e re  i s  anyth ing
wrong or u n d e s ira b le  in  having such an in c l in a t io n .  On the c o n tra ry ,
a c ts  done from n a tu ra l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  in  in c re a s in g  the happ iness of o th e r
people a re  " d u t i fu l  and am iable" (Ak. 398). Again, Kant says th a t  the
B ib l ic a l  love must be commanded even i f  a man has an av ers io n  toward
b e n e fic e n t a c ts .  But he does no t say  th a t  i t  i s  b e t t e r  to  have such an
av e rs io n . On the  c o n tra ry , he e x p l i c i t ly  a s s e r ts  th a t  i t  i s  b e t t e r  to
do o n e 's  du ty  c h e e rfu lly  than  o th e rw ise , because maxims of our a c tio n s
a r i s e  "from d e s ire  and in c l in a t io n  under the  co o p e ra tio n  of reason" (Ak.
427). In  s h o r t ,  K a n t's  r e j e c t io n  of Hume's c o n te n tio n  th a t  rea so n  i s
only the  s la v e  of the  p assio n s should n o t be taken  as a com plete d e n ia l
23of m an's em otional n a tu re . In  t h i s  sense K a n t's  p o s it io n  on in c l in a ­
t io n  i s  s im ila r  to  M encius' p o s it io n  on em otional n a tu re . The only  d i f ­
fe re n c e  seems to  be th a t  Kant pu ts  more emphasis on duty  than on i n c l i ­
n a tio n , whereas Mencius p u ts  a r e l a t i v e ly  equal emphasis both  on moral 
and em otional n a tu re .
Now we come to  th e  main p o in t .  What i s  the  s ig n if ic a n c e  of 
K a n t's  s y n th e t ic a l  argument fo r  M encius' argument? In o rd er to  re p ly
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to  t h i s  q u e s tio n , I  w i l l  f i r s t  summarize K a n t 's  argum ent.
According to  K ant, a l l  r a t io n a l  b e ings have a w i l l ,  bu t the 
w i l l  i s  "a k ind  of c a u s a l i ty ."  But a w i l l  can a c t  c a u sa lly  in  two d i f ­
f e r e n t  ways; i t  can a c t  w ith o u t being  fo rced  by something o th e r  than  i t ­
s e l f ;  i . e . ,  by a law of freedom , or i t  can a c t  c a u s a l ly , as in  the  case 
of i r r a t i o n a l  b e in g s , only  so f a r  as i t  i s  fo rced  by something o th er 
than i t s e l f ,  i . e . ,  by a n a tu r a l  n e c e s s i ty .  Now s in c e  the  law of freedom 
must be se lf-im p o se d , n o t o ther-im posed , freedom i s  id e n t ic a l  w ith au ton­
omy. And s in c e  autonomy i s  the  p r in c ip le  of m o ra lity , a s  Kant has a lre ad y  
proved in  th e  p rev ious ch ap te r of the  F o u n d a tio n s , a f r e e  w i l l  i s  a w i l l  
under m oral law s. But h e re  a r i s e s  a problem  of "v ic io u s  c i r c l e , "  nam ely, 
to  argue th a t  one must suppose h im se lf  f r e e  because he i s  under m oral 
law s, and then  to  argue th a t  one must be under m oral laws because he has 
supposed th a t  he i s  f r e e .  The s o lu t io n  of t h i s  problem l i e s  in  the  
" d o c tr in e  of two s ta n d p o in ts "  which was e x p lic a te d  in  the  C r itiq u e  of 
Pure Reason. To be b r i e f ,  we must suppose th a t  man belongs to  two d i f ­
f e r e n t  w orlds—a s e n s ib le  w orld which i s  g iven  to  senses  and an i n t e l ­
l i g i b l e  world which can be conceived b u t can never be known. When man 
reg a rd s  h im se lf  a s  be long ing  e x c lu s iv e ly  to  the  s e n s ib le  w orld , he i s  
com pletely  s u b je c t  to  th e  law of cause and e f f e c t .  But when he reg a rd s  
h im se lf as be long ing  e x c lu s iv e ly  to  the  i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld , he i s  sub­
j e c t  to  laws vAiich "have th e i r  grounds in  reaso n  a lone"  and h i s  a c tio n s  
a re  e n t i r e ly  f re e .
But the concept of freedom , w ithou t which th e re  can be no m oral 
judgm ents, i s ,  Kant c o n tin u e s , only an " id e a  of reaso n "  whose " o b je c tiv e  
r e a l i t y  in  i t s e l f  i s  d o u b tfu l"  (Ak. 455); and th e  power of a l l  id eas  of
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reason  always produces "u n co n d itio n a l concepts which go beyond sense and 
can have no e m p irica l exam ple." I t  fo llow s t h a t  rea so n  cannot ex p la in  
"how pure reason  can be p r a c t ic a l"  (Ak. 458). This e n t a i l s  t h a t  th e re  
can be no f u l l  ex p la n a tio n  o f th e  concept of freedom and t h i s ,  in  tu rn ,  
e n ta i l s  th a t  th e re  can be no f u l l  e x p la n a tio n  o f m o ra lity  e i t h e r .
Kant has indeed l e f t  h i s  re a d e rs  w ith  th e  im pression  th a t  h is  
s y n th e t ic a l  argument would go beyond what has been s a id  in  h i s  p rev ious 
a n a ly t ic a l  argument and p ro v id e , once and fo r  a l l ,  an a p o d ic t ic  j u s t i f i ­
c a tio n  fo r  a c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e . As shown in  the  above summary, 
however, he spends most of the  l a s t  ch ap te r of the  Foundations ex p la in in g  
why we can never d isco v er answers to  th e  fundam ental q u e s tio n s  of the  
m etaphysics o f m orals.
K a n t's  argument s t a r t s  w ith  a d e f in i t io n  of a w i l l  and qu ick ly
invo lves th e  concept of freedom because he b e lie v e s  th a t  we must f i r s t
presuppose freedom fo r  a l l  r a t io n a l  a g e n ts  in  o rd er to  have m o ra lity  a t
a l l .  But th e re  i s ,  to  be s u re , a c o n f l i c t  or c o n tra d ic t io n  between
freedom and c a u s a l i ty .  We can abandon n e i th e r  of them in  fav o r o f th e
o th e r . T his c o n f l ic t  can be reso lv e d  only  i f  man conceives h im se lf  both
a s  a member of a s e n s ib le  o r phenomenal world and as a member of an
i n t e l l i g i b l e  o r noumenal w orld . As a member of the  form er world man i s
com pletely  s u b je c t  to  th e  law of cause and e f f e c t ,  b u t as a member of the
l a t t e r  world he i s  com pletely  f r e e .  Kant s t a t e s :
The m oral worth i s  th e re fo re  h i s  own v o l i t io n  as a member of the  
i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld , and i t  i s  conceived by him as an ought only  in  
so f a r  as he reg a rd s  h im se lf  a t  the  same tim e as a  member o f the  
w orld o f sense . (Ak. 455)
K a n t's  s y n th e t ic a l  argument i s  n o t convincing  a t  a l l  fo r  s e v e ra l  
rea so n s . F i r s t ,  the  argument h e a v ily  depends on some c r u c ia l  p o in ts
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which Kant b e lie v e s  he has a lre ad y  proved in  th e  p rev ious a n a ly t ic a l  
argum ent, and th i s  does n o t square  w ith  h i s  own d e c la ra t io n  th a t  the  
" r e a l"  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  a c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  must be made in  the 
s y n th e t ic a l  argum ent. Second, K a n t 's  two-world view i s  something very  
d i f f i c u l t  to  a c c e p t. I t  i s  indeed amazing to  see t h a t ,  fo r  Kant, the  
c o n f l ic t  between freedom and n a tu r a l  determ inism  and th e  ex p lan a tio n  of 
how a r u le  of autonomous reaso n  can appear to  men as a c a te g o r ic a l  im­
p e ra t iv e  a re  only th e  c o r o l la r ie s  of h i s  d i s t i n c t io n  between appearances 
and th in g s - in - th e m se lv e s .
T h ird , even i f  we accep t h i s  two-world view , we must f u r th e r  
assume th a t  th e  i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld , in  K a n t 's  own word, "co n ta in s"  the  
ground of th e  s e n s ib le  world and a ls o  of i t s  law s, because Kant in f e r s  
from t h i s  assum ption th a t  th e  laws governing my w i l l  a s  a member of the  
i n t e l l i g i b l e  world ought to  govern my w i l l  as a member of the  s e n s ib le  
w orld . But th e re  i s  no reason  why we should  g ra n t ,  a t  l e a s t  w ithou t f u r ­
th e r  e x p la n a tio n , th e  prim acy of a noumenal s e l f  over the  phenomenal 
s e l f .  F o u rth , on K a n t 's  own argum ent, we can have no knowledge of the  
i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld , fo r  we have no acquain tance  w ith  such a world by 
means of i n tu i t i o n  (e x p e r ie n c e ) . We have only  an id ea  of i t ,  and th a t  
i s  a l l .  This means, as Kant h im se lf  ad m its , t h a t  our id ea  of freedom, 
vdiich i s  d i r e c t l y  d e riv ed  from th e  id e a  of th e  i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld , can­
n o t be ad eq u ate ly  e x p la in e d , and t h i s ,  in  tu rn ,  means th a t  we only  have 
a "form" of the  i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld , i . e . ,  th e  p r in c ip le  of autonomy and 
i t s  co rrespond ing  concept (a  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e ) . At any r a t e ,  Kant 
concludes the  Foundations w ith  an apology f o r  " th e  extrem e l im it  of a l l  
m oral enqu iry"  r a th e r  than  w ith  a n o te  of trium ph: "We cannot prove
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freedom to  be r e a l  in  o u rse lv es  and in  human n a tu re "  (Ak. 447). We can­
no t comprehend the  p r a c t ic a l  unconditioned  n e c e s s i ty  of a  m oral im pera­
t iv e ;  a l l  we can comprehend i s  i t s  " in c o m p re h e n s ib ility "  (Ak. 463).
We can a ls o  e x p la in  K an t's  " f a i lu r e "  in  term s o f h i s  d i s t i n c t io n  
between a n a ly t ic  and sy n th e tic  judgm ents. According to  K ant, th e  connec­
t io n  between su b je c t  and p re d ic a te  term s in  a l l  s y n th e t ic  judgm ents r e ­
q u ire s  a " th i rd  th in g "  by which the  two term s can be u n ite d . In  the case 
of o rd in a ry  s y n th e tic  e m p iric a l judgm ents, our experience  se rv e s  a s  th e  
th ir d  th in g . But the m atte r  i s  not so sim ple w ith  s y n th e t ic  a  p r io r i  
judgm ents, fo r  we cannot j u s t i f y  them by app ea lin g  to  e x p e rien ce . Kant 
thus concludes in  th e  C r itiq u e  of Pure Reason th a t  " th e  c o n d itio n s  of a 
p o ss ib le  experience  in  g e n e ra l"  se rv es  as th e  th i r d  th in g  f o r  a l l  syn­
th e t ic  a p r io r i  judgm ents. In  a s im ila r  b u t a r b i t r a r y  way, Kant con­
cludes in  th e  Foundations th a t  th e  p r in c ip le  of autonomy and i t s  c o r re s ­
ponding c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  a re  a ls o  s y n th e t ic  a p r io r i  and th a t  the  
th ird  th in g  in  t h i s  case  i s  " th e  p o s i t iv e  concept of freedom ." But i t  
tu rn s  out th a t  th e  th i r d  th in g  in  which th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  i s  
grounded i s  no thing b u t an a s s e r t io n  th a t  man exp erien ces  h im se lf  both  
as a cond itioned  appearance and an unconditioned  noumenon.
What i s  the b ea rin g  of our e v a lu a tio n  o f K an t's  argument on
Mencius? My p o in t, as I  w i l l  argue in  th e  fo llo w in g , i s  t h i s :  (a)
24Although th e re  a re  many d if fe re n c e s  between th e i r  argum ents, they  
have th e  same lo g ic a l  form or s t r u c tu r e ,  (b) But t h i s  form i s  n o t v a l id  
because i t  has a t  l e a s t  one counterexam ple, namely, K a n t's  argum ent.
(c) I t  fo llow s from these  th a t  M encius' argument i s  no t v a l id  by v ib tu e  
of th a t  form, and th a t  we s h a l l  have to  f in d  ano ther form i t  p o ssesses
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25i f  we a re  to  show i t  to  be a v a lid  argum ent.
Now th e i r  argum ents have th e  fo llow ing  form: From the  p rev ious
argument ( i . e . ,  an a n a ly t ic a l  argument fo r  K ant, and a p sy ch o lo g ica l 
argument fo r  Mencius) i t  fo llow s th a t  no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  ( i . e . ,  an a p o d ic tic  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of m o ra lity  fo r  K ant, and a complete j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of u n i­
v e r s a l  s ta tem en ts  fo r  Mencius) i s  p o s s ib le  by examples g iven to  us in  
ex p e rien ce . So the  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  must be made, i f  a t  a l l ,  by some non- 
e m p iric a l argum ents. Both p h ilo so p h e rs  thus make an appeal to  a non- 
e m p iric a l th in g , namely, an i n t e l l i g i b l e  world or a h ig h er p r in c ip le .  
According to  K ant, man i s  a member of bo th  w o rld s, b u t he should s t r i v e  
to  a c t  as a member of an i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld . According to  M encius, man 
i s  a fo llo w er of both  p r in c ip le s ,  b u t he should s t r i v e  to  fo llow  a h ig h er 
p r in c ip le .  Of cou rse , Mencius does n o t o f f e r  an e la b o ra te  argument such 
as Kant d oes, b u t i f  he were p ressed  to  do so , I  th in k  he would have 
come o u t w ith  something l ik e  K a n t's  argum ent.
To prove th a t  a form i s  f a l la c io u s ,  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  f in d  
one counter-exam ple which has th a t  form. Now i f  my e v a lu a tio n  of K a n t's  
argument (and K a n t 's  own con fession ) i s  c o r r e c t ,  th e  form of both  K an t's  
and M encius' argum ents has a t  l e a s t  one counter-exam ple. F o r, as I  
m entioned b e fo re , K a n t's  argument f i r s t  presupposes the  e x is te n c e  of 
freedom , vrtiich on K a n t 's  own co n fessio n  cannot be adequate ly  ex p la in ed .
M encius' argument a ls o  presupposes the e x is te n c e  of freedom.
This i s  c le a r  by th e  f a c t  th a t  we can indeed make no sense  of h is  d i s ­
cu ssio n  of two d i f f e r e n t  p r in c ip le s  i f  we cannot choose e i th e r  of them 
f r e e ly .  But M encius' a ttem p t to  re so lv e  a c o n f l ic t  o r c o n tra d ic tio n  
between freedom and n e c e s s i ty , which he could have made b u t u n fo rtu n a te ly
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did  n o t ,  w i l l  u l t im a te ly  be a f a i l u r e  in  the  same way th a t  Kant f a i l s .
F i r s t  of a l l ,  a m oral s k e p tic ,  who b e lie v e s  th a t  th e re  i s  no reason  to
blame or p ra is e  o th e r  people m o ra lly , would n o t accep t th a t  man has
26w ith in  h im se lf two d i f f e r e n t  p r in c ip le s .  Second, u n lik e  K ant, Mencius
does no t even o f fe r  a f u l l  e x p la n a tio n  why i t  i s  th e  case  th a t  th e re  a re
two d i f f e r e n t  p r in c ip le s  in  a l l  human b e in g s . He sim ply tak es  i t  fo r
g ran te d . T h ird , even i f  he were to  o f f e r  an e x p la n a tio n  along  the l in e s
of K a n t 's  argum ent, he could n o t have provided  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  h is
th e s is  w ithou t some p r io r  m etaphysica l p re su p p o s itio n s  l ik e  K a n t 's  two-
w orld  view , and th ese  p re su p p o s itio n s  would be something v e ry  hard  to
swallow fo r  most " n o n b e lie v e rs ."  F in a l ly ,  even i f  we a c cep t h i s  two-
p r in c ip le  view , Mencius i s  f u r th e r  o b lig ed  to  e x p la in  why we should f o l -
27low f r e e ly  th e  h ig h e r  p r in c ip le  r a th e r  than  th e  lower p r in c ip le ,  j u s t  
as Kant i s  ob liged  to  e x p la in  why we should l iv e  as a member of a noumenal 
world r a th e r  than  as a member of a  phenomenal w orld .
As I  m entioned in  th e  In tro d u c tio n , most th e o r ie s  of human na­
tu r e ,  whether th a t  n a tu re  be good, e v i l ,  or n e u t r a l ,  b o a s t of a u n iv e r­
s a l i t y  th a t  a llow s no e x c ep tio n s , and most p h ilo so p h ie s  o f human n a tu re , 
\d ie ther they be t h e i s t i c ,  a t h e i s t i c ,  or n o n th e is t ic ,  a ls o  b o a s t of t h e i r  
u n iv e r s a l i ty .  M encius' th eo ry  of human n a tu re  and h is  ph ilosophy  of 
human n a tu re  a re  n o t an ex cep tio n  to  t h i s  c la im . But i f  my d isc u ss io n  
of M encius' argum ents i s  c o r r e c t ,  th e  u n iv e r s a l i ty  claim ed by h i s  th e s i s
cannot be j u s t i f i e d ,  and t h i s  means th a t  M encius' a ttem pt to  ex p la in  why
28a l l  men w ithou t excep tio n  ought to  do good r a th e r  than  e v i l  has f a i l e d .
CHAPTER I I  FOOTNOTES
^L ater In  th is  c h a p te r  I  w i l l  d isc u ss  K an t's  p o s it io n  on du ty  
and in c l in a t io n  in  comparison w ith  M encius' p o s i t io n  on m an's r a t io n a l  
and em otional n a tu re , and argue th a t  t h i s  i s  in  f a c t  a  m islead ing  way 
to  c h a ra c te r iz e  K a n t's  p o s i t io n  on in c l in a t io n .
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Of co u rse , the  prim ary d if f e re n c e  between them l i e s  in  what 
they  tak e  to  be u n iv e rs a l  r a th e r  than  in  what they  mean by " u n iv e r s a l ."  
Kant tak es  th e  c a te g o rie s  and th e  forms of space and tim e to  be u n iv e r­
s a l ,  whereas Mencius ta k e s  the  o r ig in a l  goodness o f human n a tu re  to  be
u n iv e r s a l .
3
In the  f i n a l  c h a p te r  I  w i l l  argue th a t  some of M encius'
a s s e r t io n s  m entioned h e re  do n o t fo llow  from h i s  th e s i s .
^ K an t's  e x p la n a tio n  o f a p r io r i  elem ents involved  in  our em pir­
i c a l  knowledge, which he c a l l s  " c a te g o r ie s "  or "form s of space and t im e ,"  
i s  the  same as t h i s  p rocedu re . He argues th a t  th e  c a te g o r ie s  a re  u n i­
v e r s a l  and n e c e ssa ry , n o t in  th e  sen se  th a t  we can deduce from them 
p a r t i c u la r  e m p irica l p ro p o s itio n s  by a  s t r i c t  d e f in i t i o n ,  b u t in  the  
sense th a t  a l l  e m p iric a l p ro p o s it io n s  must conform to  the  c a te g o r ie s .
The c a te g o rie s  a re  th e  "g en e ra l c o n d itio n "  of experience  i t s e l f .  See 
Immanuel K ant, C r i tiq u e  of Pure Reason, Ak. 421.
K a n t 's  t e x t s  quoted in  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t io n  a re  C r i tiq u e  of Pure 
Reason, t r a n s .  by Norman Kemp Sm ith, S t .  M a rtin 's  P re s s , New York, 1965; 
Foundations of th e  M etaphysics of M orals, t r a n s .  by Lewis W hite Beck,
The L ib ra ry  of L ib e ra l  A r ts ,  New York, 1959. But they  w i l l  be s ig n i f ie d  
by the  o r ig in a l  Akademie e d i t io n  numbers.
^ I  d isc u ss  th e se  c la im s in  th e  l a s t  two s e c tio n s  of th is  c h a p te r .
^The term s " a n a ly t ic a l"  and " s y n th e t ic a l"  should  n o t be con­
fused  w ith  " a n a ly tic  judgm ent" and " s y n th e tic  judgm ent."  According to  
K ant, th e  a n a ly t ic a l  argument i s  one proceeded "by a mere a n a ly s is  of 
th e  concept" o ccu rrin g  in  th e  argum ent; th e  s y n th e t ic a l  argument i s  one 
proceeded by "a c r i t i c a l  exam ination of th e  s u b je c t ,  i . e . ,  of the  pure  
p r a c t ic a l  reason"  (Ak. 440). For t h i s  d if f e re n c e  I  w i l l  u se  in  th is  
d i s s e r ta t io n  " a n a ly t ic a l"  and " s y n th e t ic a l"  r a th e r  than  " a n a ly tic "  and 
" s y n th e t ic ."
^Book of M encius, 6A :2 :2-3 .
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S t r i c t l y  sp eak in g , no p h ilo so p h e r o f fe r s  any in d u c tiv e  or 
d e d u c tiv e  account o f human n a tu re . But t h i s  problem i s  more p e r t in e n t  
to  M encius, who, u n lik e  o th e r  m o ra l is ts ,  p ro fe s se s  to  o f f e r  h i s  theory  
as a d e s c r ip t io n ,  n o t a p r e s c r ip t io n .  See my c r i t ic is m  of L egge 's  i n t e r ­
p r e ta t io n  o f M encius’ th e s i s  in  th e  p rev io u s  c h a p te r .
9
R ich a rd s , op. c i t . , p . 69.
^ ^ If  we d e fin e  m o ra lity  by the  id e a  of the  predom inance of the  
h ig h e r  p r in c ip le ,  t h i s  o b je c tio n  does n o t h o ld . But M encius' e th ic s  i s  
n o t d e f in i t i o n a l .
^^There a re  o f course  some a c t io n s ,  Kant adm its , where duty and 
in c l in a t io n  may c o in c id e  and th u s  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  determ ine w hether 
or n o t they  a re  m otivated  by d u ty . But K a n t 's  p o in t  i s  th a t  i t  must be 
assumed in  g e n e ra l th a t  a m ora lly  worthy a c tio n  i s  done fo r  th e  sake of 
d u ty  a lo n e .
12Three comments a re  needed h e re , (a) Kant argues t h a t  man i s  
a r a t i o n a l  agent who has th e  power to  a c t  in  accordance w ith  u n iv e rs a l  
p r in c ip le ,  from which the  concept o f du ty  a r i s e s .  But he a ls o  argues 
t h a t  man i s  an im p e rfe c tly  r a t i o n a l  b e in g ; h i s  rea so n  does n o t have f u l l  
c o n tro l  over h i s  a c t io n s .  T his i s  why th o se  p r in c ip le s  a re  seen as 
c o n s tr a in t s  on man; they  seem imposed on th e  w i l l  from o u ts id e  as some­
th in g  conceived as n e c e s s i ta t in g .  And where an o b je c t iv e  p r in c ip le  i s  
conceived as n e c e s s i ta t in g ,  i t  becomes a command, and i t s  form ula may 
be c a l le d  an im p e ra tiv e .
(b) But th e re  a re  two k in d s of im p era tiv e : h y p o th e t ic a l  and 
c a te g o r ic a l .  The form er p re s e n ts  an a c tio n  as a means to  ach ieve  some­
th in g  e ls e ,  and i t s  g e n e ra l form i s  " I f  I  w i l l  X, then  I  ought to  do Y"; 
such an im p era tiv e  i s  good only  as a means to  an end a lre a d y  w il le d . On 
th e  o th e r  hand, a c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  p re s e n ts  an a c tio n  th a t  i s  ob­
j e c t iv e ly  n e c essa ry  w ith o u t any re fe re n c e  to  an o th er end, and i t s  g en e ra l 
form i s  sim ply " I  ought to  do X"; and such an im p era tiv e  i s  good in  i t ­
s e l f .  (Kant does n o t d isc u ss  im p era tiv es  th a t  a re  n o t good.)
(c) Kant a ls o  argues th a t  a c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  may be formu­
la te d  in  many d i f f e r e n t  ways. But the  form ula of autonomy, i . e . ,  the  
id e a  o f the  w i l l  of every  r a t i o n a l  be ing  a s  making a u n iv e rs a l  law, i s  
p a r t i c u l a r ly  im p o rtan t. For i t  makes us see  th a t  we ought to  fo llow  a 
u n iv e r s a l  law which we o u rse lv e s  make. In  o th e r w ords, we a re  bound to  
obey th e  law in  v i r t u e  of i t s  u n iv e r s a l i ty ,  and th e  law which we a re  
bound to  obey must be th e  p roduct of our own w i l l ,  says K ant.
13Book of M encius, 7 A :1 5 :l-3 .
According to  W olff, Kant h im se lf  knows t h a t  h i s  a n a ly t ic a l  
argument proves "no th ing  to  th e  s c e p t ic ,  b u t he th in k s , n e v e r th e le s s , 
t h a t  i t  i s  a good way to  beg in  an exam ination of m oral p h ilo so p h y ."  
R obert P. W olff, The Autonomy of Reason; A Commentary on K a n t 's  Ground­
work of the  M etaphysics o f M orals, H arper & Row, 1963, o r ig in a l ly  pub­
l is h e d  in  1963, p. 52.
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15Perhaps th is  c r i t ic is m  does no t apply  to  Kant. F o r, as I 
mentioned b e fo re , the c a te g o r ic a l  im perative  i s  n o t a p r in c ip le  from 
which we can deduce p a r t ic u la r  judgm ents, and thus K a n t's  arguments 
have to  do w ith  the a p r io r i  c o n d itio n  of m oral judgments g e n e ra lly .
^^(a) There i s  a ls o  a d if f e re n c e  between th ese  two argum ents. 
K an t's  argument p o in ts  to  cases where the o th e r " g i f t s "  a re  p re s e n t ,  b u t 
good w i l l  i s  ab sen t. But Mencius does not d isc u ss  such ca se s .
(b) According to  Gruender, K a n t's  p o in t h e re  i s  th a t  a l l  o th e r 
" g i f t s "  a re  n o t a b s o lu te ly  good, f o r ,  w ithou t the  p r in c ip le  of a good 
w i l l ,  they can e a s i ly  be "m isused ." B ut, he a rg u es , th is  i s  n o t con­
v in c in g  a t  a l l  because a good w i l l  may very  w e ll  be m isused. See C.
David Gruender, "The C a te g o rica l Im perative  as an A P r io r i  P r in c ip le ,"
The P h ilo so p h ic a l Forum, V ol. I I ,  No. 4 , p . 462.
But I  b e lie v e  th is  i s  a m isunderstanding  of Kant because Kant 
h e re  o f fe r s  a "conceptual argum ent," namely, th a t  a good w i l l  i s  th e  
only  u n q u a lif ie d ly  good th in g , w hether o r no t anyone has i t .
^^(a) Immanuel Kant, R e lig io n  W ithin the  L im its of Reason A lone,
p . 85.
(b) Here i s  a c r i t ic is m  d ire c te d  a g a in s t  th e  K antian  d o c tr in e  of 
a good w i l l ,  which may w e ll be a c r i t ic is m  a g a in s t  a good n a tu re  in  a 
s l ig h t ly  d i f f e r e n t  form: I f  a good w i l l  i s  good w ith o u t q u a l i f ic a t io n ,
the m oral worth based on i t  "has no r e l a t i o n  to  any o th e r  goods." But 
t h is  incom parable s u p e r io r i ty  of m oral goodness must be compared w ith  
o th e rs  in  o rder to  show i t s  supremacy. I t  fo llow s th a t  th e  m oral good­
ness Kant i s  ta lk in g  about i s  "som ething which may be im portan t to  God 
in  p assing  a f i n a l  judgment on men, b u t i s  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  r e le v a n t  to  
human j u s t i c e . "  W illiam  C. Swabey, E th ic a l  Theory from Hobbes to  K ant,
The C ita d e l P re ss , p . 222. I  b e lie v e  th a t  t h i s  c r i t ic is m  i s  unw arranted . 
I t  must be remembered th a t  K a n t's  good w i l l  i s  n o t u n re la te d  to  o th e r s , 
b u t i t  i s  n o t in  the  l e a s t  a ffe c te d  by o th e rs  in  determ in ing  w hether an 
a c tio n  i s  m ora lly  worthy.
18S t r i c t l y  speak ing , the  dem onstra tion  of the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f an 
ab so lu te  m oral law i s ,  accord ing  to  K ant, n ecessa ry  "only  fo r  i t s  ex­
p la n a tio n  and no t fo r  i t s  e s ta b lish m en t"  (Ak. 420). So the word " p o ss i­
b i l i t y "  should be taken as " ju s t i f i c a t i o n . "
19How can we e x p la in , th e n , K a n t's  own e m p iric a l example of a 
f a ls e  prom ising in  the  f i r s t  ch ap te r and fo u r o th e r  examples in  th e  second 
chap ter of the Foundations? According to  W olff, t h i s  i s  no th ing  s tra n g e  
because i t  may very  w e ll be th a t  we can dem onstrate  th e  v a l id i t y  of m oral 
p r in c ip le s ,  although we cannot g ive  a " c e r t i f i e d  example" of a c tio n s  done 
out of such p r in c ip le s .  W olff, op. c i t . , p . 142.
20One m ight say th a t  s in c e  M encius' u n iv e r s a l  s ta te m e n t, as I  
m entioned b e fo re , i s  n o t as s t r i c t l y  u n iv e rs a l  as K a n t 's ,  no a p o d ic tic  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  may be needed fo r  i t .  There a re  two r e p l ie s  to  t h i s  ob­
je c t io n .  (a) Assuming th a t  Mencius i s  concerned only w ith  e x p lic a t in g  
or ex p la in in g  m o ra lity  in  terms of h i s  theory  of human n a tu re  r a th e r
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than  e s ta b l is h in g  m o ra lity , t h i s  o b je c tio n  does no t prove M encius' 
th e s is  . (b) Although Mencius p ro fe sses  to  be concerned w ith
ex p la in in g  m o ra lity , he im p l ic i t ly  t r e a t s  h i s  th e s i s  as a b a s is  fo r  
e s ta b l is h in g  m o ra lity . For he b e lie v e s  th a t  from h is  th e s i s  i t  l o g i ­
c a l ly  fo llow s th a t  man has an in n a te  knowledge of the  good and an in ­
n a te  a b i l i t y  to  do good. I  w i l l  d iscu ss  th is  problem in  d e t a i l  in  the 
concluding chap ter of t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n .
^ ^ o a h  P o r te r ,  K a n t's  E th ic s , S.C. Griggs and C o., Chicago,
1886, p. 53.
^^W olff, op. c i t . , p . 17.
23According to  C op leston , Kant does n o t say e x p l i c i t ly  th a t  i t  
i s  m ora lly  wrong to  p rese rv e  o n e 's  l i f e  because of h i s  in c l in a t io n  to  
do so ; the  a c t  i s  a t  l e a s t  in  accordance w ith  and n o t incom patib le  w ith  
d u ty . The a c t  has no m oral v a lu e , b u t i t  "can h a rd ly  be c a lle d  immoral 
in  the  sense  th a t  s u ic id e  i s  im m oral." F re d e r ic k  C op leston , A H is to ry  
of P h ilsoophy , Vol. 6 , Doubleday, New York, 1967, p . 109.
24I  mentioned a few d if fe re n c e s  between t h e i r  argum ents in  the 
f i r s t  s e c t io n  of t h i s  c h a p te r . But the d if fe re n c e s  go f u r th e r .  In  f a c t ,  
most terms such as " u n iv e rsa l"  or " f re e "  th a t  bo th  p h ilo so p h e rs  use  do 
no t have the  same meaning. M oreover, what they  in ten d  to  e s ta b l is h  in  
t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  arguments i s  d i f f e r e n t  from one a n o th e r . But th ese  
d if fe re n c e s  w i l l  n o t a f f e c t  my d isc u s s io n , fo r  in  the  fo llow ing  I  w i l l  
d isc u ss  th e  form of th e i r  argum ents, n o t the  arguments them selves. When 
we d e a l w ith  the form of argum ents, we do no t have to  c a re  about th e  
p a r t i c u la r  c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  of th e  c la s s e s  r e f e r r e d  to  by th e  term s. We 
can even s u b s t i tu te  l e t t e r s  fo r  each of th e  term s, u sin g  the same l e t t e r  
to  re p la c e  the  same term  each tim e i t  occurs and d i f f e r e n t  l e t t e r s  to  
re p la c e  d i f f e r e n t  term s.
25I  use  th e  ph rase  "no t v a l id  by v i r tu e  of t h i s  form" because , 
s t r i c t l y  speak ing , the  method of counter-exam ple "co n c lu s iv e ly  proves 
the in v a l id i ty  of a  form , b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  th a t  of a p a r t i c u la r  argu­
m ent. . . .  I f  we m erely show th a t  an argument has a c e r ta in  form , and 
th a t  th is  form i s  in v a l id ,  we have n o t thereby  proved th a t  the  argument 
i s  in v a l id .  In  o rder to  e s ta b l is h  co n c lu s iv e ly  the in v a l id i ty  of an 
argum ent, i t  i s  n e c essa ry  to  show th a t  th e re  i s  no o th e r  form which i t  
p o ssesses  by v i r tu e  of which i t  i s  v a l id ."  Wesley C. Salmon, L og ic , 
P re n tic e -H a ll ,  1973, p. 21.
26We may be a b le  to  show th a t  the  s k e p t i c 's  p o s i t io n  i s  u n ten ab le , 
b u t th is  i s  of course  ano ther m a tte r .
27See my fo o tn o te  (10) on p . 53.
28There a re  many th e o r ie s  o f human n a tu re  o th e r  than  th a t  of 
M encius. For in s ta n c e , Hsun Tzu argues th a t  man i s  o r ig in a l ly  e v i l ;  "The 
inborn  n a tu re  of mankind i s  e v i l .  The good in  men must be made. . . . Men
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a re  bom  w ith  a love  of p r o f i t  in  them. . . . Men a re  born  w ith  rag e  and 
h a te  in  them. . . . Men a re  born w ith  th e  a p p e t i te s  of ea r and eye, they  
have a love o f sounds and s ig h ts  in  them. . . . Take man as h e 's  bo rn .
H is f e e l in g s  develop , accord ing  to  t h a t ,  what w i l l  come of i t ?  H e 'l l  
f ig h t ,  h e ' l l  g rab , h i s  r o le  w i l l  be th e  r e b e l 's ,  h i s  p r in c ip le s  w i l l  be 
the  a n a r c h i s t 's ,  and he w i l l  tu rn  in to  a c r im in a l. T h erefo re , we must 
have a change. Man needs a tea c h e r  as m odel, and he needs the  Tao of 
r i t u a l  and e q u ity . . . .  I f  we look a t  th e s e  f a c t s ,  we can see th e  t r u th  
c le a r ly  enough: the  inborn  n a tu re  of mankind i s  e v i l .  The good in  men
must be made, i t  i s  a r t i f i c i a l . "  Hsun Tzu, Hsun Tzu, chap. 23 (McNaughton's 
t r a n s l a t i o n ) .
I  doubt w hether th ese  th e o r ie s  a re  j u s t i f i e d .  F i r s t  of a l l ,  
th e re  a re  no u n iv e r s a lly  accep ted  co n c lu sio n s concerning human n a tu re , 
and th i s  s e r io u s ly  underm ines th e  u n iv e r s a l i ty  claim ed by th ese  th e o r ie s .  
Furtherm ore, th ese  th e o r ie s  a re  u s u a lly  fo rm ula ted  n e i th e r  in d u c tiv e ly  
no r d e d u c tiv e ly , " re ly in g  s o le ly  upon th e  c re a t iv e  im ag ina tion  of th e i r  
ad h e ren ts"  such th a t  they  a re  n o t even su b je c t  to  c r i t i c a l  in q u i r ie s .
John J .  M itc h e ll , "Why Study Human N atu re?" Human N a tu re , ed. John J .  
M itc h e ll , Metuchen, New J e rs e y , 1972, p . 23.
This i s  no t to  say , however, th a t  th e  term  "human n a tu re "  i s  a 
genuine misnomer or th a t  th e re  i s  no such r e a l i t y .  Nor does i t  mean 
th a t  we should abandon a l l  in v e s t ig a t io n s  of human n a tu re  a l to g e th e r .  I 
b e lie v e  th a t  th e re  i s  a unique human n a tu re  which makes man d i f f e r  from 
o th e r  c re a tu r e s ,  and th a t  we can s e n s ib ly  in v e s t ig a te  t h i s  unique human 
n a tu re  p sy c h o lo g ic a lly  or p h y s io lo g ic a l ly . I  only  doubt w hether any 
p h ilo so p h er or th eo lo g ian  can propose h i s  own v e rs io n  of th eo ry  w ithou t 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  and assume h is  th eo ry  as  th e  only supreme p r in c ip le  of 
m o ra l i ty .
CHAPTER I I I
A SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE, WITH REFERENCE TO CONFUCIUS
In tro d u c tio n
I f  M encius' ph ilosophy  of human n a tu re  i s  in ad eq u a te , a s  I  
argued in  the  p rev ious c h a p te r , i s  th e re  any a l t e r n a t iv e  philosophy?
In  sea rch in g  fo r  such an a l t e r n a t iv e  in  t h i s  c h a p te r , I  w i l l  tu rn  to  
Confucius and argue th a t  h is  ph ilosophy  of a c tio n ^  i s  more adequate 
than  M encius' ph ilosophy  of human n a tu re  in  e x p la in in g , a t  l e a s t  to  
some deg ree , th e  complex problem s of human a c t io n .
For t h i s  purpose , I  w i l l  f i r s t  in d ic a te  in  t h i s  ch ap te r some 
c ru c ia l  d if fe re n c e s  between Confucius and Mencius in  t h e i r  b a s ic  a t t i ­
tude  toward human b e in g s . F o r, w ith  some e x c ep tio n s , i t  i s  g e n e ra lly  
b e liev ed  th a t  th e re  i s  no o r l i t t l e  d if f e re n c e  between th ese  two p h i­
lo sophers on th e  problem of human n a tu re  and human a c tio n  and th a t  
Mencius sim ply expanded C onfucius ' view in  a c le a re r  way. I  must admit 
th a t  my own in te r p r e ta t io n  of Confucius i s  only  a "p ro p o sa l"  and th a t  
my d isc u ss io n  of i t  i s  more or l e s s  " n e g a tiv e ."  I t  i s  n eg a tiv e  because 
I  w i l l  sim ply ta k e  up two t r a d i t i o n a l  arguments advanced to  a s s im ila te  
Confucius to  M encius, or more c o r r e c t ly  speaking Mencius to  C onfucius, 
on the problem of human n a tu re , and show th a t  th e se  arguments f a l l  sh o r t  
of e s ta b l is h in g  c o n c lu s iv e ly  th a t  Confucius was in  f a c t  a ph ilo so p h er
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of human n a tu re  as  Mencius was- Obvously, the  r e f u ta t io n  of th e se  argu­
ments does no t prove th e  t r u th  of my in te r p r e ta t io n  of C onfucius. This 
i s  why i t  must rem ain a p ro p o sa l, n o t a f i n a l  v e r d ic t .  A ll I  am a ttem p ting  
to  do in  th is  s e c t io n  i s  to  show th a t  th e re  a re  some grounds fo r  i n t e r ­
p re t in g  Confucius as a man of a c t io n  r a th e r  th an  as a  p h ilo so p h e r of 
human n a tu re . To make i t  f i n a l  we need some p o s i t iv e  argum ents to  prove 
th a t  C onfucius, u n lik e  M encius, never based h is  ph ilosophy  on any theory  
of human n a tu re , and I  w i l l  le a v e  t h i s  ta sk  to  o th e r  s c h o la rs . My p o in t 
i s  th a t  th e  philosophy  of a c tio n  Confucius m ight be taken  to  have ad­
voca ted  i s  more adequate than  M encius' s p e c u la tiv e  ph ilosophy  of human 
n a tu re  in  d ea lin g  w ith  problem s of human a c tio n .
Second, I  w i l l  argue in  t h i s  ch ap te r th a t  Confucius was more 
concerned w ith  showing how man could do good than  w ith  why man ought to
do good. He took i t  f o r  g ra n te d  th a t  man always ought to  do good in s te a d
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of e v i l ,  vdienever i t  was p o s s ib le .  S u rp r is in g ly , however, he d id  n o t 
make c le a r  how we can determ ine  w hether an a c tio n  i s  good or e v i l .  What 
i s  th e  c r i t e r io n  o r  s tan d ard  by which we can reco g n ize  w hether an a c tio n  
i s  good and m ora l, o r e v i l  and immoral? C onfucius indeed p rovided  no 
s in g le  c r i t e r io n .  R a th e r, he showed us many d i f f e r e n t  ways to  judge a 
p a r t i c u la r  a c tio n  good or e v i l .  Now one m ight argue th a t  C onfucius ' 
ph ilo sophy  i s  d e fe c t iv e  or erroneous due to  t h i s  incom plete p o s i t io n .
I  w i l l  contend th a t  th is  i s  n o t a d e fe c t  on the  p a r t  of C onfucius ' 
th o u g h t, and th a t  he i s ,  on th e  c o n tra ry , a c re a t iv e  th in k e r  because of
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t h i s  " p o s i t io n  of many c r i t e r i a . "
Confucius as a Man of A ction  
C onfucius ' p o s it io n  on the problem of human n a tu re  and human
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a c tio n  i s  n o t c le a r ,  to  say  th e  l e a s t .  While i t  i s  obvious th a t  he a l ­
ways emphasized the  im portance of human a c tio n , he s a id  ve ry  l i t t l e  
about human n a tu re . He sa id  th a t  a l l  men a re  equal and d e s ir e  h ap p in ess , 
bu t he d id  n o t say , a t  l e a s t  e x p l i c i t l y ,  th a t  a l l  men a re  o r ig in a l ly  or 
n a tu r a l ly  good. According to  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  argum ents, which I  w i l l  
d isc u ss  l a t e r ,  however, Confucius was t r u ly  a p h ilo so p h e r of human na­
tu re  as much as Mencius was. The only d if fe re n c e  is  th a t  w hile  Confucius 
im p l ic i t ly  b e liev ed  in  the  o r ig in a l  goodness of human n a tu re , Mencius 
e x p l i c i t ly  s ta te d  and expanded t h i s  p o s it io n . This i s  the  in te r p r e ta t io n  
of Confucius I  wish to  ch a llen g e .
There a re , in  g e n e ra l, two t r a d i t i o n a l  argum ents fo r  a s s im ila t in g  
Confucius to  Mencius on the problem of human n a tu re , v i z . ,  a " h i s to r i c a l  
argument" and a " te x tu a l  argum ent." The f i r s t  argument i s  based on the  
h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t  th a t  Mencius h im se lf p ro fe ssed  to  be a " tru e "  successo r 
of Confucius^ and, fu rth e rm o re , th a t  t h i s  b e l i e f  in  tu rn  has been accepted  
by many g re a t  Confucian sc h o la rs  from Chu H si and Wang Yang-ming to  Fung 
Y u-Ian, McNaughton and Chan.^ According to  th e se  s c h o la r s ,  bo th  Confucius
and Mencius wanted to  convert man in to  a " su p e rio r  man" who i s  n o t only
th e o r e t ic a l ly  w ell-equ ipped  b u t a ls o  can t r a n s la te  h i s  b e l i e f s  in to  
a c tio n , bu t Mencius o ffe red  more e la b o ra te  programs in  th a t  he supp le­
mented C onfucius’ ambiguous p o s it io n  on human n a tu re . This i s  why, they 
a rgue , we should reg a rd  Mencius as th e  second sage n e x t only to  Confucius 
ever s in c e  the emperor Shan Tung issued  a p a te n t in  1083.
I  b e lie v e  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  argument i s  no t so s tro n g  as i t  sounds.
To show i t s  weakness, I  w i l l  f i r s t  exp lo re  the  Chinese p e o p le ’s tremen­
dous re s p e c t  fo r  t r a d i t io n  and show how th is  r e s p e c t  o f te n  re s u l te d  in
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th e  m isunderstanding  o r m is in te rp re ta t io n  of the  c la s s ic a l  Chinese minds 
in  the  h is to r y  of China, and then  r e l a t e  th e  d isc u ss io n  of t r a d i t io n  to  
M encius' own in te r p r e ta t io n  of C onfucius.
E xactly  why many g re a t th in k e r s ,  in c lu d in g  C onfucius, emphasized 
the  im portance of t h i s  u n w ritten  and u n v e r if ie d  t r a d i t i o n  and w hether i t  
i s  a more e f f e c t iv e  way to  e s ta b l is h  a new p ra c t ic e  in  the  f i e ld s  of 
p o l i t i c s  and philosophy th an , say , a command of pow erful k ings or a com­
mon agreem ent of people a re  very  im portan t and c o n tro v e rs ia l  q u e s tio n s , 
b u t h e re  we a re  no t concerned w ith  th e se  q u e s tio n s .  ^ The p o in t i s  th a t  
Chinese peop le , w hether i n t e l l e c tu a l  o r n o t ,  have always emphasized the 
" le sso n "  of t r a d i t i o n ,  which was never s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  v e r i f ie d  b u t which 
they  b e lie v e d  they a l l  sh a red . Legge th u s  argues th a t  Chinese th in k e rs  
have always ended up w ith  th e  recovery  of the  "o ld  h e a r t"  and th a t  the
g
id e a  of a "new h e a r t"  was unknown to  them. Even Confucius h im se lf
d ec la red  th a t  he was n o t a c re a to r  of new t r u th s ,  b u t only a t ra n s m itte r  
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of o ld  t r u th s ,  and th a t  the  c o n s ta n t réan im ation  o f o ld  t ru th s  i s  a way 
to  new t r u t h s . U n l i k e  the  W estern t r a d i t i o n ,  where p h ilo so p h ers  o f te n  
claim ed th e i r  p re d e c e sso rs ' id ea s  as t h e i r  own, Chinese p h ilo so p h ers  
o f te n  c re d ite d  th e i r  own c re a t iv e  id eas  to  the  "old  m a s te rs ."  This r e ­
sp e c t fo r  t r a d i t i o n  o f te n  r e s u l te d  in  the  se r io u s  m is in te rp re ta t io n  or 
a r b i t r a r y  in te r p r e ta t io n  of some Chinese c la s s ic a l  concep ts . Here i s  a 
c o n c re te  h i s t o r i c a l  e x a m p l e . C h u  H si, who i s  g e n e ra lly  regarded  as 
the  champion of the  Neo-Confucian movement, f i r s t  had the  courage to  
doubt the  a u th e n t ic i ty  of the  s o -c a l le d  "an c ie n t s c r ip ts "  which were 
a p p a re n tly  unknown to  the  Han Dynasty s c h o la r s ,  b u t f i r s t  appeared in  
the  fo u rth  cen tu ry  and came to  be regarded  as an in te g r a l  p a r t  of the
61
Book of H is to ry  a f t e r  th e  seven th  c e n tu ry . L a te r ,  Wu Ch'eng 
in creased  th i s  su sp ic io n  by p rov ing  th a t  they were in  f a c t  n o t a genuine
p a r t  of th e  book. But i t  was n o t u n t i l  1543 th a t  Mei Tsu con­
c lu s iv e ly  proved th a t  they  were f o rg e r ie s  c rea ted  by one w r i te r  in  the  
fo u r th  c e n tu ry , who had based h i s  im ag inations on the numerous passages
of the  c la s s ic a l  works known as  th e  " lo s t  books" a t  th a t  tim e. But i t
Lftttook ano ther cen tu ry  to  add the  f in is h in g  touch: Yen Jo-C h’u (JjQ
w rote  a book c a lle d  The In q u iry  in to  th e  A u th e n tic ity  of the  A ncient 
S c r ip ts  of the Book o f H is to ry , and tra c e d  alm ost every sen tence  to  i t s  
so u rce , showing how the  fo rg e r  had m isquoted o r  m is in te rp re te d  th e  mean­
ings of th e  o r ig in a l  p assag es . So today we b e lie v e  th a t  n e a rly  o n e -h a lf  
of the  Book of H is to ry , which was accep ted  as sacred  s c r ip tu r e  fo r  one 
thousand y e a rs , was n o th in g  b u t a fo rg e ry .
Take th e  "decree  of heaven" as ano ther example. According to  a 
t r a d i t i o n a l  d a tin g , the  Duke of Chou d ec la red  as e a r ly  as 1122 B.C. th a t  
the  Shang Dynasty was conquered by th e  Chou Dynasty because the l a s t  k ing  
of the  former dynasty  could n o t "con tinue  to  enjoy the  decree of heaven ,"
j u s t  as the  H sia Dynasty was conquered by the Shang D ynasty, to  idiom
12heaven "se n t down i t s  b r ig h t  fav o rin g  d e c re e ."  From th is  tim e on, i t
has been a normal p a t te rn  fo r  many p o l i t i c a l  le a d e rs  and even re b e ls  to
claim  p o ssess io n  of h e a v en 's  dec ree  whenever they  f e l t  i t  was n e c essa ry .
I t  i s  l ik e  a b lank  paper which rem ains b lank  u n t i l  somebody w r i te s  h is
own language. Even the  re v o lu tio n a ry  p a r ty  led  by Sun Y at-sen  in  th is
cen tu ry  was once c a lle d  "The A sso c ia tio n  fo r  Changing the D ecree ."
13Now, as I  exp la in ed  b e fo re , Mencius was q u ite  d i f f e r e n t  from 
C onfucius in  many ways. Furtherm ore, Mencius, who never openly adm itted
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h i s  m istak es  in  h i s  l i f e t im e ,  was perhaps one of the most in n o v a tiv e , 
a g g re ss iv e  and am bitious p h ilo so p h e rs  in  th e  h i s to r y  of China. But—or 
because of th e se  rea so n s—he was e q u a lly  im pressed by th e  b r i l l i a n t  
t r a d i t i o n  s e t  by h is  m aste r, C onfucius. For example, when he was once 
asked h i s  o p in io n  on h i s  m as te r, he made re fe re n c e s  to  C onfucius ' own 
d i s c ip le s ,  such as T s i Wo , who s a id  th a t  "Confucius was f a r
su p e rio r  to  Yao and Shun," Tsze-Kung ) , who sa id  th a t  "from the
b i r th  of mankind t i l l  now th e re  has never been ano ther l ik e  our M aste r,"  
and Yu Zo , who sa id  th a t  " th e re  has  never been one so com plete
as  C onfucius" among the  sages in  the  h i s to r y  o f mankind. F in a l ly ,
Mencius h im se lf  d e c la re d  th a t  " s in c e  th e re  were l iv in g  men u n t i l  now, 
th e re  never was ano ther C onfucius" and confessed  th a t  he would always 
fo llow  "the  way of C onfucius.
We can e a s i ly  imagine th a t  Mencius very  w e ll could have a t ­
tem pted to  a s s im ila te  h i s  own id e a s , n o t those  of h is  opponents, to  
C on fuc iu s ' te a c h in g s . I f  so , we can f u r th e r  imagine th a t  M encius' 
am bitious a tte m p t could have e a s i ly  become a  " h i s to r i c a l  f a c t"  accep ted  
by many o th e r  sc h o la rs  due to  the  above-m entioned p e c u lia r  a t t i t u d e  t o ­
ward t r a d i t i o n  h e ld  by Chinese peop le . The co n tro v ersy  over the "an c ie n t 
s c r ip t s "  of the  Book of H is to ry  shows th a t  o n c e -e s ta b lish e d  " h i s to r i c a l  
f a c t , "  even i f  i t  were f a l s e ,  could become a " t r a d i t io n "  and l a s t  a s  
long as one thousand y e a rs . T his i s  why I  suggest th a t  th e re  a re  some
grounds fo r  su sp ec tin g  th a t  M encius' i n te r p r e ta t io n  of C onfucius, even
15i f  i t  were in ad eq u a te , could l a s t  as long as two thousand y e a rs .
Another weakness of the  h i s t o r i c a l  argument l i e s  in  the f a c t  
th a t  what Mencius sa id  and b e lie v e d  about Confucius i s  one th in g , and
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what Confucius h im se lf  s a id  and b e lie v e d  i s  q u i te  a n o th e r . Remarks made 
by Mencius on th e  l i f e  and say in g s  of Confucius cannot lo g ic a l ly  prove 
th a t  Mencius was a " tru e "  su c ce sso r  of C onfucius.
The t e x tu a l  argument i s  based on one passage (6 :17) of the 
A n a le c ts , which i s  b e lie v e d  to  be th e  most r e l i a b l e  book a v a i la b le  fo r  
us concerning th e  l i f e  and say in g s  of C onfucius. The passage  may be 
t r a n s la te d  a t  l e a s t  th re e  d i f f e r e n t  ways, a lthough  one t r a n s la t io n  may 
be more a p p ro rp r ia te  than  the  o th e rs
(a) Man i s  born  fo r  u p r ig h tn e s s . I f  a man lo se s  h i s  u p r ig h t­
n e s s , and y e t l i v e ,  h i s  escape  from d ea th  i s  the  e f f e c t  o f mere good 
fo r tu n e s . (Emphasis i s  m ine.)
(b) Man's v e ry  l i f e  i ^  u p r ig h tn e ss ; w ith o u t i t ,  he i s  lucky to  
escape  w ith  h is  l i f e .  (Emphasis i s  m ine.)
(c) Man i s  born  w ith  u p r ig h tn e s s . I f  one lo se s  i t ,  he w i l l  be 
lucky  i f  he escapes w ith  h i s  l i f e .  (Emphasis i s  m ine.)
The f i r s t  t r a n s la t io n  could  mean th a t  l i f e  w ith o u t pu rsu ing  
u p r ig h tn e ss , w hatever th a t  u p r ig h tn e ss  may b e , i s  n o t a t ru e  l i f e ,  o r 
t h a t  w ithou t u p r ig h tn e ss  th e  purpose o f l i f e  w i l l  never be f u l f i l l e d .
Or, i t  could sim ply mean th a t  man should  l iv e  in  an u p r ig h t way, vrtiat- 
ever th a t  way may b e . But none of th e se  i n te r p r e ta t io n s  lo g ic a l ly  im­
p l ie s  th a t  man i s  o r ig in a l ly  good. The second i s  a more d i r e c t  and 
l i t e r a l  t r a n s la t io n  th an  th e  o th e r s .  But i t s  meaning i s  r a th e r  t r i v i a l ,  
because a l l  i t  means i s  th a t  s in c e  i t  i s  an u p r ig h t th in g  to  be bo rn , 
no one should say th a t  i t  i s  n o t .
I t  i s  only  in  th e  t h i r d  t r a n s la t io n  th a t  some s c h o la rs  found a 
c lu e  to  argue th a t  C onfucius, l i k e  M encius, b e lie v e d  in  th e  o r ig in a l  
goodness of human n a tu re . A ccording to  th is  i n te r p r e ta t io n ,  the phrase 
"man i s  born w ith  u p r ig h tn e s s "  in  the  above passage means th a t  man i s
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born w ith  a p a r t ic u la r  in n a te  c h a ra c te r ,  namely, an u p rig h tn ess  or good- 
18n e ss . The only d if fe re n c e  between Confucius and Mencius i s  th a t
"w hile Confucius no more than im plied  th a t  human n a tu re  is  good, Mencius
19dec la red  d e f in i te ly  th a t  i t  i s  o r ig in a l ly  good."
But th e  m atte r  i s  no t so sim ple as i t  appears. F i r s t ,  th e re  i s
no assu rance  th a t  th e  th i r d  t r a n s la t io n  o f the passage is  more accu ra te
than  the  o th e rs . Second, even i f  we accep t th is  t r a n s la t io n ,  i t  i s  a t
most an in d ir e c t  su g g estio n , fo r  th e  word "u p rig h tn e ss"  ( ^  ) i s  very
d i f f e r e n t  from the  word "good" ) .  F in a l ly ,  i f  we c a re fu l ly  examine
th e  A n a le c ts , we fin d  a s u rp r is in g  passage: "We can h ea r our M aste r 's
view [C onfucius' view] on c u l tu re  and i t s  m a n ife s ta t io n , b u t we cannot
20hear h is  view on human n a tu re  and th e  way of heaven ."  Furtherm ore,
the  word "n a tu re"  ) m entioned in  th i s  passage appears elsew here in
the  A nalects  only once, where Confucius s a id  t h a t  "men a re  by n a tu re
21n e a rly  a l ik e ,  bu t they become wide a p a r t  through p r a c t ic e ."  These 
f a c t s  would be q u ite  u n in te l l i g ib l e ,  I  th in k , i f  we assume th a t  C onfucius, 
l ik e  Mencius, was p reoccupied  w ith  th e  problem of human n a tu re . How 
would i t  be p o s s ib le  t h a t  C onfucius, i f  he were a p h ilo sopher of human 
n a tu re , d id  n o t express h is  op in ion  on human n a tu re  and th a t  the  word 
"human n a tu re "  was m entioned only  tw ice in  the whole te x ts  of the  
A nalects?  This suggests  th a t  Confucius was p r im a rily  concerned w ith 
concre te  human a c tio n , n o t w ith  some th eo ry  of human n a tu re  which a l le g ­
ed ly  could ex p la in  away a l l  problem s of human a c tio n , or th a t  he was 
n o t even in te r e s te d  in  a s p e c u la tiv e  th eo ry  of human n a tu re . Perhaps 
he was so busy d e a lin g  w ith  co n c re te  human a c tio n  th a t  he had no le is u re  
to  plunge h im se lf in to  m etaphysica l sp e c u la tio n .
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I f  my d isc u ss io n  o f th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  argum ents i s  c o r r e c t ,  th e re  
i s  no firm  b a s is  to  conclude th a t  C onfucius, l ik e  M encius, was t r u ly  a 
ph ilo sopher of human n a tu re . The h i s t o r i c a l  argument has some m e r it ,  
b u t i t  i s  s t i l l  incom plete because of M encius' own "am bition" and be­
cause of the  Chinese p e o p le 's  p e c u lia r  a t t i t u d e  toward t r a d i t i o n .  The 
te x tu a l  argument i s  based on one ambiguous passage of th e  A n a le c ts , but 
a c a re fu l  exam ination  o f o th e r  p a r ts  of the book su g g ests  th a t  i t  would
be unwise to  b e lie v e  th a t  Confucius was much in te r e s te d  in  a sp e c u la tiv e
22theo ry  of human n a tu re .
Confucius was a man of a c tio n . This i s  no t to  say th a t  he was
a ph ilo so p h er of a c tio n . He was a man of a c tio n  in  th e  sen se  th a t  he
p u t more emphasis on p ra c t ic e  than  on th eo ry , as shown in  the numerous
passages of the  A n a le c ts . He s a id  th a t  th e  man who wants to  le a rn  " is
23e a rn e s t  in  what he i s  doing and c a re fu l  in  h i s  sp eech ."  The su p e rio r
man "wishes to  be slow in  speech and e a rn e s t  in  h i s  c o n d u c t , o r  " a c ts
25b e fo re  he speaks and a fte rw ard s  speaks accord ing  to  h i s  a c t io n ."  He
i s  "modest in  h i s  speech , bu t exceeds in  h i s  c o n d u c t . I n  a d d it io n ,
v i r tu e  c o n s is ts  of n o t only  " le a rn in g  e x te n s iv e ly , having  a firm  and
s in c e re  aim, and in q u ir in g  w ith  e a rn e s tn e s s ,"  b u t a ls o  of " s e l f -
27a p p lic a tio n "  of what has been le a rn e d . In  ano ther p la c e , Confucius
even confessed  th a t  he used to  h e a r p e o p le 's  words and g ive  them c re d i t
fo r  th e i r  conduct, bu t now he would h ea r " th e i r  words and look a t  th e i r  
28conduct."  F in a l ly ,  he d ec la red  th a t  " to  see  what i s  r ig h t  and n o t to
29do i s  want o f co u rag e ."
I  b e lie v e  i t  i s  m islead ing  to  say th a t  Confucius as a p h i lo s ­
opher of human n a tu re  d id  n o t f u l ly  e x p lic a te  the  c lo se  r e la t io n s h ip
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between human n a tu re  and human a c tio n  as Mencius t r i e d  to  do. As I  w i l l
ex p la in  in  the  nex t s e c t io n , he was more concerned w ith  ex p la in in g
p r a c t ic a l l y  how man could do good than  w ith  e x p la in in g  th e o r e t i c a l ly  why
30man ought to  do good.
The P o s i tio n  o f Confucius
Confucius was m ainly concerned w ith  showing how we can do good 
31and be men of m o ra lity . S u rp r is in g ly , however, he d id  n o t s p e l l  ou t
how w e  can know w hether a p a r t i c u la r  a c tio n  i s  good or e v i l .  What i s ,
acco rd ing  to  Confucius, th e  c r i t e r io n  o r s tan d a rd  by which we can d e te r -
32mine an a c tio n  to  be good and m oral, o r e v i l  and immoral?
The same q u es tio n  can be made in  term s of the  Tao (Way), which
was m entioned alm ost a hundred tim es in  th e  A n a le c ts . In  pre-C onfucian
c o n te x ts , th e  word "Tao" was used , w ith  some e x c e p tio n s , in  i t s  o r ig in a l
sense  of "road" or as a p roper name. But th e  word means, fo r  C onfucius,
a "way of a c tio n "  or a "way of co n d u c t."  Furtherm ore, i t  i s  n o t ju s t
one of many ways, bu t th e  only  way above a l l  o th e r  ways. I t  i s  what
we may conven ien tly  c a l l  the  way, by which in d iv id u a ls ,  s t a t e s  and the
w orld  should conduct them selves and be conducted. I f  an in d iv id u a l  a c ts
accord ing  to  the  Tao, i t  means th a t  he a c ts  as he should  a c t and th a t  he
i s  th u s  a man of m o ra lity . I f  a l l  in d iv id u a ls  in  a  s t a t e  a c t  acco rd ing
to  the  Tao, i t  means th a t  they a re  governed as they  should  be and th a t
33m oral p r in c ip le s  p r e v a i l .  In  o th e r  w ords, i t  i s  th e  way everyone
34should a c t .  I t  i s  l ik e  a door everyone has to  pass through to  go o u t. 
B ut, we may ask , who i s  to  determ ine which i s  th e  Way? What i s  the  
c r i t e r io n  o r s tan d ard  by which to  s e le c t  the  most c o rre c t  and the only  
way from o th e r  c o rre c t  and in c o r r e c t  ways? Confucius t e l l s  us to
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p r a c t ic e  th e  Way. But how do we f in d  ou t what the  Way is ?  What i s  th e  
s tan d a rd  by which a l l  th in g s  a re  to  be measured?
The s i tu a t io n  i s  in  some degree s im ila r  to  ano ther im portan t 
C onfucian concept—" r ig h t"  ( ) .  The word does n o t mean, fo r
C onfucius, sim ply what i s  r ig h t  or r ig h te o u s  in  th e  o rd in a ry  sen se . I t  
means what i s  f i t t i n g  o r s u i ta b le  to  a p a r t i c u la r  s i t u a t io n .  For exam­
p le ,  when we ag ree  to  do som ething fo r  o th e r s , we should f i r s t  co n sid e r
35a l l  th e  c ircum stances and prom ise only  what i s  p roper and s u i ta b le .
That i s ,  each in d iv id u a l  must dec ide  fo r  h im se lf  what i s  most f i t t i n g  
to  each given s i t u a t i o n . Y e t  the q u e s tio n  rem ains; what i s  the  c r i ­
t e r io n  to  determ ine  what i s  s u ita b le ?
The c r i t e r io n  can h a rd ly  be such " e x te rn a l"  r e s u l t s  as w ea lth , 
hono r, ran k , p o s i t io n  or even r e f u ta t io n ,  fo r  Confucius contended th a t  
they  a re  no t only  u n c e r ta in  b u t "beneath  th e  d ig n ity "  of a man of m o ra lity . 
He thus d e c la re d  th a t  "w ealth  and honor a re  what every  man d e s ir e s .  But
i f  they  have been ob ta ined  in  v io la t io n  of m oral p r in c ip le s ,  they  must 
37n o t be k e p t ."  Even r e f u ta t io n  was n o t im portan t to  him. He thus s a id
th a t  n e i th e r  th e  man who i s  loved by a l l  ne ighbors no r th e  man who i s
38h a te d  by a l l  ne ighbors i s  v ir tu o u s  enough to  be a s u p e r io r  man. The
c r i t e r io n  can h a rd ly  be a  way to  im m o rta lity  o r some s o r t  of happ iness
39a f t e r  d e a th , fo r  he sim ply d id  n o t ta lk  about such a th in g .
One m ight argue t h a t ,  as f o r  M ohists, C onfuc ius ' c r i t e r io n  was 
an anthropom orphic e n t i ty  c a lle d  Heaven, th e  p r in c ip a l  d e ity  of the  
Chinese people  a t  th a t  tim e. Confucius b e lie v ed  th a t  Heaven had en­
t ru s te d  him w ith  a sacred  m ission  to  "save" C h i n a . H e  b e lie v ed  th a t  
he always fo llow ed " th e  w i l l  of Heaven"^^ and once d e c la re d  in  d e sp a ir
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42th a t  nobody ex cep t Heaven understood  him . When accused of wrongdoing,
43he c a lle d  upon Heaven to  w itn ess  h i s  innocence . Upon th e  dea th  o f h is  
f a v o r i te  d i s c ip le ,  he d e c la re d , "Heaven i s  d e s tro y in g  me!
The l a s t  passage i s  b e s t  understood  as a sim ple cry  of angu ish , 
fo r  th e re  i s  no in d ic a tio n  th a t  C onfucius considered  Heaven to  be tak ing  
some s p e c ia l  a c tio n  a g a in s t  him. In  a n c ie n t tim es i t  h as  been so con­
c e iv ed . We th u s read in  th e  Book of H is to ry  and th e  Book of P o e try  th a t
Heaven superv ised  the change of d y n a s t ie s ,  punished or rew arded the
45v ic io u s  or v ir tu o u s  r u l e r s ,  e tc .  For C onfucius, however. Heaven was 
f a r  l e s s  p e rso n a l. Although he m entioned Heaven and o th e r  s p i r i t u a l  
e n t i t i e s  s e v e ra l  tim es in  th e  A n a le c ts , he d id  n o t e la b o ra te  a s  to  
w hether such e n t i t i e s  r e a l ly  e x i s t .  In s te a d , he c o n s is te n t ly  r e f ra in e d  
from ta lk in g  about them. Whereas he ta lk e d  a g re a t  d e a l about the  way 
man should  a c t ,  one of h i s  d i s c ip le s  complained th a t  he d id  n o t d isc u ss  
" th e  way of H e a v e n . A n o t h e r  d i s c ip le  asked him how one shou ld  se rv e  
s p i r i t u a l  e n t i t i e s ,  and he s a id ;  "You a re  n o t y e t  a b le  to  se rv e  men, 
how can you se rv e  s p ir i ts ? " ^ ^  These rem arks in d ic a te  t h a t  Confucius was 
n o t much concerned w ith  such e n t i t i e s ,  perhaps because they  a re  in  the 
realm  of fo rc e  beyond m an's c o n tro l .  He was more concerned w ith  changing 
t h i s  i n to le r a b le  world in to  a  good w o rld , a p r o je c t  we could  always d e a l 
w ith  h e re  and now. He was occupied w ith  th e  v e ry  p r a c t i c a l  problem how 
b e s t  to  u t i l i z e  such a b i l i t i e s  as we have to  a c t  e f f e c t i v e ly .  He thus 
s a id ,  "To give o n e 's  s e l f  e a rn e s t ly  to  the  d u t ie s  of men, and , w hile  
re s p e c tin g  s p i r i t u a l  b e in g s , to  keep a lo o f  from them , may be c a lle d  
wisdom.
One m ight wonder w hether C onfucius s e t  up h i s  own words or
69
a c tio n s  as an u ltim a te  a u th o r i ty .  For he b oasted  th a t  he had no p e r­
p le x i t i e s  a t  the  age of f o r ty ,  th a t  he understood  th e  mandate of Heaven
49a t  f i f t y ,  and th a t  he was a t  ea se , w hatever he h e a rd , a t  s ix ty .  A fte r
h i s  d e a th , Confucius became the  most sacred  d e ity  in  China. He was
c a lle d  " th e  duke N i, a ll-co m p le te  and a l l  i l l u s t r o n s , "  " th e  v en erab le
N i, the accom plished S age,"  "Kung, the  a n c ie n t T eacher, accom plished and
i l l u s t r o n s ,  a ll-c o m p le te , the  p e rfe c t  S age ,"  "T eacher, equa l to  Heaven
and E arth  in  v i r t u e , "  e tc .  But a l l  th is  rev e ren ce  fo r  Confucius was
a g a in s t  h is  own i n t e n t i o n . W h e n  he was convinced th a t  h is  d is c ip le s
were wrong, he d id  n o t a ttem pt to  bludgeon them w ith  h i s  own a u th o r i ty
as a  te a c h e r . He t r i e d  to  convince them by reason  and, i f  he could n o t,
l e t  the  m a tte r  d rop .^^  Furtherm ore, he b e lie v e d  th a t  a l l  men a re  l i a b le
to  e r r  and advised  them n o t to  be a f r a id  to  adm it and c o rre c t  t h e i r  m is- 
52ta k e s . He even ta lk e d  about the su p e r io r  m an's m is tak es , which may be
compared to  th e  e c lip s e  of the  sun o r moon; when the su p e rio r  man makes
m is tak e s , a l l  men see i t ,  b u t when he c o r re c ts  them, a l l  men "look up to  
53h im ." He made no claim  to  i n f a l l i b i l i t y  and even p e rm itted  h is  d i s ­
c ip le s  to  d i f f e r  from him on some m a tte rs .  A fte r  a l l ,  Confucius d id  n o t 
say anyth ing  l ik e  " I  am the  Way, th e  T ru th , and th e  L ife ." ^ ^
What i s  the  c r i te r io n ?  C onfucius ' re p ly  i s  th a t  th e re  a re  many 
c r i t e r i a ;  i t  i s  wrong to  say  th a t  th e re  i s ,  must b e , or can be one s in g le  
c r i t e r io n .  The in v e s t ig a t io n  or réan im ation  of the  p a s t i s  one way 
(method) of acq u irin g  knowledge. He thus d e c la re d  th a t  he was only a 
t ra n s m itte r  of old t r u th s ,  n o t a c re a to r  of new t r u t h s , a n d  confessed , 
" I  am n o t one who was born  w ith  knowledge. I  love a n c ie n t teach in g s  and 
e a rn e s tly  seek them ."^^ He mentioned th a t  the  v i r tu e  of the a n c ie n t
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Chou dynasty  has "reached the  h ig h e s t  p o i n t . H e  even s a id , "Never
c r i t i c i z e  what i s  a lre ad y  p a s t  and never complain about what i s  now
,,58 going o n ."
Confucius i s  o f te n  rep re sen te d  as  one who was m erely a ttem p ting
to  re v iv e  th e  g lo r ie s  of a r e a l  o r fan c ied  golden age of a n t iq u i ty .  For
exam ple, th e  d i s c ip le  Tzu-kung d e c la re d  th a t  Confucius needed no teacher
s in c e  he was a b le  to  le a rn  fo r  h im se lf the  d o c tr in e s  of the  e a r ly  Chou
r u l e r s .  Mencius s a id  th a t  Confucius t ra n s m itte d  th e  teach in g s of the
59e a r ly  em perors, Yao and Shun. I t  i s  t ru e  th a t  Confucius d id  ta lk  about
a n t iq u i ty  and d e riv e  some of h is  im portan t id eas  from the  legendary  sages.
But h i s  in te n tio n  was no t to  re v iv e  a n t iq u i ty  as such . As w i l l  be shown
in  th e  fo llo w in g , he d id  no t b e lie v e  th a t  a n t iq u i ty  i s  the  only  source
o f our knowledge. I f  we assume, however, th a t  Confucius regarded  the
tea c h in g s  o f old sages as the  only  so u rce , then  we must conclude th a t  he
was in  a  sense  in c o n s is te n t .  S ince he b e lie v ed  th a t  a l l  men, in c lu d in g
Yao and Shun, were eq u a l, he could not say  th a t  th e  v i r tu e s  of old sages
were somehow su p e rio r  to  those  of o rd in a ry  p eo p le . This i s  why he once
s a id  th a t  even Yao and Shun " f e l l  s h o r t  o f hum anity.
The read ing  o f books, e s p e c ia l ly  th e  Book of P o e try , i s  ano ther
way of a c q u ir in g  our knowledge. Confucius thus to ld  h i s  son th a t  i f  he
d id  no t study  p o e try  he would be " l ik e  one who s ta n d s  w ith h i s  face  r ig h t
a g a in s t  a w all"^^  and advised  h i s  d i s c ip le s  to  s tu d y  th e  Book of P o e try ;
The Ordes se rv e  to  s tim u la te  th e  mind. They may be used fo r  pur­
pose of se lf -c o n te m p la tio n . They teach  th e  a r t  of s o c ia b i l i ty .
They show how to  r e g u la te  f e e l in g s  of resen tm en t. From them you 
le a m  th e  more immediate duty of se rv in g  o n e 's  f a th e r ,  and the  
rem oter one of se rv in g  o n e 's  p r in c e . From them we become la rg e ly  
acquain ted  w ith  the names o f b i r d s ,  b e a s ts ,  and p la n ts .
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W ithin a few c e n tu r ie s  a f t e r  the  death  of C onfucius, many C o n fu c ian is ts
became too p reoccupied  w ith  the books, and the  government exam inations
became too e x c lu s iv e ly  l i t e r a r y .  But I  b e lie v e  i t  c e r ta in ly  was n o t the
method of C onfucius. He considered  the  study  of the  books a p a r t ,  bu t
63only a p a r t ,  of th e  education  o f th e  s u p e rio r  man. More b a s ic  was
the c u l t iv a t io n  of c h a ra c te r .  Furtherm ore, i f  one could n o t make
p r a c t ic a l  a p p lic a t io n  of h i s  le a rn in g , he d ec la red  th a t  i t  was u se le ss
m erely to  memorize the  books:
Though a man may be a b le  to  r e c i t e  the  th re e  hundred odes, y e t i f ,  
when in t r u s te d  w ith  a governm ental charge , he knows n o t how to  a c t ,  
o r i f ,  when se n t to  any q u a rte r  on a m iss io n , he cannot g ive  h i s  
r e p l ie s  u n a s s is te d , n o tw ith s tan d in g  th e  e x te n t o f h is  le a rn in g , of 
what p r a c t ic a l  use i s  i t? ^
Experience i s  ano ther way of a c q u ir in g  our knowledge, and i t  i s
as  im portan t a s  a n t iq u i ty  o r  c e r ta in  books. C onfucius thus s a id ,  "Hear
much, b u t s e le c t  what i s  good and fo llow  i t , " ^ ^  and, in  ano ther p la c e .
"Hear much and pu t a s id e  what i s  d o u b tfu l. . . . See much and pu t a s id e
seal 
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what seems p e r i l o u s . F o r  hum anity l i e s  in  "wide re s rc h  and s te a d ­
f a s t  pu rposes , eager q u e s tio n in g  and c lo se  r e f l e c t io n .
That Confucius had no one stan d ard  i s  s ta te d  in  th e  A nalects 
aga in  and ag a in . "There were fo u r th in g s  from vdiich th e  M aster was 
e n t i r e ly  f r e e .  He had no foregone c o n c lu s io n s , no a r b i t r a r y  p re d e te r ­
m in a tio n s , no o b s tin a c y , and no e g o i s m . H e  h im se lf  sa id  th a t  he 
ha ted  o b s t i n a c y , a n d  d e c la re d , "The s u p e rio r  man, in  th e  w orld , does 
n o t s e t  h is  mind e i th e r  fo r  any th in g , or a g a in s t  an y th in g ; what i s  r ig h t  
he  w i l l  f o l l o w . T h e  tru e  b e l i e f  of Confucius i s  th a t  we can le a rn  
from any th ing  and anyone. He thus s a id ,  "When I  walk along w ith  two 
o th e r s , they may se rv e  me as  my te a c h e rs . I  w i l l  s e l e c t  t h e i r  good
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q u a l i t i e s  and fo llow  them, t h e i r  bad q u a l i t i e s  and avoid them ,"^^ In 
the  fo llo w in g , I  w i l l  t r y  to  shed some l i g h t  on th is  main elem ent o f 
C onfucius ' ph ilosophy of a c tio n , which I  w i l l  c a l l  a " p o s i t io n  of many 
c r i t e r i a . "
F i r s t ,  C onfucius ' p o s it io n  may be c h a ra c te r iz e d  as a f le x ib le
one. We o f te n  th in k  th a t  i t  in f r in g e s  the  d ig n ity  of a man of m o ra lity
to  change h is  mind and to  admit h i s  m is tak e s . In a s im ila r  way, we
o f te n  th in k  th a t  God or a ve ry  wise sage must p a rtak e  of th e  unbending
c h a ra c te r  o f a b so lu te , immutable, and e v e r la s t in g  t r u th s .  But Confucius
b e lie v ed  th a t  a l l  men a re  l i a b le  to  e r r  and th a t  th e re  i s  n o th in g  wrong
in  a d m ittin g  th e i r  m is tak e s . The r e a l  e r r o r  i s  to  admit o n e 's  m istakes
and y e t n o t change them. Confucius th u s  s a id ,  "When you have f a u l t s ,
72do n o t f e a r  to  abandon them ." In  a d d it io n , Confucius was w e ll aware
th a t  good a c tio n  and th u s  m oral a c tio n  keep changing acco rd ing  to  tim e 
73and p la c e , and th a t  th e re  i s  th e re fo re  no one a b so lu te  t r u t h ,  and,
74even i f  th e re  i s ,  our understand ing  o f i t  must be r e l a t i v e .
Second, C onfucius' p o s i t io n  may be c h a ra c te r iz e d  as a compro­
m ising one. We o f te n  look upon compromise w ith  d is fa v o r , b u t t h i s  idea  
comes from th e  m istaken  su p p o s itio n  th a t  t r u th  or v i r tu e  must be f ix e d  
and immutable and th a t  our understand ing  of i t  must a ls o  be f ix e d  and 
imm utable. No man in  the  world has a r ig h t  to  regard  h im se lf  as th e  
s o le  guard ian  of the  t r u th .  According to  C onfucius, one man i s  in  a 
sense j u s t  a s  capable  of judg ing  what i s  good and what i s  wrong as 
a n o th e r . The only d if fe re n c e  among men i s  th a t  some a re  more e a rn e s t 
than  o th e rs  in  le a rn in g  and in  p r a c t ic in g  what has been le a rn e d . Indeed, 
C onfucius ' d o c tr in e  of the golden r u le  and h is  d o c tr in e  of th e  mean do
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fo llo w  from t h i s  compromising p o s i t io n .  H is thought was in  the  fram e­
work o f "both-and" r a th e r  than  " e i t h e r - o r ."
F in a l ly ,  C onfucius ' p o s it io n  shows a k in d  of s c i e n t i f i c  s p i r i t  
in  the  sense  th a t  i t  does n o t s e t  any u n a lte ra b le  s ta n d a rd  fo r  t ru th  and 
ad v o ca te s , in s te a d , a form of i n t e l l e c tu a l  democracy, as c le a r ly  expressed  
by C ree l:
But h i s  [C o n fu c iu s ']  th in k in g  was c h a ra c te r iz e d  by an absence of 
dogma, a c le a r  r e a l iz a t i o n  of the  n e c e s s i ty  o f suspended judgment, 
and an espousal of i n t e l l e c tu a l  democracy. . . . S c ience , l ik e  
C onfucius, has no u n a lte ra b le  s tan d ard  f o r  t r u th ;  i t  i s  sea rch in g  
fo r  t r u t h ,  no t deducing i t  from a p rea rran g ed  fo rm ula . Yet t h i s  
i s  no t to  say th a t  i t  g iv es  us no h e lp  toward f in d in g  th e  t r u th .
I t  does n o t t e l l  us what t r u th  i s ,  b u t i t  g iv es  us a g re a t  d e a l of 
adv ice  as to  how to  look f o r  i t .  So does C onfucius.
One m ight th in k  th a t  C onfucius ' ph ilo sophy  was d e fe c tiv e  o r in ­
com plete because he provided  no a b so lu te  c r i t e r io n  by which we, o rd in a ry  
p eo p le , could  judge an a c tio n  to  be m oral o r immoral, and th a t  he thus 
f a i l e d  to  p rov ide  a s a t i s f a c to r y  re p ly  to  th e  q u e s tio n  of how man could 
do good and a c t  m ora lly . But t h i s  c r i t ic i s m  i s  based  on th e  m istaken  
assum ption th a t  th e re  i s  only  one a b so lu te  t r u th  and only one way to  
f in d  i t .  Although Confucius l iv e d  in  a f e u d a l i s t i c  s o c ie ty ,  he d id  n o t 
espouse such an " u n s c ie n t i f ic "  dogma. F u r th e r fo re , he b e lie v e d  th a t  
t r u th  i s  our permanent g o a l. I t  i s  no t a s o r t  of snug haven in  which 
we may r e s t  in  com placent s e c u r i ty .  R a th e r, i t  i s  a goal we must con­
s ta n t ly  t r y  to  ach iev e . We may ach ieve  some degree of v i r t u e  in  our 
l i f e t im e  through ed u ca tio n  and s e l f - c u l t i v a t i o n .  But we should  always 
keep on s t r iv in g  to  be men of v i r t u e .  C onfucius th u s  d e c la re d , "Learn 
as  i f  you would n o t reach  your o b je c t ,  and were always fe a r in g  a lso  
l e s t  you should lo se  i t , " ^ ^  and, in  an o th er p la c e , " I f  a  man does no t 
c o n s ta n tly  ask h im se lf , 'What i s  th e  r ig h t  th in g  to  do? ' I  r e a l l y  d o n 't
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know what i s  to  be done about Indeed , Confucius was a man who
78"keeps working on."
In  t h i s  chap ter I  have suggested  th a t  C onfucius ' ph ilo sophy , 
under the  new in te r p r e ta t io n ,  may be an a l t e r n a t iv e  to  M encius' p h i lo s ­
ophy, in  d e a lin g  w ith problems of human a c tio n . This i s  n o t to  say 
th a t ,  accord ing  to  C onfucius, we can ex p la in  a l l  human a c tio n  by human 
a c t io n , w ithou t invo lv ing  any theo ry  of human a c tio n . The p o in t i s  th a t 
i t  i s  f u t i l e  to  a ttem pt to  ex p la in  away a l l  com plicated  problems of human 
a c tio n  in  term s of M encius' theo ry  of human n a tu re . I  b e lie v e  i t  i s  no t 
enough to  say  th a t  Confucius was p r im a rily  concerned w ith  c o n c re te  human 
a c tio n  and th a t  the  problem of human n a tu re  must be judged , i f  a t  a l l ,  
by human a c tio n . He was no t much in te r e s te d  in  a s p e c u la tiv e  theory  of 
human n a tu re  or any problems r e la te d  to  human n a tu re .
Furtherm ore, I  have suggested  th a t  C onfucius' teach in g  i s  both 
t r a d i t i o n a l  and p ro g re ss iv e . I t  i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  because he always em­
phasized  the  im portance of the  lesso n s  we can le a rn  from th e  a n c ie n t 
sa g es , a lthough he knew p e r f e c t ly  w e ll th a t  they were only legendary  
f ig u r e s .  I t  i s  p ro g re ss iv e  because , a t  th e  same tim e, he urged us to  
look  in to ,  examine, e x p lic a te  o r r e f in e  what we experience  today . To 
use F in g e r e t te 's  suggestive  language, Confucius was sacred  in  h is  r e ­
sp e c t fo r  the  p as t and " se c u la r"  in  h is  re sp e c t fo r  the  p re se n t and 
fu tu r e .  I  have c h a ra c te r iz e d  th i s  a t t i t u d e  of "bo th-and" as a " p o s it io n
of many c r i t e r i a . "  He d id  n o t b e lie v e  th a t  th e re  i s  one stan d ard  fo r
79tru th s  or th a t  t ru th s  a re  f ix e d  or immutable. I  b e lie v e  C onfucius ' 
thought i s  r e a l ly  c re a tiv e  and "modern" j u s t  because of t h i s  p o s it io n  
of many c r i t e r i a .
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F in a l ly ,  I  have suggested  th a t  C onfucius was a man of a c tio n .
He devoted h is  l i f e  to  educate  people to  ^  som ething; he was n o t engaged
in  edu ca tio n  fo r  the  sake of ed u ca tio n , b u t was p rep a rin g  h i s  s tu d e n ts  to
80go ou t in to  the  world to  work and s tru g g le  fo r  h is  p r in c ip le s .  To use
81Mahood's ex p re ss io n , Confucius was a "moral agen t"  vdio p resen ted  him­
s e l f  as a l iv in g  model fo r  moral a c t io n , n o t a "moral p h ilo so p h er"  who
82e n e rg e tic a lly  engaged in  th e o r e t ic a l  in q u iry  in to  human a c tio n .
CHAPTER I I I  FOOTNOTES
^For the ex p la n a tio n  o f C onfucius ' ph ilosophy of a c t io n , see 
my fo o tn o te  (4) on page 6.
2
But th is  i s  no t to  say , as I  w i l l  ex p la in  in  th e  f i n a l  c h a p te r, 
t h a t  Mencius was concerned only  w ith  e x p la in in g  th e o r e t ic a l ly  why man 
ought to  do good and C onfucius, w ith  showing p r a c t ic a l ly  how man could 
do good.
3
For the purpose of e x p lic a t in g  C onfucius ' thought I  w i l l  r e ly  
on the  A n a le c ts , no t on a v a r ie ty  of works by l a t e r  C o n fu c ian is ts  (some 
f a l s e ly  a t t r ib u te d  to  C onfucius ' a u th o rs h ip ) . The case i s  s im ila r  to  
th e  S o c ra tic  t r a d i t i o n  s in c e  we have P l a to 's  d ia lo g u e s , on the  one hand, 
and th e  numerous works by N e o -P la to n is ts , on th e  o th e r . Yet few would 
t r y  to  study  back from the N e o -P la to n is ts  to  r e c o n s tru c t  the  philosophy 
of S o c ra te s ; th e  u su a l p r a c t ic e  i s  r a th e r  to  study  P l a to 's  d ia lo g u es  and 
to  determ ine how much of i t  may be b e lie v e d . For C onfucius, however, the  
common p r a c t ic e  has been the  o p p o s ite . In  re v e rs in g  th is  approach and 
l im it in g  our study  to  th e  A nalects a lo n e , what we le a rn  may n o t be ex­
te n s iv e  b u t ,  I  hope, t ru e .
^Book of M encius, 2A:2 :18 -28 .
^Even Hsun Tzu, who vehem ently in s i s te d  th e  o r ig in a l  e v iln e ss  
of human n a tu re , i s  n o t d i f f e r e n t  from M encius' p o s it io n  in  th a t  the  
form er a ls o  took Confucius to  be a ph ilo sophyer of human n a tu re . The 
only excep tions to  t h i s  g e n e ra l tre n d  th a t  I  have found among contem porary 
sc h o la rs  a re  C reel and F in g a re t te .
^According to  McNaughton, fo r  example, Mencius i s  " th e  m ajor 
t ra n s m itte r  of the pure Confucian t r a d i t i o n . "  W illiam  McNaughton, The 
Confucian V is io n , The U n iv e rs ity  of M ichigan P re ss , 1974, p . 15.
^These q u es tio n s  a re  beyond the scope of th is  d i s s e r t a t io n .  For 
in te r e s t in g  d isc u ss io n  of th ese  q u e s tio n s , see  F in g a re t te ,  op. c i t . , 
p. 59 f .
g
Legge, op. c i t . , p . 414 fo o tn o te .
g
A n a le c ts , 7 :1 . Thus, Confucius i s  o f te n  compared to  S ocrates 
as a "m idw ife."
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10 ~I b id . ,  2 :11 .
^^Thls and o th e r examples of th e  same k ind  a re  included  in  Hu 
Shih , op. c i t . , pp. 104-131.
12Quoted from C re e l, op. c i t . , p . 17.
13The second s e c t io n  of th e  second c h ap te r of t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n .
^\ o o k  of M encius, 2A:2 :18 -28 . Also see  Legge, op. c i t . , p. 278 
fo o tn o te .
^^The f a c t  th a t  many s c h o la rs  have s in c e  accep ted  M encius’ p h i­
losophy r a th e r  than  Hsun T zu 's  ph ilosophy  lends some p l a u s i b i l i t y  to  
M encius' in te r p r e ta t io n  o f C onfucius on t h i s  s u b je c t .  But th e  accep tance 
has a l o t  to  do w ith  o th e r  a sp e c ts  of M encius' ph ilo sophy , p a r t i c u la r ly  
h i s  p o l i t i c a l  ph ilo sophy .
^^Mencius never met Confucius in  h i s  l i f e t im e ,  a lthough  he once 
s tu d ie d  under the  p u p ils  of C onfucius ' own grandson.
^^The f i r s t  i s  L egge 's  t r a n s la t io n .  James Legge, Confucius: 
Confucian A n a le c ts , The G reat L earning & The D octrine  of the  Mean, Dover 
P u b lic a tio n s , 1971, p . 190. As Legge p o in ts  o u t, Chu H si and o th e r  
sc h o la rs  u s u a lly  made a d i s t i n c t io n  between two appearances of th e  same 
word "sang" ( ^  ) ,  by tak in g  the  form er as  " b ir th "  o r "beginn ing  of 
l i f e "  and th e  l a t t e r  as " p re s e rv a tio n  of l i f e "  ) .  But
C ree l made no such d i s t i n c t io n  in  the  second t r a n s la t io n .  H. G. C re e l, 
Confucius and th e  C hinese Way, H arper & Row, New York, 1960, p . 133.
The th i r d  i s  C han 's t r a n s la t io n .  Chan does n o t seem to  tak e  th e  passage 
in  the way I  d o , f o r  he says somewhat am biguously th a t  " th e  say ing  h e re  
can be in te r p re te d  to  mean th a t  man can l iv e  th roughou t l i f e  because he 
i s  u p r ig h t ."  Chan, op . c i t . , p . 29. But C han 's o v e r - a l l  p o s i t io n  i s  
th a t  man i s  bo rn  w ith  a p a r t i c u la r  in n a te  c h a ra c te r ,  namely, an u p r ig h t­
ness o r goodness. See I b id . , p . 49 f .
X8One might argue th a t  t h i s  in te r p r e ta t io n  i s  a ls o  supported  by 
the  tea c h in g s  of th e  D octrine  of the  Mean, which i s  b e lie v ed  to  be w r i t te n  
by C onfucius ' own grandson and i s  g e n e ra lly  regarded  as th e  most p h ilo ­
so p h ic a l t r e a t i s e  among th e  a n c ie n t Confucian l i t e r a t u r e .  In  th e  very  
f i r s t  parag raph  of th e  Mean i t  i s  s ta te d  th a t  " s in c e  vdiat heaven im parts 
to  man i s  c a lle d  human n a tu re , to  fo llow  human n a tu re  i s  c a lle d  the Way, 
and to  c u l t iv a t e  th e  Way i s  c a lle d  e d u c a tio n ,"  and, more c le a r ly  in  the 
th i r te e n th  c h a p te r , t h a t  " th e  s u p e r io r  man governs men as men, in  acco r­
dance w ith  human n a tu re "  (C han 's t r a n s la t io n ) .  However, b e s id e s  the 
f a c t  th a t  s c h o la rs  s t i l l  d isp u te  th e  ex ac t a u th o rsh ip  of the  Mean, we 
have no com pelling reaso n  to  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  au tho r of the  Mean, who­
ever he may b e , d id  n o t tak e  o r change some of C onfucius ' thought in to  
h i s  own d i r e c t io n .
19Chan, op. c i t . , p . 49.
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20A n a le c ts , 5 :12 .
^4 b i d . ,  17:2 .
22B esides th ese  two t r a d i t i o n a l  argum ents, one m ight advance a 
" lo g ic a l  argum ent" in  th e  fo llow ing  way. Confucius d id  n o t s t a t e  ex­
p l i c i t l y  h i s  b e l ie f  in  th e  o r ig in a l  goodness of man, e i t h e r  because he 
d id  n o t wish to  d isc u ss  i t  openly w ith  h i s  narrowminded d i s c ip le s  o r 
because he was n o t even aware th a t  he had such a b e l i e f . But he must 
have assumed i t ,  and t h i s  i s  the  only  way we can make h i s  whole p h i lo s ­
ophy lo g ic a l ly  c o n s is te n t .  Confucius urged every  man to  " p ra c t ic e  v i r ­
tu e "  fo r  the  sake of v i r t u e ,  w ithou t ex p ec tin g  any rew ards out o f i t .
But t h i s  s o r t  of moral p r a c t ic e  i s  p o s s ib le ,  the  argument c o n tin u e s , 
on ly  i f  man i s  o r ig in a l ly  good. In  o th e r  w ords, M encius' th e s is  i s  a 
lo g ic a l  p re su p p o s itio n  fo r  C onfuc ius ' o^m ph ilo sophy . I  th in k  t h i s  
argument begs the  q u e s tio n . For i t  presupposes th a t  Confucius in  f a c t  
had such a  b e l i e f ,  or th a t  we can a t  l e a s t  ta k e  h i s  tea c h in g s  in  such 
a d i r e c t io n .
^^A n a le c ts , 1 :14 .
^^ Ib id . ,  4 :24 .
^^I b id . ,  2 :13.
26 I b id . , 14:29. Compare t h i s  passage w ith  th e  D octrine  of the  
Mean, 13 :4 . "The s u p e r io r  m an's words correspond  to  h i s  a c tio n s  and 
h i s  a c tio n s  correspond to  h i s  w ords."
^^I b id . ,  19:6 .
^ ^ I b ld . , 5 :9 .
29 I b id . ,  2 :2 4 :2 .
30I f  my in te r p r e ta t io n  of C onfucius i s  c o r r e c t ,  Fung Y u-Ian i s  
wrong in  h is  a s s e r t io n  th a t  M encius, w hether or n o t he has succeeded in  
h i s  am bitious p ro je c t  to  e x p la in  a l l  problem s r e la te d  to  human a c tio n  
s o le ly  in  term s of one m etaphysica l th eo ry  of human n a tu re , has " re p re ­
se n te d  an advance over C o n fu c iu s ."  Fung, op . c i t . , p . 76. D esp ite  h i s  
noble  m otive to  be a t ru e  su c ce sso r  of C onfucius, Mencius has in  f a c t  
m isrep resen ted  h i s  m aster in  a very  im portan t se n se . F u rtherm ore, my 
in te r p r e ta t io n  of Confucius su g g ests  th a t  the  whole h i s to r y  of 
Confucianism  a f t e r  Confucius needs to  be reexamined or even rea rran g ed  
from a com pletely  d i f f e r e n t  a n g le .
31This does no t mean, of c o u rse , th a t  i t  was h is  only  concern . 
The p o in t i s  th a t  he was more concerned w ith  "how" than  w ith  "why."
32I  use " c r i te r io n "  and " s ta n d a rd "  in te rch a n g e a b ly . A lso , I  u se  
th e s e  term s lo o se ly  to  mean th e  way or method of ac q u ir in g  knowledge of 
th e  good, which can be a guide to  do an a c tu a l  good.
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^^A n a le c ts , 11 :23 :3 ; 4 :15 ; 1 5 :2 :3 .
^^ Ib ld . . 6 :15 .
^^I b id . . 1 :13; 1 :31.
^^I b id . ,  9 :13 .
37I b id . , 4 :5 :1 . (C han 's t r a n s la t io n )
^^ Ib id . ,  13:24.
30
I b id . ,  11 :1 .
^^I b ld . ,  7 :22.
^4 b i d . ,  9 :5 .
^^I b id . ,  14:37.
^^I b id . ,  6 :26 .
44ibld. ,  11:8.
^^Book o f  H is to ry , 369; 374; 385; 457-459; 495-502. Book of 
P o e try , 432-436; 598-599,
A n a le c ts , 5 :12 .
^^ Ibid. ,  11:11.
^^ Ib id . , 6 :20 . As Legge p o in ts  o u t, th e  ph rase  "keep a lo o f  from 
them" h e re  means " to  keep a t  a d is ta n c e  from them" n o t " to  keep them a t  
a  d is ta n c e ."
^^I b id . ,  2 :4 .
^^Legge thus says th a t  Confucius was "unreasonably  n eg lec ted  
when a l iv e "  and "unreasonably  ven era ted  when d ead ."  Legge, op. c i t . , 
p . 92.
^^A nalec ts , 17:21.
^^I b id . ,  1 :8 :4 ;  9 :24 .
^^I b id . ,  19:21.
^^John, 14 :6 .
^^A n a le c ts , 7 :1 .
^ ^ I b id . ,  7 :19.
80
^^I b i d . , 8:20.
CO
I b id . ,  3 :2 1 .(F eib lem an 's t r a n s la t io n )
^^Book of M encius, 78 :38 :1 -4 .
^^A n a le c ts . 6 :2 8 . (C han 's t r a n s la t io n )
^ 4 b i d . ,  17:10.
^^I b id . . 1 7 :9 :2 -7 .
^^ I b i d . ,  7 :24.
64 I b id . ,  13:5.
^^I b id . , 7 :27 . (C han 's t r a n s la t io n )
^^I b id . , 2 :18 . (C han 's t r a n s la t io n )
^^I b id . , 19 :6 . (F eib lem an 's  t r a n s la t io n )
^ ^ Ib id . . 9 :4 .
**I b id . ,  14:34.
^ ° Ib id . ,  4 :10.
^^ Ib id . ,  7 :21 .
^^I b id . ,  1 :8 :4 .
^^ Ibid. ,  11:21.
74Of co u rse , i t  does n o t fo llow  from t h i s  th a t  we can be ca re ­
le s s  w ith  o u rse lv es  and o th e rs  in  our d a i ly  a c tio n . The s ta tem en t "I do 
n o t know any th ing  w ith  an a b so lu te  c e r ta in ty "  does no t e n ta i l  th a t  i t  i s  
n o t my duty  to  feed my neighbor when he i s  s ta rv in g .
^^C reel, Confucius and th e  Chinese Way, p . 137.
^^A n a le c ts , 8 :17.
^^I b id . ,  15:15.
78I b id . , 14:41. (McNaughton's t r a n s la t io n )
79I  th in k  t h i s  view i s  in  a way c o n s is te n t  w ith th e  s p i r i t  of 
l a t e r  W ittg e n s te in .
80According to  C re e l, Confucius "had never in tended  to  make a 
c a re e r  o f te a c h in g . His p lan  was to  reform  the w orld , and he was teach ing
81
only u n t i l  h is  o p p o rtu n ity  came a long . He wanted n o th ing  le s s  than to 
d i r e c t  the government o f the  s t a t e . "  C re e l, Chinese Thought, p. 43.
81G. H. Mahood, "S ocra tes  and C onfucius: Moral Agents or Moral 
P h ilo sophers?"  Jo u rn a l of Chinese P h ilosophy , 1, 1974, pp. 177-194.
^^According to  Wang Chung ( 5 & ^ ) ,  Chia I  , Han Yu. . U X i ig L.V i i VjLiULIg \  / ( J  /  > J, \  M  |f J t - /  9 U.
and o th e r s , Confucius he ld  " the  th eo ry  o f t l^ e e  grades of human 
n a tu re , " i . e . ,  th a t  some men a re  o r ig in a l ly  good, some men a re  o r ig in a l ly  
e v i l ,  and the r e s t  a re  n e u tr a l .  To suppo rt t h i s  i n te r p r e ta t io n ,  they 
u s u a lly  c i t e  two passages from the A n a le c ts , (a) "Those who a re  born 
w ith  th e  po ssess io n  o f knowledge a re  the  h ig h e s t  c la s s  of men. Those 
who le a rn ,  and so , r e a d i ly ,  ge t p o ssess io n  of knowledge, a re  the  n e x t. 
Those who a re  d u l l  and s tu p id , and y e t compass th e  le a rn in g , are  ano ther 
c la s s  nex t to  th e s e . As to  those who a re  d u l l  and s tu p id  and ye t do not 
l e a r n ;—they a re  the  low est of the  people" (1 6 :9 ) . (b) "There a re  only
th e  w ise of the  h ig h e s t  c la s s ,  and the s tu p id  o f the  low est c la s s ,  who 
cannot be changed" (1 7 :3 ) .
They argue th a t  ' t h e  h ig h e s t  c la s s  of men" in  th e  above passages 
should  be id e n t i f ie d  w ith  the  o r ig in a l ly  good men, " the  s tu p id  of the  
low est c la s s "  w ith  th e  o r ig in a l ly  e v i l  men, and the  r e s t  w ith  th o se  in -  
betw een, and t h i s  i s  why, th e  argument c o n tin u e s , th e  h ig h e s t  and the 
low est cannot change th e i r  o r ig in a l  n a tu re .
Most sc h o la rs  today regard  t h i s  i n te r p r e ta t io n  as f a r fe tc h e d .
They contend th a t  th e  phrase "cannot be changed" sim ply means th a t  some 
people  have become too in te l l i g e n t  o r  too  s tu p id  to  change th e i r  p resen t 
n a tu re . I  p e rso n a lly  b e lie v e  th a t  the  passage  in  q u e s tio n  should be read  
in  term s of a c q u ir in g  knowledge o r in te l l ig e n c e ,  and th i s  i s  why, I  th in k , 
th e re  appears a s u rp r is in g ly  s im ila r  passage in  the  D octrine  of the  Mean, 
20 :9 . "Some a re  bom  w ith  knowledge. Some le a m  i t  through study .
Some le a rn  i t  through hard  work. But when knowledge i s  acq u ired , i t  
comes to  the  same th in g ."  (Emphasis i s  m ine.)
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Both Confucius and Mencius were men of a c tio n . Thus Mencius 
a ls o  devoted h i s  l i f e  to  educate  people  to  ^  som ething. Not only  was 
he concerned w ith  a th e o r e t ic a l  q u e s tio n  why man ought to  do good, but 
a ls o  w ith  a p r a c t ic a l  q u e s tio n  how man could do good. I t  i s  indeed un­
f a i r  to  Jfencius i f  we b e lie v e  he was never in te r e s te d  in  the  p r a c t ic a l  
q u e s tio n . In  f a c t ,  he wanted to  e x p la in  "how" as much as "why," a g a in , 
in  term s of h i s  th eo ry  of human n a tu re . But th e re  i s  a d if f e re n c e  be­
tween Confucius and Mencius on the  m atte r  of th e i r  em phasis. Confucius 
was p r im a rily  concerned w ith  a  p r a c t i c a l  problem and thus p u t more 
em phasis on p r a c t ic e  th an  on th e o ry . In  t ry in g  to  so lv e  bo th  p r a c t ic a l  
and th e o r e t ic a l  problem s, on th e  o th e r  hand, Mencius pu t eq u a l emphasis 
on th eo ry  and p r a c t ic e ,  o r ,  p e rh ap s , more on theo ry  than  on p r a c t ic e .^  
According to  M encius, s in c e  a l l  men have in n a te  seeds o f good, 
th e  most im portan t th in g  men should  do i s  to  c u l t iv a te  o r develop these  
se ed s , and, i f  they  lo se  them, they should do th e i r  b e s t  to  recover 
them. B esides t h i s ,  however, Mencius makes many o th e r  a s s e r t io n s  which 
a re  d i r e c t l y  o r in d i r e c t ly  r e la te d  to  h i s  th eo ry  of human n a tu re , (a) He
a s s e r t s  th a t  a l l  men a re  e q u a l, or to  be more c o r r e c t ,  "n e a r ly  a l ik e "  in
2
th e  sense  t h a t  they  a l l  have th e se  in n a te  se ed s . A ll men a re  th e  same
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3
in  k ind  and d i f f e r e n t  only in  deg ree . Even Yao and Shun were no b e t t e r  
in  k ind  than  o rd in a ry  p eo p le . What makes them d i f f e r  from us in  degree 
i s  th a t  they  p re se rv e  "what i s  common" in  men, whereas we o f te n  lo s e  i t .
I t  a l l  depends on how much one can p re se rv e  and develop h i s  " n a tu ra l
4
pow ers." (b) Mencius a ls o  b e lie v e s  i t  fo llo w s from h is  th eo ry  o f human 
n a tu re  t h a t  i f  man does e v i l ,  i t  i s  n o t the  f a u l t  o f h is  n a tu ra l  endow­
m ent. E v il  i s  n o t o r ig in a l ,  bu t due to  th e  underdevelopm ent of man's 
o r ig in a l  good n a tu re , and th e  underdevelopm ent i s ,  in  tu rn ,  due to  man's 
f a i l u r e  to  avoid e v i l  e x te rn a l  in f lu e n c e s . Some men abandon them selves 
to  e v i l ,  n o t because th e re  i s  "any d if fe re n c e  in  th e  n a tu r a l  ca p ac ity  
endowed by heaven" among men, b u t because t h e i r  minds a re  "allow ed to  
f a l l  in to  e v i l . "  I t  i s  due to  the " c irc im s tan ce  through which they 
a llow  t h e i r  minds to  be snared and drowned in  e v i l . " ^  In  th is  sense 
m an's n a tu re  i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  o r b a s ic a l ly  good.^ I t  can only  be over­
shadowed or overpowered by some e v i l  e x te r n a l  c ircum stances , (c) F in a l ly ,  
Mencius a ls o  deduces from h is  th eo ry  o f human n a tu re  th a t  a l l  men have 
in n a te  knowledge of good and in n a te  a b i l i t y  to  do good.^
I t  i s  no t c le a r  w hether th ese  a s s e r t io n s  a r e ,  accord ing  to  
M encius, im plied  o r presupposed by m an's o r ig in a l  good n a tu re , o r even a 
p a r t  of the  meaning of "m an's good n a tu r e ."  W hatever M encius' p o s it io n  
may b e , in  the  fo llow ing  we w i l l  look more c lo s e ly  a t  the  l a s t  a s s e r t io n ,  
fo r  i t  seems to  be a  d i r e c t  re p ly  to  th e  q u e s tio n  how man can do good a t  
a l l ;  Man can do good because he has an in n a te  a b i l i t y  to  d isc r im in a te  
betw een what i s  good and what i s  e v i l ,  and , in  a d d it io n , he has an in -
g
n a te  a b i l i t y  to  t r a n s la t e  h is  in te n t io n  to  do good in to  p r a c t ic e .
Mencius thus a s s e r ts  th a t  " th e  a b i l i t y  possessed  by men w ithou t having
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been acqu ired  by le a rn in g  i s  in n a te  a b i l i t y  [to  do good], and the knowl­
edge possessed  by men w ithou t e x e rc ise  of thought i s  t h e i r  in n a te  knowl- 
g
edge [o f th e  good].
I  th in k  th is  a s s e r t io n  i s  n o t j u s t i f i e d .  On th e  one hand, i f  
we suppose th a t  Mencius makes th e  a s s e r t io n  as a p re su p p o s itio n  of h is  
main t h e s i s ,  then  he must show us th a t  th e re  a re  s u f f i c i e n t  grounds to  
accep t the  a s s e r t io n  as a f u l ly  w arran ted  p re su p p o s itio n , b u t he does 
n o t show t h i s .  On th e  o th e r  hand, i f  we suppose t h a t ,  as Chan su g g e s ts , 
Mencius makes the  a s s e r t io n  as a lo g ic a l  c o ro l la ry  of h i s  main th e s i s ,  
th en  we must conclude th a t  Mencius commits a lo g ic a l  b lu n d e r. F i r s t ,  
one may be good o r e v i l  w ithou t knowing h im se lf to  be so . Even i f  we a s ­
sume th a t  man i s  o r ig in a l ly  good, i t  does n o t fo llow  from th is  th a t  he 
knows he i s  good. Second, o n e 's  knowledge does no t always e n t a i l  a c tio n . 
Even i f  we assume th a t  man i s  o r ig in a l ly  good, i t  does n o t fo llow  from 
t h i s  th a t  he has a c tu a l  power to  do good. T h ird , even i f  we assume th a t  
the  a s s e r t io n  i s  g e n e ra lly  t r u e ,  i t  i s  undoubtedly too  n a iv e . F o r, as a 
m a tte r  of ex p e rien c e , th e re  may be some "hard cases"  where we ve ry  much 
want to  do good bu t cannot f ig u re  out what good i s ,  and, in  a d d it io n ,
th e re  may be some " s p e c ia l  c a se s"  where we sim ply have no power to  do
. 11 good.
That Mencius d id  n o t p rov ide a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  the  a s s e r t io n  
th a t  man has an in n a te  knowledge of good and e v i l  and an in n a te  a b i l i t y  
to  do good i s  a very  se rio u s  shortcom ing. I t  shows th a t  Mencius has in  
f a c t  f a i l e d  to  ex p la in  s u c c e s s fu l ly  how m an's o r ig in a l  good n a tu re , even 
i f  he  has  one, in f lu e n c e s , de te rm ines, or d i r e c ts  h is  a c tio n . That i s ,  
M encius' e f f o r t s  to  ex p la in  human a c tio n  i s  a f a i l u r e ,  n o t only because ,
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as I  argued in  the t h i r d  c h a p te r , he d id  n o t ex p la in  s u c c e s s fu lly  why 
man ought to  do good r a th e r  than  e v i l ,  bu t a ls o  because he d id  n o t even 
e x p la in  su c c e s s fu lly  how man could do good.
Now we can see  more c le a r ly  some d if fe re n c e s  between Confucius 
and Mencius on the  q u es tio n  how man could do good. Doing good needs to  
ex p la in  two s u b je c ts .  The one i s  to  e x p la in  how man i s  a b le  to  know 
which a c tio n  i s  good or e v i l .  The o th e r  i s  to  e x p la in  how man comes to  
do what appears to  him good. On the  f i r s t  s u b je c t ,  Confucius o ffe red  
no ab so lu te  c r i t e r io n  by which man can determ ine an a c tio n  to  be good 
or e v i l .  According to  M encius, however, man has an " in n a te  c r i t e r io n "  
by which he can always d is t in g u is h  what i s  good from what i s  e v i l .  I f  
man does e v i l ,  i t  i s  n o t because he does n o t know what good i s ,  b u t be­
cau se , as I  mentioned b e fo re , h i s  in te n t io n  to  do good has been weakened 
or overcome by some e v i l  e x te rn a l  power. On th e  second s u b je c t ,  
Confucius sim ply sa id  th a t  man should always keep try in g  to  be a m oral 
person . According to  M encius, however, man has an " in n a te  a b i l i t y "  to  
do good. I f  man does e v i l ,  i t  i s  only because he has n o t f u l ly  used h is  
" n a tu ra l  pow er." We may thus c h a ra c te r iz e  Confucius as a r e l a t i v i s t  in  
th e  sense  th a t  he d id  n o t espouse an a b so lu te  t ru th  or an a b so lu te  
c r i t e r io n  o f t r u th ,  and Mencius as an a b s o lu t i s t  in  the sense  th a t  he 
b e lie v ed  in  an ab so lu te  s tan d ard  fo r  t r u t h .
Mencius a ls o  t r i e d  to  answer Wiy man ought to  do good a t  a l l .  
But Confucius s a id  very  l i t t l e  on the s u b je c t ,  a lth o u g h , as I  m entioned 
in  th e  l a s t  c h a p te r , he had a l o t  to  say about how man could do good. 
How can we e x p la in  C onfucius' s ile n c e ?
A f i r s t  response might be th a t  i t  i s  a n a c h ro n is t ic  to  ask  such
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a q u e s tio n . Confucius was only  a teach e r from a sm all p r in c ip a l i ty  of 
Lu in  the  f i f t h  cen tu ry  B.C. He d id  n o t th in k  he had a l l  th e  answers to  
a l l  im portan t human a f f a i r s ,  and obv iously  he was no t ready  to  g ive  an 
a p p ro p ria te  answer to  why man ought to  do good. He sim ply took i t  as 
common sense th a t  man ought to  do good whenever i t  was p o s s ib le  to  do so .
A "defense" of Confucius along  th ese  l in e s ,  a lthough  le g itim a te  
as f a r  as i t  goes, n e v e rth e le s s  pays a p r ic e .  I t  reduces the s ig n if ic a n c e  
o f C onfucius' teach in g  from th a t  of u n iv e rs a l  wisdom to  th a t  of a h i s ­
t o r i c a l  datum. I t  makes h is  teach in g  no more than  a h i s t o r i c a l  specimen,
which cannot be a teach ing  fo r  u s , the inform ed c i t iz e n s  of th e  tw e n tie th  
12c e n tu ry .
Furtherm ore, such a h i s t o r i c a l  approach s t i l l  leav es  one problem
unso lved . Confucius s a id  on one occasion  th a t  he had no concealm ents 
13from h is  d i s c ip le s ,  and req u es ted  them to  be honest and to  admit th e i r  
m istakes  or ignorance f ra n k ly . Why, th e n , d id n 't  he confess h i s  own 
ignorance? How i s  i t  p o s s ib le  th a t  he always demanded h i s  d i s c ip le s  to  
be s in c e re  and honest and y e t he was no t s in c e re  to  h im se lf?  Legge be­
l ie v e s  th a t  Confucius was in  f a c t  in s in c e re  to  h im se lf :
Many sayings m ight be quoted from him [C onfuciu s], in  which ' s in c e r ­
i t y '  i s  c e le b ra te d  as  h ig h ly  and demanded as s t r in g e n t ly  as ev er i t  
has been by any C h r is t ia n  m o ra l is t ;  y e t he was a lto g e th e r  n o t the  
t r u t h f u l  and t ru e  man to  whom we accord our h ig h e s t  ap p ro b a tio n .^^
I  th in k  th is  i n te r p r e ta t io n  i s  ex trem e, fo r  numerous passages
of th e  A nalects do in d ic a te  th a t  s in c e r i ty  was indeed one of the  main
p o in ts  Confucius wanted to  show to  h im se lf  and o th e rs . " I f  a man lacks
s in c e r i t y ,"  he s a id ,  " I  d o n 't  know how he can ge t on, no more than  a
wagon could w ithou t a yoke fo r  a tta c h in g  th e  h o r s e s . I n  ano ther
p la c e , he s a id ,  "Let h is  words be s in c e re  and t r u t h f u l ,  and h i s  a c tio n s
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honourable and c a r e f u l ; —such conduct may be p ra c t is e d  among th e  rude 
t r ib e s  of the  South or th e  N orth . I f  h i s  words be no t s in c e re  and t r u t h ­
f u l ,  and h is  a c tio n s  no t honourable and c a re f u l ,  w i l l  h e , w ith  such con­
d u c t, be a p p re c ia te d , even in  h i s  neighborhood?"^^ He p ra ise d  th o se  who 
a re  n o t ashamed to  le a rn  from t h e i r  i n f e r i o r s . H e  p ra ise d  those  who
a re  h onest enough to  recommend th a t  t h e i r  m e r ito r io u s  in f e r io r s  be
18r a is e d  to  rank  on a par w ith  them selves. He was sc o rn fu l o f h y p o c risy .
He was ashamed of " f in e  w ords, an in s in u a tin g  appearance , and ex cess iv e  
19r e s p e c t ."  "He who p u ts  on an appearance of s te rn  firm n ess , w hile  i n ­
w ardly  he i s  weak, i s  l ik e  one o f th e  sm a ll, mean p e o p le ,"  and such a
20person  i s  no b e t t e r ,  he d e c la re d , th an  a t h ie f .
F urtherm ore , Confucius b e lie v e d  th a t  i t  i s  no t enough to  be
s in c e re  m erely  in  thought and speech . True s in c e r i ty  c a l l s  fo r  a c tio n .
Men shou ld  be "determ ined to  be s in c e re  in  what they say , and to  c a rry  
21out what they  d o ."  He who e n te r s  government s e rv ic e ,  fo r  example, 
should g iv e  h is  whole e f f o r t s  to  th e  ta s k  to  be accom plished, w h ile  r e -
22gard ing  th e  s a la ry  o r o th e r  reward t h a t  he may ga in  as p u re ly  secondary .
To see what i s  r ig h t  and y e t n o t do i t  i s  cow ardice. I f  n e c e ssa ry , one 
should be p repared  to  g ive  up h i s  own l i f e  fo r  th e  sake of h is  
p r in c ip le s .
I  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  q u e s tio n  why man ought to  do good sim ply d id  
n o t occur to  C onfucius. Why? In  t ry in g  to  answer t h i s  q u e s tio n , I  w i l l  
assume th a t  we can le a rn  a l o t  more from C onfucius’ philosophy i f  we look 
a t  him as  an in n o v ato r as w e ll as "a g e n te e l  b u t s tubbo rn ly  n o s ta lg ic  
a p o lo g is t  o f th e  s ta tu s  quo a n te ." ^ ^
G enerally  speak ing , we can judge m o ra lity  as d i s t i n c t  from, say .
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prudence, in  term s of bo th  in te n t io n  and consequence. The emphasis on 
in te n t io n  was p r e t ty  much in  th e  a i r  among the a n c ie n t Chinese m o ra l is ts .  
Both Confucius and Mencius th u s  emphasized the c u l t iv a t io n  of c h a ra c te r  
as one of the  most im portan t th in g s  to  be done. At th e  same tim e, 
Confucius knew very  w e l l ,  I  th in k , th a t  we cannot read  c le a r ly  someone's 
in te n t io n ,  and thus he a ls o  emphasized the im portance of consequence as 
w e ll as in te n t io n .  In  t h i s  sense  he was bo th  a c re a to r  of a new id e a l  
and an a p o lo g is t  fo r  an o ld  one.
A ll e th ic a l  th eo ry  must be ab le  to  answer two q u e s tio n s . The 
f i r s t  i s  to  answer why man ought to  do f r e e ly  a c e r ta in  th in g , and th is  
in v o lv es  o n e 's  choosing X (good or v i r tu e  o r w hatever) r a th e r  than  Y 
( e v i l  or v ic e  or w h a te v e r) . The second i s  to  answer how man comes to 
do what he has chosen to  do, and th is  in v o lv e s , on th e  one hand, o n e 's  
dec id ing  to  do X r a th e r  th an  Y (which re q u ire s  knowledge of how to  d i s ­
t in g u is h  X from Y) and , on th e  o th e r  hand , o n e 's  doing X (which re q u ire s
25h is  a b i l i t y  to  do X ). Now the  im portance of the  l a s t  s ta g e  cannot be 
overem phasized. A ll com plicated  p ro cesses  of choosing and dec id ing  c u l­
m inate in  do ing . In  t h i s  sense we may say  th a t  man i s  what he does. 
F urtherm ore, doing i s  th e  only  s ta g e  we can observe , d i r e c t l y  or in ­
d i r e c t l y .  The p e r f e c t  God, i f  he e x i s t s ,  would be a b le  to  see (and 
exp la in ) bo th  why man ought to  do f r e e ly  a c e r ta in  th in g  r a th e r  than  
ano ther and how man could d is t in g u is h  what he ought to  do from what he 
ought no t to  do. B ut, as we have a lre a d y  se en , Confucius was n o t i n t e r ­
e s te d  in  such an om nisc ien t and om nipotent Being. He was more in te r e s te d  
in  human a c t i v i t i e s ,  which we can alw ays, to  some e x te n t ,  observe , 
e v a lu a te , and judge. In  o th e r  w ords, he knew th a t  a l l  we can observe
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about human a c tio n  i s  i t s  consequence, and thus b e liev ed  th a t  man should 
be judged by what he a c tu a l ly  does o r  what he a c tu a lly  accom plishes. 
Confucius was the man who recogn ized  th e  s ig n if ie ?  ice of a c tu a l  human 
a c t i v i t i e s  as w e ll  as t h e i r  in te n t io n .  This i s  the  s p i r i t  of the  "bo th- 
and" a t t i t u d e  we can le a rn  from C onfuc ius’ philosophy of a c tio n .
CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES
^One might go one s te p  f u r th e r  and argue t h a t ,  fo r  M encius, 
the  q u es tio n  of "why" has dominated th a t  of "how."
2
I t  i s  more c o rre c t  to  say th a t  a l l  men are  n e a r ly  a l ik e ,  fo r  
no two men in  th e  w orld a re  equal o r id e n t ic a l  w ith  one an o th er in  the  
b io lo g ic a l  sense . A c tu a lly , th e  word "equal"  has two d i f f e r e n t  m eanings. 
F i r s t ,  i t  means th a t  a l l  men should  be t re a te d  in  th e  same way; they  
should re c e iv e  equa l p o l i t i c a l  and economic p r iv i le g e s ,  im p a r tia l  t r e a t ­
ment b e fo re  th e  law and so f o r th .  In  t h i s  sense the  dominant Chinese 
view i s  th a t  men are  of unequal m e rits  and thus unequal tre a tm e n ts  a re  
j u s t i f i e d .  The word "equal"  a ls o  r e f e r s  to  common a t t r ib u t e s  shared  by 
a l l  men a t  b i r t h ,  and i t  i s  in  the  second sense th a t  Mencius uses the 
term . Munro r e f e r s  to  th e  f i r s t  k ind  of e q u a li ty  as " e v a lu a tiv e "  and 
to  the  second kind as " d e s c r ip t iv e "  or " n a tu r a l ."  David Munro, The 
Concept of Man in  E a rly  C hina, S tan fo rd  U n iv e rs ity  P re ss , 1969, Ch. 1.
3
Book of M encius, 6A :7:3.
T^ b id . ,  2A ;6:7.
^I b id . ,  6A :7:1,
^ I  have n o t found such ph rases  as "Man's n a tu re  i s  in c o r r ig ib ly  
good" or "Man's o r ig in a l  n a tu re  i s  in c o r ru p tib le "  in  the  Book of M encius.
^There i s  ano ther a s s e r t io n  which Mencius d id  n o t deduce, but 
lo g ic a l ly  fo llow s from h is  t h e s i s .  I f  m an's n a tu re  i s  m orally  good and 
man always a c ts  ou t of o r acco rd ing  to  h is  m oral n a tu re , then  a l l  human 
a c tio n s  a re  worthy of m oral e v a lu a tio n . Not on ly  a c tio n s  l ik e  keeping  
prom ises, t e l l i n g  l i e s  o r t r u th s ,  and making d e c is io n s , b u t a lso  a c tio n s  
in v o lv ing  o n e 's  d re s s , c a r r ia g e ,  tone  o f v o ic e , e t i q u e t t e  w ith  f r ie n d s ,  
m usical a c t i v i t i e s ,  g iv in g  g i f t s ,  h an d lin g  r i t u a l  o b je c ts  o r even tak in g  
b a th s , would have m oral im p lic a tio n s . To be s u re , some a c tio n s  w i l l  be 
o f g re a te r  im port than o th e r s , bu t no human a c t i v i t y  i s  t o t a l l y  lack in g  
in  m oral s ig n if ic a n c e . This a s s e r t io n  i s ,  I  th in k , a v e ry  in te r e s t in g  
su b je c t to  s tu d y . F o r, in  th e  W estern t r a d i t i o n ,  t h i s  a s s e r t io n  does 
n o t make sen se , because we u s u a lly  d is t in g u is h  m oral or immoral a c tio n s  
l ik e  t r u t h - t e l l i n g  o r l i e - t e l l i n g  from s o c ia l  a c tio n s  l ik e  so u p -s lu rp in g . 
We b e lie v e  we f i r s t  need to  know w hether an a c tio n  i s  w orthy of m oral 
e v a lu a tio n  or p u re ly  a s o c ia l  a c tio n , b e fo re  we can t a lk  about whether
90
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th a t  a c tio n  i s  moral or immoral. See Henry Rosemont, J r . ,  "Notes from 
a Confucian P e rsp e c tiv e : Which Human Acts a re  Moral A cts?" I n te r ­
n a t io n a l  P h ilo so p h ic a l Q u a rte r ly , 16, March, 1976, pp. 46-61.
g
The d o c tr in e  of in n a te  knowledge and in n a te  a b i l i t y  has con­
t r ib u te d  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  to  th e  fu tu re  development of i d e a l i s t i c  
Confucianism , rep re sen ted  by Wang Yang-Ming ( ) .
9
Book of M encius, 7A:15:1.
^^Chan, op. c i t . , p . 50.
^^One might in te r p r e t  th e  in n a te  knowledge and a b i l i t y  as a p a r t  
of the meaning of " o r ig in a l  good n a tu re "  in  such a  way th a t  to  f in d  a 
human a c tio n  which does no t have th ese  in n a te  c h a ra c te rs  i s  to  f in d  a 
c o n tra d ic t io n  in  term s. B ut, in  th is  c a se , M encius' th e s i s  does no t 
se rv e  to  e x p la in  how man could do good.
12This may be t r u e ,  b u t I  am h e re  assuming th a t  C onfucius' te a c h ­
ing can be more than  a h i s t o r i c a l  specim an.
^^A n a le c ts , 7:23.
^^Legge, C onfucius: Confucian A n a le c ts , The G reat L earning and
The D octrine  of the  Mean, p . 100.
Legge a t t r ib u te s  th is  in s in c e r i ty  to  "a n a tu r a l  r e s u l t  of the  
u n - re l ig io n  of C onfucius:" "There a re  c e r ta in  v i r tu e s  which demand a 
t ru e  p ie ty  in  o rder to  t h e i r  f lo u r is h in g  in  the  h e a r t  of man . . . bu t 
i t  r e q u ire s  more to  m ain ta in  the  love of t r u t h ,  and make a l i e ,  spoken 
or a c te d , to  be shrunk from w ith  shame. I t  r e q u ire s  in  f a c t  the  l iv in g  
re c o g n itio n  of a God of t r u t h ,  and a l l  the  sa n c tio n s  of rev ea led  r e l ig io n .  
U n fo rtu n a te ly  the  Chinese have n o t had th e s e ,  and th e  example of him 
[C onfucius] to  whom they  bow down as th e  b e s t  and w is e s t  of men, does 
n o t s e t  them a g a in s t d is s im u la tio n ."  I b i d . ,  p . 101.
A n a lec ts , 2 :22 . ( C re e l 's  t
l ^ I b i d . , 1 5 :5 :2 .
^ ^ Ib id . , 5 :14 .
^ ^ Ib id . , 14:19; 15:13.
^ ^ Ib id . , 5 :24 .
2 ° I b id . , 17:12.
^ ^ Ib id . , 13 :20 :3 .
^ ^ Ib id . , 6 :20; 12 :21:3 ; 15 :3 .
^ ^ Ib id . , 14:13; 15:8.
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^ ^ F in g a re tte , o p . c i t . , p. 60.
25This does n o t mean th a t  th e re  a re  always th re e  s te p s  of choosing, 
d e c id in g , and doing in  a l l  human a c tio n . Nor does i t  mean th a t  a l l  human 
a c tio n  tak es  p lace  in  th a t  o rd e r .
Of co u rse , we can and do make in fe re n c e s  about m o tives, but such 
in fe re n c e s  a re  n o t e m p ir ic a l.
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